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This thesis investigates the determinants and/or barriers to financial inclusion in 
Africa and the Middle East. Financial inclusion, which is defined as individuals and 
businesses having access to useful and affordable financial products and services 
that meet their needs and which are delivered in a responsible and sustainable way, 
remains a huge challenge facing developing regions of the world, including Africa 
and the Middle East. According to the Global Findex database, Africa and the 
Middle East remains behind the world in terms of the number of people who have 
access to financial services.  
This study therefore examines the African and the Middle East regions where 43% 
and 48% of the population are characterised as financially included while nearly 98 
million people are informally served. It is also estimated that approximately US $3 
billion is kept under mattresses in Sub Saharan Africa (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 
Singer, Ansar, & Hess, 2018). The main goal of financial inclusion is to improve 
the range, quality, and availability of financial services and products to the unserved, 
under-served, and financially excluded. Financial inclusion has recently attracted 
political attention and risen to prominence on a national, regional, and global 
agenda. To create a fully inclusive financial system, it is imperative to address the 
needs of the different users of the system in order to make financial products and 
services attractive. Therefore, identifying the drivers of financial products and 
services usage will enhance take-up of financial products, deepen the local financial 
industry, stimulate economic growth, and ultimately reduce poverty.  
A growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that financial sector 
development that focuses on financial inclusion provides the poor with the tools 
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needed to escape poverty. To ensure sustainable access to, and use of, appropriate 
financial services, factors that deprive people from accessing these financial 
services are addressed. However, the very important factors that explicitly put 
barriers to financial inclusion are often ignored in the literature.  This thesis 
therefore fills this important gap in the literature. It provides evidence on these 
factors by undertaking three major related studies, of which each uses variables in 
local contexts with global implications to determine why people are still excluded 
from the financial system. 
To elucidate the importance of and to determine the factors that hinder the 
development of financial inclusion, the author used data from the Global Findex 
database for 2011, 2014 and 2017. Data was also drawn from the World Bank’s 
world development indicators, world governance indicators, international 
telecommunication union, and research on ICT in Africa. These data sources aided 
the author to empirically examine the number of variables that are important for the 
studies in this thesis. The examination and analysis of the data and variables through 
various theoretical models provide important findings about the limited growth of 
financial inclusion in developing countries. 
In the first study, the thesis examines how political instability impacts on financial 
inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In the wake of the 
political instability that engulfed the region, policy makers looked outside the 
region for potential guidance in order to raise economic growth and, ultimately, to 
resolve the instability. It provided the premise of this study’s investigation of how 
the instability variable affects the delivery of economic targets including financial 
inclusion. The study asks the question: what is the effect of political instability on 
financial inclusion in the MENA region? Given that endogeneity and an 
iv 
 
asymmetrical relationship could create a bias in the empirical results between 
political instability and financial inclusion, the study tested the asymmetrical 
relationship between political instability and financial inclusion using the probit 
model with sample selection, and a multiplicative interaction test of asymmetric 
models. Having satisfied the question of endogeneity, the study finds that political 
instability positively correlates with lower degrees of financial inclusion, indicating 
that political instability can lead to financial exclusion. Further, the study finds that 
higher incomes and higher education are associated with higher degrees of financial 
inclusion.  A lack of documentation required by formal financial institutions proves 
to be a major barrier to financial inclusion in the region, considering that a greater 
number of the population are in the informal sector. In addition, inefficient 
mechanisms to determine real interest rates, corruption, oil reliance, unemployment, 
and religious tensions also negatively affect financial inclusion. Finally, the study 
proposes and calculates the political stability threshold value that will trigger 
financial inclusion to be -0.960 for the MENA region. 
In analysing how formal financial intermediation influences the use of informal 
financial intermediation and cash in Africa, the findings of the second study show 
that financial inclusion based on the use of formal financial intermediaries strongly 
correlates with the use of informal financial intermediaries. The study shows a 
strong complementary evidence between formal financial inclusion and informal 
financial intermediation but indicates a negative relationship with cash preference 
respectively. However, governments’ use of cash for poverty relief payments is 
found to negatively impact on financial inclusion. Informal financial intermediary 
groups building on long-standing traditions of revolving savings circles and credit 
associations that exist worldwide has contributed to the economic development of 
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poor people in the past. Their impact on education, healthcare, and social 
management is evidence that they have sustained poor people.  In Africa, these 
intermediaries are the backbone of societies especially in rural areas. Their presence 
has evolved into community cooperatives that has a wider impact on their socio-
economic wellbeing. ROSCAs and other forms of traditional institutions are 
significant devices for the poor in their attempts to diffuse the impact of shocks as 
well as building trust and social capital. 
The third study in this thesis considers whether electricity supply and enabling 
regulation matter in relation to the adoption and use of mobile money to gain 
financial inclusion in Africa.  The hypothesised research model tested context-
based constructs such as the availability of electricity, enabling regulation, and rural 
dwellings, with the technology acceptance model (TAM) to determine how these 
constructs affect peoples’ intentions and attitudes towards the adoption and 
continuous use of mobile money. Exploring these constructs using the structural 
equation modelling (SEM) technique, the empirical results suggest that the 
perceived availability of electricity is an important factor for the adoption and use 
of mobile money through the functionality of mobile phones. Perceived enabling 
regulation also shows a correlation with individuals’ intention to adopt and use 
mobile money. However, perceived rural dwelling is found to negatively correlate 
with individuals’ attitudes and intentions to adopt and use mobile money because 
of inadequate or limited network coverage in rural areas. As access to technology 
speeds up financial transactions, the costs for rendering financial services to the 
unbanked are reduced and provide better ways for the poor to manage their lives. 
This thesis has policy implications in that MENA governments can reduce and 
eliminate political instability through greater financial inclusion of their populations, 
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and by working towards the political stability threshold value of -0.960 to trigger 
financial inclusion. Because of the informal economies of Africa, mobile money 
adoption, which has defied the poverty nature of the people, can be the best 
alternative for financial inclusion. Governments can implement measures to 
disallow the use of cash for its poverty reduction payments by doing these through 
bank accounts and mobile money to increase financial inclusion among the poor.
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1.1 The concept of financial inclusion 
Financial inclusion has been extensively investigated both theoretically and 
empirically. Financial inclusion, which is defined conceptually as giving 
individuals and businesses access to useful and affordable financial products and 
services that meet their needs, and which are delivered in a responsible and 
sustainable way (Demirgüç-Kunt, Honohan, & Beck, 2008) has gained momentum 
from important sections of society including the G20 countries. Financial inclusion 
is important in finance as it promises to liberalise the formal provision of financial 
products and services by providing universal access to all people who are capable 
of using them. Financial inclusion is considered a development tool as in previous 
attempts through microcredit and microfinance. Given that financial empowerment 
leads to economic and social empowerment, policymakers and governments believe 
that financial inclusion will strengthen their countries’ investment climate and 
consequently lead to economic growth.  
Financial inclusion has generated considerable interest in recent times, with 
emphasis on some topical areas of direction for research. These areas include 
gender, income, education, financial literacy and mobile money adoption through 
network of agents and the ability to own a mobile phone. Studying financial 
inclusion and legal discrimination against women, Asli and Klapper Leora (2013) 
analyse gender differences in the use of financial services using individual-level 
data from 98 developing countries.  Highlighting the existence of significant gender 
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gaps in ownership of accounts and usage of savings and credit products, they find 
that legal discrimination against women and gender norms may explain some of the 
cross-country variation in access to finance for women. For instance, legal 
restrictions that prevent women from becoming heads of households, working, 
choosing where to live, and receiving inheritances, mean that women, compared to 
men, are less likely to own an account as well as to save and borrow. They contend 
that the level of violence against women and the incidence of early marriage for 
women, help to explain the variation in the use of financial services between men 
and women (Asli & Klapper Leora, 2013). Ghosh and Vinod (2017) findings 
support the above. Specifically, they examine whether gender matters for financial 
inclusion and if so, what are the possible factors that influence this relationship. 
Using within-country data, their findings suggest a significant gender disparity in 
both access to, and the use of, financial services. On average, female-headed 
households are 8% less likely to access formal finance and 6% are more likely to 
access informal finance as compared to households that are headed by males.  
Allen, Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Peria (2016) in their study of the foundations 
of financial inclusion find that enabling environments such as lower account costs 
and greater proximity to financial intermediaries leads to greater ownership and use 
of financial accounts.  They add that policies such as requiring banks to offer basic 
or low-fee accounts, being exempt from arduous documentation requirements, 
allowing correspondent banking, and using bank accounts to make government 
payments, could be effective among those most likely to be excluded from the 
financial system. Using the World Bank's Global Findex database on 37 African 
countries to study the determinants of financial inclusion, Zins and Weill (2016) 
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find that higher income, higher education, higher age brackets and being male are 
the factors that determine financial inclusion or use of mobile money.  
Bruhn and Love (2014) provide evidence on the impact of access to finance on 
poverty, focusing on underserved low-income clients and those located in areas 
with lower pre-existing bank penetration. They find a sizeable effect of access to 
finance on labour market activity and income levels, drawing the implication that 
working individuals who have access to financial services reduce their poverty 
levels compared to those without access. Studying financial inclusion, poverty, and 
the role of relative income, Li (2018) argues that the effect of income comparisons 
on credit applications can be explained by either a “keeping up with the Joneses” 
effect, in which the poor seek financing for costly consumption so as to emulate the 
consumption patterns of the wealthy. This either keeps the poor in persistent 
poverty, or produces a “tunnel” effect, in which the poor are inspired by the 
economic success of the wealthy and use credit for investment. The author contends 
that poor households can use finance to escape poverty when they keep to the 
“tunnel” effect.  
In investigating how financial literacy affects financial inclusion at the cross-
country level, Grohmann, Klühs, and Menkhoff (2018) show that a higher degree 
of financial literacy has a clear beneficial effect on financial inclusion. They also 
find that financial infrastructure and financial literacy are mainly substitutes in 
terms of access to finance; however, the effect of higher financial literacy 
strengthens the effect of more financial depth. Berry, Karlan, and Pradhan (2018) 
looked at how financial education affects the youth in Ghana using the randomised 
control trials. They find that after nine months, the program had a positive impact 
on self-reported savings at school relative to the control group, but there were no 
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statistically significant increases in aggregate savings nor in hypothesised 
mechanisms such as attitudes, preferences, or knowledge.  
Recent developments in the financial system call for a number of other topical 
issues to be examined as their impact on financial inclusion is important. For 
instance, little is heard about how political instability affects financial inclusion 
especially in the wake of the political instability in the MENA region, or the impact 
of formal financial intermediation on the use of informal financial intermediaries 
and cash preference in this financial inclusion “revolution”. Other issues include 
how electricity supply, enabling regulation, and costs of services can affect the 
adoption and continuous use of mobile money for financial inclusion. These issues 
have been largely ignored and represent a gap in the financial inclusion literature. 
This thesis fills the gap by examining how the financial inclusion agenda can move 
forward when these issues are addressed. The first chapter of the thesis looks at the 
low levels of financial inclusion in the MENA region, taking into account the 
political situation, oil reliance, unemployment, and corruption. The second chapter 
then considers whether the economic infrastructure of African countries with 
relatively inadequate financial infrastructure serve as conduits for informal 
financing. Finally, the third chapter examines how factors such as the availability 
of electricity, income disparities, and the cost of mobile money services, enabling 
regulation, and rural dwelling can affect attitudes and intentions to adopt and use 
mobile money in Africa. These investigations are all geared towards the universal 
evidence that financial inclusion will lead to poverty reduction and empower people 
to improve their standards of living.  
Levine (2005) posits that theory and evidence in the finance literature imply that better 
developed financial systems ease the external financing constraints faced by firms, and that 
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having access to finance where individuals encounter income distribution works to reduce 
poverty and to contribute to economic development. Levine (2005) thesis considers the 
impact of financial intermediation and its effects on the growth models, where financial 
deepening variables centre on key factors that are necessary conduits for economic growth 
and development through financial development. These key factors include the production 
of ex ante information about possible investments and the subsequent allocation of 
resources in the form of capital. Other key factors include the monitoring of these 
investments after capital allocation, and exertion of a form of corporate governance; the 
facilitation of trading, diversification, and management of risk; mobilisation and pooling 
of savings; and finally, a move to ease the exchange of goods and services for individuals 
and businesses. The effects of these functions at the microeconomics level saw the 
introduction of microcredit programmes for poverty alleviation in most developing 
economies. This was later transformed into micro banks called microfinance institutions 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2007).  
Microfinance was then widely adopted as a panacea to effectively push the inclusive 
growth agenda, where access to finance would drive the economic and social needs of the 
poor at the bottom of the pyramid (Nissanke, 2001). The implementation and monitoring 
of the microfinance agenda and the production of impact assessment research led 
development experts in conjunction with multi-lateral corporations such as the World Bank, 
the IMF and others to the broadening of the microfinance agenda into what is now termed 
financial inclusion (Robinson, 2001). In recognition of the fact that diversification of 
financial products and services is important for broad base inclusive growth1 , financial 
services, under financial inclusion, are now diversified into savings, credit, payments, 
insurance and remittances. In parallel, financial service providers to the poor have 
expanded from credit-only microfinance institutions (MFIs) to deposit-taking MFIs, 
                                                          
1 Early development experts in the 1970s and 1980s hypothesise that microcredit was the only 
financial service required by the poor. This according to them will eliminate poverty, as more 
income is available for consumption and creation of microenterprises to increase their wealth. 
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commercial banks, cooperatives, telecom companies, payment companies, insurance 
companies, and others. The legal forms of financial service providers and regulatory 
frameworks have also been diversified. Financial infrastructure service providers and 
investors are also part of the stakeholders. Consequently, the original vision of 
microfinance has now been extended with at least five “P’s” under financial 
inclusion: 
 New products beyond the original enterprise credit, to encompass all 
forms of credit, savings, insurance, and payments 
 New populations, both upmarket and downmarket of the populations 
traditionally reached by microfinance, and including new groups largely ignored 
by microfinance, such as persons with disabilities and the elderly 
 New platforms, using digital technologies to connect with people at more 
times and places 
 New providers, not just traditional microfinance institutions, but a range 
of private and not-for-profit providers, with governments injecting some helpful 
impetus through G2P transfers 
 All facilitated by new policies. 
 To make financial inclusion strategies workable, and to ensure that both rich and 
poor households have access to financial services, policy frameworks have been 
initiated by governments and regulators of central banks in many parts of the world. 
For instance, the Community Reinvestment Act (1997) of the United States of 
America requires banks to offer credit in all catchment areas and prohibits them 
from targeting only the rich neighbourhoods. Britain constituted the Financial 
Inclusion Task Force (FITF) in 2005 in order to monitor the development of 
financial inclusion. Another example worth mentioning is the German Bankers 
Association voluntary code (1996), which sought to provide an “everyman” current 
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banking account that facilitates basic banking transactions. The introduction of 
‘Mzansi’, a low-cost bank account, in 2004 by the South African Banking 
Association for financially excluded people is also notable. The United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) project, building inclusive financial sectors 
for development, broadly described the main goals of inclusive finance as access to 
a range of financial services (savings, credit, insurance, remittance and payment 
services) at a reasonable cost to all households and businesses (United Nations 
Capital Development Fund, 2006).  This was a major international initiative to 
involve all nations of the world to focus on financial inclusion as a strategy to 
eliminate social and financial exclusion among individuals, households, and 
businesses. Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also focussed on the issue of financial 
inclusion through policy prescriptions and guidelines.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, and Van Oudheusden (2015) argue that access to 
savings, credit, insurance, and payments instruments effectively begins with the 
existence of a bank account by individuals. They urge people to understand the 
importance of access to finance to support their socio-economic and cultural lives. 
This contrasts the traditional supply-led channel where microcredit was supplied to 
people based on their poverty situations. Financial inclusion mechanisms or 
strategies are designed to include all people who can and are willing to use financial 
services by making the costs affordable and using infrastructure and technology to 
underscore barriers such as distance to service points. Development finance 
literature posits that access to affordable financial products and services could 
effectively distribute income to the poor and eliminate inequality, as the distributive 
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income contributes to economic growth and the creation of wealth (Dabla-Norris, 
Ji, Townsend, & Unsal, 2015).  
Accordingly, financial inclusion has several merits. It facilitates the efficient 
allocation of productive resources that can potentially reduce the cost of capital. It 
enhances efficiency and welfare by providing avenues for secure and safe financial 
services best practices. It provides an avenue for the protection of clients through 
information sharing under the guidance of a regulator. It strengthens the availability 
of economic resources by prompting the financial system of a country to be efficient 
and effective. It equips people with the tools needed to access financial services by 
encouraging choices and competition in the financial system. In sum, it contributes 
towards the progress of the economy in a consistent manner. Financial inclusion 
can help reduce the growth of informal sources of credit such as moneylenders, 
which are often found to be exploitative. It also helps in creating an avenue for the 
government’s revenue mobilisation by identifying the tax obligations of both 
individuals and enterprises.  
In spite of the numerous benefits that society ought to get from financial inclusion, 
there are still people who are excluded from financial services globally. According 
to the latest World Bank estimates (Demirgüç-Kunt & Singer, 2017), there are 
about 1.7 billion people in the world who still do not have a bank account. Of these 
numbers, the majority come from developing countries. Figure 1.1, which shows 
the levels of financial inclusion among individual characteristics, is taken from the 




Figure 1.1 Financial inclusion among the regions of the World 
 
Clearly, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab World show lower levels of financial 
inclusion in the world. What or who then determines financial inclusion? 
Researchers and development experts argue that lack of access to finance can be 
voluntary or involuntary. In their thesis entitled Banking services for everyone? 
Barriers to bank access and use around the world, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Martinez Peria (2008) contend that involuntary exclusion can be attributed to high 
risk clients and poor project quality, as well as high prices of financial services and 
discrimination. In the case of voluntary exclusion, people may not use financial 
services because of ethical or religious grounds, which are forms of self-exclusion 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Honohan, 2008).  
Kempson and Jones (2000) argue that barriers to financial inclusion can be grouped 
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availability of, or difficulty in securing, appropriate services) as well as risk 
assessment and credit scoring. The second barrier relates to the prices of financial 
products and services (such as charges and commissions) which makes services 
unaffordable especially to low income people.  The third is condition barriers that 
is conditions attached to certain financial products, such as deposit or savings 
balance level requirements which can be difficult and inappropriate for some people. 
Fourthly, there are also marketing barriers in the form of target market (how 
products are promoted, their image or mode of delivery) and segmentation. Finally, 
there is self-imposition barriers – psychological states of people relating to 
experiences about using financial services (Kempson & Jones, 2000).  An 
additional barrier is illiteracy, which prevents a substantial number of people from 
taking recourse in banking services, especially in developing nations (Cole, 
Sampson, & Zia, 2011; Xu & Zia, 2012).  
Barriers to inclusion occur in most cases as a direct discrimination by mainstream 
banking institutions, making their products more expensive and out of reach or less 
attractive to certain categories of people (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 
2008). The physical distance of bank branches in relation to people’s settlements 
also poses serious challenges to accessing financial services. Expenses incurred in 
travelling to a bank branch to deposit an even lesser amount is uneconomical. This 
is particularly common among African nations where people have to travel several 
kilometres to transact business with a formal financial institution (Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Klapper, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, Ansar, & Hess, 2018; King, 
2012). Anti-money laundering rules that have been tightened because of the 
upsurge in terrorist activities mean that people find it difficult to access financial 
services. Documentation and identity issues, which have become more pronounced 
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in the face of the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirement, also poses problems 
to the principle of free access for all (Anderloni & Carluccio, 2007; Kempson & 
Jones, 2000).  
In considering the determinants of financial inclusion, it is important to understand 
why people may not have access to financial services, since exclusion from these 
services equally brings about social exclusion, which is dangerous for society 
(Adato, Carter, & May, 2006). The literature on barriers to, or determinants of, 
financial inclusion pay more attention to the involuntary aspect than the voluntary. 
It has been argued that those who are voluntarily excluded do not need any further 
policy interventions to usher them into the financial system (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Honohan, 2008). Voluntary exclusion due to idiosyncratic religious restrictions, 
especially the Muslim religious beliefs that restrict individuals from accessing 
interest based financial services, are worth of addressing. Finally, the use of 
technology to address barriers to financial inclusion is equally critical especially in 
regions where financial exclusion is endemic.   
1.2 My area of focus 
This thesis takes a critical look into why the lack of financial access is still pervasive 
in the MENA and Africa regions and therefore contributes to the literature on 
determinants of financial inclusion.  It examines both the voluntary and involuntary 
actions and inactions of players in the financial system to inform policy decisions 
to promote broader financial inclusion. This thesis uses variables and proxies that 
explain these two aspects of financial inclusion determinants.  It provides three 
studies on financial inclusion with a primary focus on Africa and the Middle East. 
The three essays demonstrate a careful reconsideration of constraints both at the 
individual and country levels on financial inclusion. The essays present a structured, 
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critical, empirical, and policy discourse of analysis of the factors that hinder people 
at the micro and macro levels. This is done not as a critique, but as a form of creating 
awareness to policy makers and users of financial services to understand how these 
factors affect them in their quest to becoming financially included.  
1.2.1 Political instability and financial inclusion 
The first essay (chapter two) provides evidence on the impact of political instability 
on financial inclusion in the MENA region. In the wake of the region’s recent 
political instability, the central question posed is: What is the effect of political 
instability on financial inclusion in the MENA region? This question is answered 
using data for 2011, 2014, and 2017 from the Global Findex database. The study 
also tests the asymmetric relationship between political instability and financial 
inclusion. It proposes and tests a political stability threshold model that may trigger 
financial inclusion. Considering the politically unstable climate in the MENA 
region in recent times, policy makers are in need of policy direction in the form of 
political stability indicators that can trigger and promote financial inclusion as an 
alternative for faster economic growth. In addition, the study empirically explores 
the barriers to financial inclusion from the Global Findex database by critically 
examining these barriers in the context of the MENA region and selected countries 
of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The findings of the study are 
robust and critical to the MENA region and other developing areas. 
1.2.2 Informal financial intermediation and financial inclusion  
Informal financial intermediation is also important both for financial inclusion and 
for economic growth. Mohieldin (2014) argues that financial cooperatives that are 
based on the notion of social and economic cooperation, mostly in rural 
communities, overcome barriers in the marketplace by grouping together. Serving 
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people who live on less than $2 a day (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013; Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2018), these financial cooperatives are currently one of the largest 
providers of financial intermediation to the poor. Mohieldin (2014) emphasises that 
overcoming their governance challenges will see them live up to their full potential, 
as 78 million people globally are served through these cooperatives. Given this, the 
third chapter critically examines the impact of formal financial inclusion on 
informal financial intermediation and cash preference, with a focus on Africa. The 
paper discusses the proposition that the use of formal financial intermediation 
reduces the use of cash and informal financial intermediaries in a developing world 
setting, using Africa as a case study. The paper explores this evidence by examining 
the traditional mechanisms that poor people use to meet their financial needs in the 
wake of global leadership attempts to expand formal financial inclusion. The paper 
further examines the rationale behind governments’ use of cash to pay poverty 
alleviation beneficiaries when formal financial inclusion is a strong policy agenda. 
The findings of the study support the fact that cooperatives still play important roles 
in the financial systems of Africa. However, with different sets of rules and 
regulations, it becomes difficult for harmonisation and standardisation as different 
countries operate these cooperatives differently. Harmonisation and standardisation 
will ultimately lead to broader financial inclusion as informal financial 
intermediation positively correlates with formal financial inclusion.    
1.2.3 Mobile money adoption and financial inclusion 
There is a critical role for technology in expanding financial inclusion. Mobile 
money, electronic payments, and related technologies such as borrower 
identification using biometric data are revolutionising access to finance. 
Technological innovations significantly lower the cost of accessing financial 
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services, while minimising the impact of geographical isolation (Mohieldin, 2014). 
However, not all these benefits can be accrued if electricity (energy) costs are high. 
Mobile money or banking uses mobile phone devices and so requires electricity for 
its functionality. The upshot of this is that if people cannot be connected to the 
national grid because of their geographical distances, then access to mobile 
technology for mobile money will be undermined. This eventually leads to further 
financial exclusion. The fourth chapter explores this issue further by incorporating 
a number of constructs (through moderations and modifications in order to 
understand the local contexts) to drive home the factors that determine the adoption 
and continuous use of mobile money in Africa. The study provides preliminary 
results on factors that determine the adoption and use of mobile money in Africa, 
using data from Research ICT Africa, International Telecommunication Union, and 
the World Bank.  The hypothesised research model tests the context-based 
constructs such as the availability of electricity, enabling regulation, rural dwellings, 
and the costs structure of mobile money with the technology acceptance model 
(TAM) to determine how these constructs affect peoples’ intentions and attitudes 
towards the adoption and continuous use of mobile money.  Exploring these 
constructs using the structural equation modelling (SEM) technique, the empirical 
results give interesting outcomes that are necessary for effective policy 
interventions in this current mobile money revolution.  
The thesis is organised as follows: chapter one introduces the concept of financial 
inclusion and discussed how the three topics are linked together. Chapter two then 
looks at how political instability affects financial inclusion in the MENA region, 
while chapter three consider the rationale behind the use of informal financial 
intermediation and cash preference in the wake of the global financial inclusion 
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agenda in Africa. Chapter four completes the determinants of financial inclusion in 
Africa and the Middle East by examining how electricity supply, income, rural 
dwelling and enabling regulation affects the intentions and attitudes of individuals 
in the adoption and use of mobile money for financial inclusion in SSA. The fifth 
chapter then summarizes the main findings of the three chapters and discuss the 
contribution of the thesis to literature and policy discourse. Finally, the thesis 
provides an overview of the regulatory framework in Africa, under the topic: The 
enabling regulation for financial inclusion in Africa – issues and practices in chapter 
five. The brief critically examines the practices of regulatory bodies especially the 
Central Banks by uncovering the issues and challenges they face and suggest ways 
that they can deal with the challenges in order to embrace full scale financial 





Political instability and financial inclusion 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial inclusion was adopted by the G20 as a policy goal in 2010 (GPFI, n.d.). 
The G20 seeks to provide poor people with ‘effective’ access to credit, savings, 
payments and insurance services through formal financial institutions (Demirguc-
Kunt & Klapper, 2013) with the expected benefits of increased national growth, 
efficiency and welfare. To this end, the World Bank has encouraged financial 
inclusion as an economic emancipation tool for the poor. The starting point of 
financial inclusion is owning an account in a formal financial institution, as a 
gateway for other financial services such as savings, borrowing or purchasing an 
insurance policy. The benefits derived from financial inclusion include wealth 
creation, consumption smoothing, and increased entrepreneurship productivity 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Dupas, Green, Keats, & Robinson, 2012); investment 
in education for future employability (Bruhn & Love, 2014; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Klapper, 2013); female empowerment (Swamy, 2014); and financial stability (Han 
& Melecky, 2013). However, many individuals are still not financially included 
(Cole et al., 2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018; Osei-Assibey, 2009). The question 
is why are individuals not financially included despite the many potential benefits 
available to them? 
The literature highlights that political instability and other reasons2 contribute to the 
differences in financial and economic development in the world (Cole, 2009; 
                                                          
2 Other reasons include weak institutional and regulatory frameworks, lack of effective interest 
rates, market imperfections, underdeveloped financial infrastructure etc. (See Beck et al., 2008, 
Beck & De La Torre, 2007). 
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Honohan, 2008; Roe & Siegel, 2011). For example, Roe and Siegel (2011), who 
study political instability and its effects on financial development and economic 
inequality, report that political instability leads to financial backwardness. The data 
used by Roe and Siegel (2011) is for the period 1965-2003 and does not include the 
recent waves of political instability that have erupted in the MENA countries since 
2011. Political instability involves political protest and anti-government activities 
that, if persisting for long periods, tend to disrupt productive activities and 
consequently erode economic gains.  
The research examines how political instability affects people’s ability to own 
accounts, save money, and access credit in formal financial institutions in MENA, 
and in selected Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. As a result, a 
political stability value that can trigger financial inclusion is proposed. Olson (2008) 
argues that governments become easy prey for interest groups the longer they 
remain in office. Following Olson (2008), the author argues that people in the 
MENA region may have been financially excluded partly because the regimes in 
these countries have held power for long periods. In such situations, the regimes 
assume authoritative power, where only those within the “inner circles of power” 
control both the resources of the nation and the institutions and policies that regulate 
economic sectors. The argument is that these policies discourage internal and 
external investment institutions in making funds available for lending to clients. 
Consequently, the financial sector becomes underfunded and underdeveloped 
because interest groups lobby governments to make policies that benefit only a few 
(Dang, So, & Yan, 2017) and weaken institutional capacities (such as regulatory 
frameworks). The persistence of such leads to weakening financial systems and 
growing popular disaffection. Eventually, anti-government activities erupt.  
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the link 
between political instability and financial inclusion in the MENA region and 
selected OIC countries, using the Global Findex data. Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, 
Singer, and Van Oudheusden (2015) report on the Global Financial Development 
and indicate that poverty and youth unemployment in the MENA region is 
increasing partly due to inadequate financial intermediation, which leads to lower 
degrees of financial inclusion.  
The author investigates whether political instability in the region leads to lowered 
degrees of financial inclusion using the 2011 to 2017 Global Findex data. The 
author uses the multiplicative interaction test of asymmetric model proposed by 
Clark, Gilligan, and Golder (2006) and lagged variables to overcome the asymmetry 
and endogeneity problems identified in the study. To provide a deeper 
understanding of financial inclusion in the sample countries, the study also 
examines the individual characteristics that determine financial inclusion and 
identifies the barriers individuals face in their quest to become financially included. 
The author further proposes and tests a threshold model following Balke and Fomby 
(1997) by determining a minimum political stability threshold value necessary to 
trigger and promote financial inclusion in the MENA region. The results indicate 
that political instability is positively associated with lower degrees of financial 
inclusion indicators, formal accounts, formal savings, and formal credit. Lack of 
efficient mechanisms to determine interest rates is also found to impede the 
development of the financial sector. Finally, historical antecedents in land tenure 
systems (Kuran, 2008) that effectively deny legal ownership rights to property 
owners has affected the level of engagement in access to finance, where banks 
require documentary proof of legal ownership of properties as collateral.  
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 
3 provides the details regarding the data, variables and method used. Section 4 
reports the results. Section 5 discusses the results and the robustness test. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 2.2 Literature review  
2.2.1 Effects of political instability on financial development 
Political instability refers to the incidence of political violence in society, such as 
demonstrations, assassinations, and acts of terrorism and anti-government activities. 
Alesina, Özler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) define political instability as the 
propensity for a change in executive power through constitutional or 
unconstitutional means. They contend that political instability results in lower 
economic growth. However, Easterly (2007) finds that low economic growth could 
also lead to political instability. In other words, both political instability and lower 
economic growth, measured by inequality and other indicators could have reverse 
causality (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002; Roe & Siegel, 2011). 
In his theory of institutional sclerosis, Olson (2008) argues that political stability 
offers opportunities for special interest groups or institutions to become corrupt 
over time, as they tend to practise rent seeking. This slows the ability of 
governments to reform as they feed on the wealth of society and fail to adapt to 
competitive markets. Resistance to change can lead to instability, as people become 
impatient for political and institutional change. In a stable environment, 
governments build relationships with banks by financing and funding them. This 
leads to less risk taking and eventually less stability in the banking system when 
these governments become unstable (Jou, Chen, & Tsai, 2017).  
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A number of empirical studies focus on political instability and its relationship with 
economic growth and development. To demonstrate how political capital influences 
the impact of bank lending on innovation in different political environments, 
Cumming, Rui, and Wu (2016) study the impact of the interaction between political 
instability and loans on innovation investment and find that political instability 
negatively affects the role of loan capital on innovation investment. Nel (2003) 
studies income inequality, economic growth, and political instability in Sub-
Saharan Africa. He reports that political instability may indirectly lower growth 
prospects because although high levels of inequality do not necessarily determine 
political instability, the overall perception of inequality has a negative effect on 
potential investors. Roe and Siegel (2011) find that political instability leads to 
weak and lower financial development. Alesina et al. (1996) look at political 
instability and economic growth globally. They find significant low economic 
growth in countries that exhibit a high propensity for government collapse. They 
add that with some caveats, lower economic growth is likely to endanger a 
government and result in a coup d’etat. Using a four-equation model to investigate 
the effects of political instability on savings in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gyimah 
Brempong and Traynor (1996) find that political instability has a detrimental impact 
on the savings rate both directly and indirectly through a reduction in investment 
and growth. Easterly and Levine (1997) increase the number of economic growth 
variables in their study of Africa’s tragic growth failure. They conclude that low 
growth and low income is associated with low schooling, political instability, 
underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high 
government deficits, and inadequate infrastructure. They contend that ethnic 
diversity explains cross-country differences in public policy and political stability. 
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This lends support to notions that interest group polarisation leads to rent seeking 
behaviour and reduces the consensus for public goods, limiting long-run growth. 
Allen et al. (2016) identify country characteristics that positively influence financial 
inclusion, such as high-quality institutions, efficient legal rules, strong contract 
enforcement, and political stability. 
2.2.2 Degrees of financial inclusion 
Account ownership is a key measure of financial inclusion because essentially all 
formal financial activities begin with account ownership (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2015). The number of adults who own formal accounts increases annually. Reports 
from the Global Findex database (2014) indicate that the number of individuals who 
own accounts in formal financial institutions has increased at least 10% from 2011 
to 2014. Figure 1 reports the percentage of individuals who own accounts, savings, 
or who have reported borrowing money from a formal financial institution.  
 
Figure 2.1 Degrees of Financial Inclusion Indicators in the World: The 

























From Figure 2.1, it is clear that the MENA region lags behind the rest of the world 
in terms of access to account ownership, savings and credit. Mohieldin, Iqbal, 
Rostom, and Fu (2011) report that about 700 million of the world’s poor live in 
predominantly Muslim-populated countries.  
Barriers to financial services can be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary barriers to 
the use of formal financial services are usually characterised by cultural and 
religious reasons or in circumstances when individuals do not need the services 
(Allen et al., 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). The 
cultural and religious settings in the MENA region are intertwined with politics and 
the economy being controlled by the state, leaving little room for private 
intervention (Dalacoura, 2012). With respect to involuntary barriers or exclusion, 
problems arise because of high risks involving female discrimination, 
documentation issues, lack of information, weak contract enforcement, product 
features, and price barriers due to market imperfections.  
Despite the economic growth and increase in the per capita household income in 
MENA, the 2011 “Arab Spring” events reveal that good economic growth had not 
translated into shared prosperity and better livelihoods for the majority. Expanding 
access to financial services could mobilise greater household savings and enable 
more people to invest in themselves and their families (Triki & Faye, 2013). 
2.3 Development of Hypothesis 
The literature points out that political instability, insufficient education, poverty, 
and high costs of financial services contribute to lower growth prospects in 
countries that have a high propensity for regime collapse. It reveals that instability 
negatively correlates with investments and subsequently lower savings rates. 
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Overall, political instability affects financial development. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2015) indicate that the MENA region has lower levels of financial inclusion 
indicators i.e., formal account ownership, formal savings accounts, and formal 
credit accounts.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no studies that link political instability and 
financial inclusion in the MENA region have been undertaken. Some studies 
examine political instability, financial development and economic growth (Alesina 
et al., 1996; Roe & Siegel, 2011) using different data, and are not specifically 
focussed on the MENA region. The use of recent Global Findex data to explore 
how political instability in MENA affects the degrees of financial inclusion has only 
started to gain momentum. From the literature the author derives the following: as 
increases in perception on the propensity for a change in executive power rises, the 
confidence citizens have in the executive reduces. Moreover, if this perception 
persists, people may take to the streets in mass protest and may use radical 
approaches such as violence and suicide bombings to express their displeasure with 
the executive power. In such situations, the economic means of the people become 
uncertain as property rights and individual liberties are less likely to be protected. 
Consequently, investments in the financial sector are curtailed as less people have 
access to financial services.  
Exploring the relationship between political instability and financial inclusion is 
therefore important so as to understand the effects that are associated with political 
instability in a region that is reported to have rising levels of poverty and youth 
unemployment. The first hypothesis is  
𝐻1: Political instability negatively affects financial inclusion. 
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The issue of low financial inclusion is further explored by examining individual 
characteristics that affect people’s ability to be financially included. This deepens 
understandings of financial inclusion by empirically testing the perceived reported 
barriers to financial inclusion by the World Bank. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al. (2015) reports that 59% of people who do not have accounts in formal financial 
institutions cite a lack of money as the main reason. Other reasons that limit 
accounts ownership include the cost of financial services (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Martinez Peria, 2008), mistrust of financial institutions (Karlan, Ratan, & 
Zinman, 2014) and failure to possess necessary documentation such as 
identification cards, wage slips, birth certificates and utility bills (Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2015). For the Muslim variable, Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Randall (2014) 
study 64 economies by analysing the impact of being a Muslim and the uptake of 
an account. They find that being a Muslim negatively affects account ownership 
significantly. The Global Findex database captures all these variables as 
determinants of financial inclusion. 
The general understanding is that these barriers to financial inclusion are 
widespread because of the economic and political situation in the region. The author 
argues that the perceived barriers are a consequence of political instability that 
creates lower economic growth prospects which invariably underpins the economic 
and social variables that determine financial inclusion. This leads to individuals’ 
inability to pay for financial services because of the high costs and poverty. It may 
also lead to inadequate possession of the necessary documents for opening new 
accounts and accessing bank credit because of a general lack of political will 
towards institutional independence to reverse the arbitrary taxation and outright 
expropriation of properties (land ownership) that threatened peoples’ livelihood. 
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Finally, people will not trust financial institutions because property and legal rights 
do not function well and as such, principal-agency problems are likely to remain 
unresolved. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is: 
𝐻2: Individual levels barriers can lead to lower levels of financial inclusion  
2.4 Data and Method  
2.4.1 Data 
The author obtained data for this study from the Global Findex database, which has 
data for 2011, 2014, and 2017 drawn from surveys conducted by the World Bank 
through Gallup Inc. The surveys cover more than 150,000 respondents from more 
than 143 countries and 140 languages, thus providing a randomly selected and 
nationally representative sample of at least 1000 individuals in each economy. The 
data contains cross-sectional information, which allows for all income levels in both 
developed and developing economies to participate. Respondents are adults, aged 
15 years and above who shared their individual level experiences of banking and 
personal financial behaviours. These include variables covering demographic data 
(age, gender, income, and education), account penetration (accounts, savings and 
credit) and barriers to financial inclusion. In total, 33,284 individuals from 41 
countries3, provide data that is included in the observations. However, the author 
acknowledges that the sample is unbalanced with missing data for eight countries4. 
                                                          
3 The sample includes the following 26 countries from the MENA Region: Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. 
In addition 15 countries from the Organisation of Islamic cooperation (OIC) were included: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Uganda. 
4 The missing data is as follows: 2011 missing data for Libya; 2014 missing data for Comoros, 
Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Syria; 2017 missing data for Comoros, Djibouti, 
Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. 
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Following the proxies for financial inclusion established in the literature, the author 
focuses on three main measures.   
(i) Formal account measures whether an individual has an account 
either at a formal financial institution (bank, MFI, credit union) or 
through a mobile money provider.  
(ii) Formal saving denotes that the individual saved money using an 
account at a formal financial institution in the past 12 months.  
(iii)Formal credit refers to the individual having borrowed money from 
a formal financial institution in the past 12 months. 
The higher the number of individuals who responded “yes” to the questionnaire, the 
higher the degree of financial inclusion in a given economy. In addition, the Gallup 
Inc. survey gathered data on the reasons why individuals did not have a formal bank 
account. Specifically, their question sought to explore the barriers to financial 
inclusion5 by asking: “Please tell me whether each of the following is a reason why 
you, personally, DO NOT have an account at a bank, credit union or other financial 
institution”.  
To estimate the political instability variable, the author obtained data from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). 
The WGI summarises the views of respondents such as enterprises, citizens and 
experts in industrial and developing countries. The WGI posits political stability 
and the absence of violence and terrorism as a variable that measures perceptions 
of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, 
including terrorism. The author included this variable to determine whether the 
                                                          
5 More information can be obtained from the Global Findex Database at 
http://www.worldbank.org/globalfindex    
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lower degrees of financial inclusion in the MENA region is partly emanating from 
its political climate.  
2.4.2 Method  
2.4.2.1 Econometric Model  
In order to evaluate and analyse the relationship between political instability and 
financial inclusion in MENA, the author performs probit estimations with sample 
selection following Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). The assumption that a 




= 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝛽  +  𝑍1𝑖𝑗𝛿   +  µ1𝑖𝑗                                                              (2.1)                                                                                                                          
where  𝑦∗
1𝑖𝑗
 is a vector of the outcome variable defined as whether the individual 
is financially included or not, that is assumed to be latent, i and j denotes individual 
and country respectively, β and δ are vectors of coefficients, 𝑋1 is a matrix of 
covariates indexing country level variables, 𝑍1  is a vector of individual level 
characteristics, with µ1 as the error term. The financial inclusion variable therefore 
assumes a binary function such that: 
𝑦1𝑖𝑗= α = (𝑦
∗
1𝑖𝑗
 > 0)                                                                          (2.2)                                                                           
where α is an indicator variable of whether the specific condition is met, so that 
 
α = 1 if  𝑦∗
1𝑖𝑗
 > 0 
       0 if 𝑦∗
1𝑖𝑗
 ≤ 0                                                                                 (2.3)                                                                                                    
 
For observations that depend on 𝑦∗
1𝑖𝑗
, running a selection model gives us 
            
𝑦∗
2𝑖𝑗
= ( 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝛽  +  𝑍2𝑖𝑗𝛿   +  µ2𝑖𝑗 > 0)                                                   (2.4)                                                                                           
where       µ1𝑖𝑗 ∼ N(0, 1)  
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                 µ2𝑖𝑗∼ N(0, 1)   
 
If  µ1𝑖𝑗   and  µ2𝑖𝑗  are correlated, i.e. Corr (µ1𝑖𝑗, µ2𝑖𝑗 ) ≠ 0, then the presence of 
 𝑦1𝑖𝑗depends on structural factors, which affect the outcome variable 𝑦
∗
1𝑖𝑗
. 𝑋2𝑖𝑗 and 
𝑍21𝑗 are vectors that affect the selection process. The probability of an outcome is 
assumed to be determined by the probit cumulative distribution function. 
2.4.2.2 Empirical Specification 
 
The probit estimation for determining the relationship between political instability 
and degree of financial inclusion is specified as follows: 




𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
𝑛=3
𝑖=1   + 𝑖𝑗                                        (2.5)                                                                                  
where 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑗  is the financial inclusion variable for individuals i in a country j. The  
𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑗 measures three proxies, which includes Formal Account, Formal Savings and 
Formal Credit, which takes the value 1 if a respondent has either an account in a 
formal financial institution, saved in a formal financial institution in the past 12 
months, and/or borrowed from a formal financial institution in the past 12 months, 
respectively or 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 is the political instability variable in a 
country j. The 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 variable measures public perceptions of the likelihood 
of an unstable government caused by politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism. The WGI measure for political stability and absence of violence and 
terrorism ranges from +2.5, as being a politically stable country to -2.5 as being 
politically unstable. 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑗 is the socio-religious and cultural variable that defines 
a country to be Islam if at least 50% of the population are Muslims.  
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The individual characteristics are as follows; 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the individual is a female and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 has two measures, one with 
the number of years (Age) and the other is age squared(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗
2 ). The latter measure 
is used to control for a possible nonlinear relation between age and financial 
inclusion in line with other studies (Allen et al., 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). 
In relation to 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 , the author uses four dummy variables (poorest 20%, 
second 20%, third 20% and fourth 20%). The fifth is the omitted dummy variable 
and represents the richest quintile. The four dummy variables take the value 1 if 
individuals report their income in the first 20% income quintile, second 20% 
income quintile and so on or 0 otherwise. Concerning 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 , the author uses 
two dummy variables: Primary and Secondary education, with Tertiary education 
as the omitted variable. The choice of the education variable is in line with political 
stability theory that states that where citizens are highly educated, they are less 
likely to engage in protests, coup d’état or extreme anti-government activities 
(Hibbs, 1973). The tertiary educated group represents the elite in society, who have 
investments and economic means which they will want to protect rather than engage 
in anti-government activities. Table 2.1 sets out the variables used in the study and 
their descriptions. 
The author postulates that political instability outcomes such as income inequality, 
lack of investments in the economy to create wealth, employment, and smooth 
consumption could affect individual characteristics of the financially excluded. 
Individuals who report idiosyncratic reasons as barriers to financial inclusion may 
do so because of the political environment that affects them directly or indirectly. 
In other words, reported barriers leading to financial exclusion is a function of 
instability within national governance, broad economic indicators, and socio-
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cultural variables. The author estimates the barriers reported by respondents in 
accessing financial products and services as follows: 
  𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗 =𝛼𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑1𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝜑2𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗
2  + ∅𝑖𝑗* 
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑛=5
𝑖=1  + 𝜃𝑖𝑗 ∗ ∑ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
𝑛=3
𝑖=1    +   𝑖𝑗                                    (2.6)                                                                                             
where  𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗  represents the barriers as reported by individuals i, in a country 
j, and α, β, 𝜑 , ∅ and θ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗,𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗, 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗  and 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗   are a set of individual level characteristics as 





Table 2.1 Description of variables and sources 
Variable  Description  Sources  
Main indicators of financial inclusion 
Formal account Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has an account at a bank, credit union, cooperative, or microfinance institution, 
0 otherwise 
G.Findex 
Formal savings Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has saved or set aside money in the past 12 months using an account at a bank, 
credit union, cooperative, or microfinance institution, 0 otherwise 
G.Findex 
Formal credit Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has borrowed money in the past 12 months from a bank, credit union, cooperative, 
or microfinance institution, 0 otherwise 
G.Findex 
Individual level variables 
Female  Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and 0 otherwise. G.Findex 
Age and age squared Age in years, squared G.Findex 
Income: poorest 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the lowest income quintile and 0 otherwise.  G.Findex 
Income: second 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the second lowest income quintile and 0 otherwise. G.Findex 
Income: Third 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the middle-income quintile and 0 otherwise.  G.Findex 
Income: fourth 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the second highest income quintile and 0 otherwise. G.Findex 
Income – richest 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the highest income quintile and 0 otherwise.  G.Findex 
Primary education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has completed primary school or less, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Secondary education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has completed secondary education, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Tertiary education Dummy variable equal to1 if the respondent has completed tertiary education or more, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Reported barriers to financial inclusion (reasons why a respondent does not have an account at a bank, credit union, or other financial institution.) 
Too far away Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “They are too far away”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Too expensive Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “They are too expensive”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Lack of documents Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “You don’t have the necessary documentation (ID, wage slip)”, 
0 otherwise  
G.Findex 
Lack of trust Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “You don’t trust them”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Lack of money Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “You don’t have enough money to use them”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Religious reasons Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “religious reasons”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
Family member 
 has an account 
Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered yes to “A family member has an account”, 0 otherwise G.Findex 
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Country level variables 
Political instability Political instability index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated 
violence, including terrorism (range from -2.5 weak, to 2.5 strong).      
WGI  
Islam Dummy equal to 1 if the population of Moslems in a country is 50% and more, 0 otherwise Pew Centre 
GPD pc growth GDP per capita growth in a country. World Bank  
Religious tensions A measure arising from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious group in a way that replaces 
civil law with religious law. 
PRS/ICRG 
Unemployment  Total number of people who are unemployed as a percentage of the total labour force (modelled with the ILO 
estimate). 
WDI  
Corruption  Corruption index measures perceptions of the extent to which people and governments use public institutions for 
private gain (range from -2.5 weak, to 2.5 strong).    
WGI  
Rule of law The rule of law index measures how society has confidence in the judicial system to enforce contracts and property 
rights (range from -2.5 weak, to 2.5 strong). 
WGI  
Gini index Gini coefficient measures the quality of income distribution (range from 0 to 100, where 0 means equal distribution 
and 100 is unequal distribution or inequality). 
HDI  
Oil reliance  Measured by the value of fuel-based exports divided by GDP. World Bank 
Agriculture 
 




2.5.1 Global account ownership 
 An analysis of the trend in global formal account ownership using data from 
the Global Findex 2011, 2014 and 2017 indicates that growth in account ownership 
increased by 7% between 2014 and 2017, compared to 11% between 2011 and 2014.  
Account ownership 51% (2011) increased to 62% (2014) and reached 69% (92017)6. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018) argue that account owners use banks, microfinance 
institutions, or other types of regulated financial institutions. However, the 
introduction of mobile money in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) has added a new 
dimension of formal account ownership. 
More adults in high-income economies (94%) hold accounts than adults in 
developing economies (63%).  The 2017 Findex data shows a wide gap between 
males and females in account ownership. Globally, 72% of men have accounts 
whilst only 65% of women have accounts. This inequality in account ownership 
also exists among the rich and the poor. For instance, the richest 60% of households 
hold 74% of the accounts while among the poorest 40% of households, only 61% 
do. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018) argue that this difference also exists in developing 
economies, and that neither gap has changed meaningfully since 2014.  
Among all regions of the world, MENA has consistently recorded lower numbers 
of account ownership and other auxiliary financial services (CGAP, 2017). In the 
MENA region, 52% of men have accounts compared to only 35% of women. This 
is the largest gender gap of any region. At the same time, approximately 20 million 
unbanked adults in the region send or receive domestic remittances using cash or 
                                                          
6 The comparison shows that about 700 million new accounts were opened between 2011 and 2014, 
decreasing the unbanked population by 20% while 515 million adults opened accounts between 2014 
and 2017.  
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an over-the-counter service, of which 7 million unbanked adults are in the Arab 
Republic of Egypt (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). 
The summary statistics (Table 2.2) shows that about 39% of the sample countries 
own bank accounts in formal financial institutions. Of these, 50% report they have 
saved with an account and 41% report they have borrowed.  
 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics for all variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main indicators of financial inclusion 
    
Formal account 33,284 0.389686 0.487686 0 1 
Formal savings 33,214 0.506255 0.499968 0 1 
Formal borrowing 33,087 0.41223 0.492243 0 1 
Individual level variables 
     
Female 33,284 0.532135 0.498973 0 1 
Age 33,165 35.33699 15.03273 15 99 
age2 33,165 1474.68 1299.206 225 9801 
Income – poorest 20% 33,284 0.169998 0.375636 0 1 
Income – second 20% 33,284 0.176885 0.381577 0 1 
Income – third 20% 33,284 0.188319 0.390972 0 1 
Income – fourth 20% 33,284 0.208819 0.40647 0 1 
Income – richest 20% 33,284 0.255979 0.436416 0 1 
Primary education 41,284 0.439994 0.496393 0 1 
Secondary education 33,284 0.432138 0.49538 0 1 
Tertiary education 33,284 0.127869 0.333948 0 1 
Barriers to financial inclusion 
    
Too far away 28,950 0.229089 0.420255 0 1 
Too expensive 28,950 0.295764 0.456395 0 1 
Lack of documentation 28,950 0.223626 0.416683 0 1 
Lack of trust 28,950 0.161079 0.367612 0 1 
Lack of money 28,950 0.212117 0.408816 0 1 
Religious reasons 28,950 0.619214 0.48559 0 1 
Family member has an 
account 
28,950 0.150821 0.357882 0 1 
Country level Variables 
     
Political instability 41 -0.91332 0.95783 -2.76 1 




Female respondents make up 53% of the sample. The average age of respondents 
is 35 years. The poorest respondents in the sample countries is 17% (first 20% 
quintile), and the richest make up 25% (fifth quintile). The mean of the 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 variable in the sample countries that are politically unstable is 91%, 
with other unstable countries such as Syria (-2.76) reporting above the threshold of 
-2.5. A Muslim majority (78%) exists in the population of the sample countries.   
2.5.2 Test of financial inclusion in oil and non-oil countries in MENA 
Table 2.3 presents the results of the probit estimations in oil producing countries in 
MENA for the main indicators of financial inclusion. Formal account, formal 
savings and formal credit are the dependent variables.  
Table 2.3 Financial inclusion indicators as predicted by political instability 
and individual characteristics in oil producing countries in MENA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
 










    
Pinstability -0.081*** -0.102** -0.114** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.041) 
Islam -0.201** -0.079*** -0.101*** 
 (0.041) (0.112) (0.057) 
Female -0.035*** -0.013** -0.043** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age 0.014*** 0.012*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.011) (0.224) (0.210) 
Income – poorest 20% -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
Income – second 20% -0.140*** -0.098*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Income – third 20% -0.122*** -0.042*** -0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Income – fourth 20% -0.100*** -0.030*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) 
Primary education -0.221*** -0.084*** -0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Secondary education -0.134*** -0.112*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) 
This table presents the probit estimations of the indicators of financial inclusion, political instability, 
Islam and a set of individual characteristics. Formal account, formal savings and formal credit are 
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the dependent variables. Two omitted variables are the richest 20% and tertiary education. The 
marginal effects and standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significance at the 10% level, ** 
Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2.4 Financial inclusion indicators as predicted by political instability 
and individual characteristics in non-oil producing countries in MENA 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
 










    
Pinstability -0.042*** -0.084** -0.102** 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.029) 
Islam -0.112** -0.026*** -0.081*** 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.022) 
Female -0.041*** -0.051** -0.054** 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.013) 
Age 0.013*** 0.0100*** -0.016*** 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.010) 
Income – poorest 20% -0.100*** -0.121*** -0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.024) 
Income – second 20% -0.120*** -0.052*** 0.013*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Income – third 20% -0.091*** -0.044*** -0.012*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) 
Income – fourth 20% -0.104*** -0.026*** -0.012*** 
 (0.029) (0.102) (0.011) 
Primary education -0.162*** -0.042*** -0.044*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) 
Secondary education -0.104*** -0.122*** -0.011*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.033) 
This table presents the probit estimations of the indicators of financial inclusion, political instability, 
Islam and a set of individual characteristics. Formal account, formal savings and formal credit are 
the dependent variables. Two omitted variables are the richest 20% and tertiary education. The 
marginal effects and standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
The marginal effects of the estimates as shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that 
political instability significantly correlates with all indicators of financial inclusion 
in the MENA oil producing countries. The value of the coefficients show that there 
is an inverse relationship between political instability and the financial inclusion 
proxies, where a percentage increase in political instability leads to 0.08%, 0.10% 
and 0.11% reduction in formal account ownership, savings and credit respectively 
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for Table 2.3. The author juxtaposes this inverse political instability relationship 
with MENA countries that do not produce oil7 and the effect is the same (Table 2.4), 
with political instability having negative outcomes with all three indicators. An 
unstable state disrupts all economic indicators including financial inclusion 
(Alesina et al., 1996; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Roe & Siegel, 2011). 
Potentially, the negative coefficients for political instability could be attributed to 
religious reasons (i.e., the domination of religion at the state level or cultural belief 
systems that impose restrictions on individuals so that they do not access financial 
services that do not adhere to the tenets of their religion, Islam). However, these 
coefficients are persistent with the same signs when the author includes all 41 
countries in MENA and OIC countries8 (Table 2.5), where the Muslim population 
in some of the countries are less than 15%. The MENA region consists of countries 
that have low scores in the political stability index rating. Accordingly, the author 
confirms the first hypothesis (𝐻1: Political instability negatively affects financial 
inclusion).  
2.5.3 Test of financial inclusion in OIC countries 
Significant relationships exist between the individual characteristics and the three 
indicators of financial inclusion. The probability of having a formal account or 
savings and credit significantly reduces for females. A nonlinear relation exists for 
the Age variable, and all adults are more likely to have accounts and savings in 
financial institutions than to borrow. Significantly, all the sample countries report 
low numbers of individuals accessing loan products from formal financial 
                                                          
7 The author considers countries to be non-oil producing if the per capita oil production in a country 
is less than 5000 people. 
8 A separate regression without Islam as a variable still supports the study’s stance. This result is 




institutions except Bahrain, Kuwait, Turkey and the UAE. The study finds 
significant coefficients for all income quintiles in the estimation, indicating that 
greater income is associated with higher levels of financial inclusion. Using the fifth 
richest income quintile as a base, the author observes in reducing order negative 
relations with all indicators of financial inclusion. For the education variables, the 
author observes negative coefficients for formal account, formal savings and formal 
credit. The omitted variable is tertiary education.  
Within the sample of 41 OIC countries, the author’s estimation indicates that 
political instability is likely to affect the ownership of bank accounts, savings and 
credit after controlling for country fixed effects. This result supports Allen et al. 
(2016) who find that countries that are politically stable are likely to hold higher 
degrees of financial inclusion.  
Table 2.5 Financial inclusion indicators as predicted by political instability 
and individual characteristics in Selected 41 OIC countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
 










    
Pinstability -0.102*** -0.095** -0.111** 
 (0.059) (0.080) (0.044) 
Islam -0.170*** -0.124*** -0.182*** 
 (0.620) (0.022) (0.064) 
Female -0.183*** -0.021*** -0.088*** 
 (0.048) (0.011) (0.017) 
Age 0.022*** 0.042*** -0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.051) (0.040) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.031) (0.0022) (0.091) 
Income – poorest 20% -0.201*** -0.134*** -0.145*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.206) 
Income – second 20% -0.182*** -0.115*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.002) 
Income – third 20% -0.120*** -0.101*** -0.114*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.031) 
Income – fourth 20% -0.104*** -0.080*** -0.045*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.108) 
Primary education -0.207*** -0.212*** -0.411*** 
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 (0.107) (0.012) (0.005) 
Secondary education -0.122*** -0.181*** -0.034*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.022) 
This table presents the probit estimations of the indicators of financial inclusion, political instability, 
Islam and a set of individual characteristics. Formal account, formal savings and formal credit are 
the dependent variables. The marginal effects and standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% 
level. 
2.5.4 Barriers to financial inclusion in MENA and OIC countries 
To examine the characteristics that are attributable to financial exclusion, the author 
tests how individual characteristics impact on peoples’ access to financial services. 
Barriers to financial services can be voluntary or involuntary. For involuntary 
barriers, problems arise because of high costs of financial services, lack of 
information, product features, and female discrimination. Voluntary barriers are 
self-exclusion from the use of formal financial services, usually characterised by 
cultural and religious reasons (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2014). Table 2.6 reports the 
results of the estimations. 
The reported barriers are the dependent variables in their negative form. Females 
are likely to report costs, lack of money, lack of necessary documents, lack of trust 
of financial institutions and distance to financial institutions as barriers to financial 
inclusion in most of the sample countries. However, in situations where a family 
member has an account in a financial institution, females see this as an incentive 
to own accounts. Females therefore can be considered as self-excluding in the 
ownership of formal accounts and in the use of financial services, as the reasons 
given for the exclusion are idiosyncratic in nature.  
Barriers to inclusion are more likely to occur among the following: low income 
individuals where asset holdings are low, individuals who are too far away from 
the location of access, and individuals who cannot afford bank fixed charges (too 
expensive) or who are unable to comply with documentary requirements. Contrary 
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to the results from female respondents, low-income individuals report that having 
a family member who owns an account may render it unnecessary for those 
individuals to have their own accounts (which is self-imposed exclusion). Further, 
low-income individuals who report the costs (too expensive) of having a bank 
account as a barrier, may benefit indirectly from family members’ access to bank 
accounts. Access is then shared, and an account may not appear to be necessary. 
Primary and secondary school education are negatively associated with almost all 
barriers to financial inclusion. Yet, in instances where a family member has an 
account, this factor appears to serve as a motivation for not having an account. 
Income and education play important roles in financial inclusion. Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2015) report that 59% of adults who do not have accounts cite lack of money 
as the key reason. 
In Table 2.7, the study reports the barriers at the national level. In all our sample 
countries, the major barrier reported is a lack of necessary documentation to 
facilitate the process of accessing credit with a financial institution. The result is in 
line with the underdeveloped property and land tenure system (Kuran, 2008; Ziadeh, 
1993), where entrepreneurs are without legal entitlements that are required by 
formal banks as proof for collateral requirements. The result is also in line with the 
evidence given by CGAP (2017) which reports that 92 million borrowers (mostly 
women, low-income people, and youth) do so from the informal sector. Because of 
the high informal sector participation in the economy, there are difficulties 




Another reason could be traced to the worldwide fight against money laundering, 
and terrorism, where the “know-your-customer” (KYC) requirement for financial 
institutions has been tightened. Further, where individuals report that a family 
member has an account in a financial institution, having their own account does not 
appear necessary. These findings are important because the region has the lowest 
levels of financial inclusion indicators in the world. The author confirms the second 




Table 2.6 Reported barriers to financial inclusion for 26 MENA countries 






























has an account 
 
yes 
        
Female 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.044*** 0.008 0.002*** 0.053*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.022) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) 
Age -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.210 -0.220 -0.000 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age2 1.050*** 0.054** 1.022*** 1.041 -0.320 -0.021*** 0.030 
 (0.068) (0.020) (0.400) (0.020) (0.201) (0.082) (0.050) 
Income – poorest 20% 0.021** 0.080*** 0.023*** -0.081** 0.090*** -0.043** 0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.035) (0.001) (0.018) (0.021) 
Income – second 20% 0.018** -0.045** 0.016*** -0.043 0.056*** -0.020* 0.041* 
 (0.012) (0.031) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) 
Income – third 20% 0.031 -0.033 -0.014 -0.041*** -0.024*** 0.051** -0.031 
 (0.006) (0.036) (0.004) (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.054) 
Income – fourth 20% 0.034 -0.025 -0.011** -0.005 -0.007** -0.044** -0.017** 
 (0.025) (0.042) (0.023) (0.034) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) 
Primary education -0.027* 0.039** 0.012*** -0.023*** 0.018*** 0.050 0.042*** 
 (0.016) (0.060) (0.003) (0.042) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) 
Secondary education 0.023*** 0.012* 0.0211*** -0.064** -0.016** 0.025 -0.105*** 
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.018) (0.073) (0.015) (0.031) (0.024) 
        
Observations 24,133 24,133 24,133 24,133 24,133 24,133 24,111 
This table presents the probit estimations of the determinants of barriers to financial inclusion in the MENA region. The barriers, presented at the top of each column, are the 
dependent variables expressed in their negative form. The number of observations reflects individual respondents who do not have accounts. The author reports the marginal 
effects with standard errors in parentheses. *Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.7 Country level determinants of barriers to financial inclusion for 41 selected OIC countries 






























has an account 
 
yes 
        
Female 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.040*** 0.002*** 0.022*** -0.090*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
Age -0.002 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.410*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2 0.064 -0.083*** 0.220*** -0.300** 0.240 -0.080* 0.062** 
 (0.040) (0.090) (0.430) (0.082) (0.067) (0.063) (0.050) 
Income – poorest 20% 0.050*** 0.021** 0.020*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) 
Income – second 20% 0.031** 0.014* 0.018*** -0.004 0.007** 0.028*** 0.240 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Income – third 20% 0.026*** -0.012 0.018*** 0.010 -0.006** 0.031*** 0.008* 
 (0.061) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Income – fourth 20% 0.018** -0.014** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.012** 0.045*** 0.048 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Primary education 0.180*** 0.082*** 0.054*** 0.023)** 0.007*** 0.033*** -0.061*** 
 (0.040) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) 
Secondary education 0.062*** 0.020* 0.012** -0.016 0.009** -0.009 -0.006*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.023) (0.016) (0.011) 
        
Observations 28,950 28,950 28,950 28,950 28,950 28,950 28,950 
This table presents the probit estimations of the determinants of barriers to financial inclusion in the MENA region. The barriers, presented at the top of each column, are the 
dependent variables expressed in their negative form. The number of observations reflects individual respondents who do not have accounts. The author reports the marginal 
effects with standard errors in parentheses. *Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
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2.6 Robustness checks 
2.6.1 The issue of endogeneity 
Endogenous problems are a major concern in empirical testing, especially when 
researchers use coetaneous dependent and independent variables. The author 
posits that endogeneity bias could be present in this study’s estimations. Lower 
financial inclusion outcomes, which lead to poverty and marginalisation, could 
influence the propensity for political instability and financial exclusion. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) contend that severe economic inequality can 
trigger political instability, which in turn can weaken financial development. In 
their studies of economic shocks and civil conflict, using an instrumental variable 
approach in SSA, Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) acknowledge the 
growing number of studies that highlight the association between economic 
conditions and civil conflict without adequately addressing the endogeneity of 
economic variables to civil war. Consequently, those studies fail to convincingly 
establish a causal relationship. Further Miguel et al. (2004) ague that omitted 
variables may drive both economic outcomes and conflict, and thereby produce 
misleading cross-country estimates.  
The instrumental variables methods use only a portion of the variability in key 
variables to estimate the relationships of interest. If the instruments are valid, the 
portion used is unrelated to the omitted variables (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). 
Instrumental variables estimate using two stage least squares or weighted 
averages are not unbiased because they involve a ratio of random quantities, for 
which expectations need not exist nor have they a simple form. Since instrumental 
variables estimates are consistent, but not unbiased, researchers using 
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instrumental variables should work with large samples to increase the statistical 
power of the coefficients (Angrist & Krueger, 2001).  
 Political theorists also argue that countries with oil exports have a tendency to 
hinder progress towards democracy. They argue that several factors attest to the 
oil-impedes-democracy claim. Factors such as a rentier effect, a repression effect, 
a modernisation effect9  and geography are responsible for anti-democracy or 
political instability, especially in the MENA region (Ross, 2001). Similarly, other 
factors such as corruption, unemployment, religious tensions, and the compulsion 
to adhere to religious edicts can have effects on stability. Therefore, unobserved 
variables may have effects on both financial inclusion and political stability, 
rather than only the variables the author has incorporated in the model.  
To model the instrumental variables10 estimation, the author uses gdppcg, which 
measures the percentage of GDP per capita growth; the Gini coefficients for each 
country11; and religious tensions, which measures the dominant (state) religion in 
a country and whether it leads to religious tensions.  Unemployment caters for the 
number of people without employment in a country. Oil reliance captures whether 
oil money makes governments autocratic because of the use of income from oil 
exports to increase ‘internal security’ and to deter dissidence. This is measured by 
the value of oil-based exports divided by GDP or oil rents as a percentage of a 
country’s GDP. Agriculture measures the share of total agricultural production as 
                                                          
9 The rentier effect is the use of low taxes by governments to relieve pressure from 
accountability; the repression effect requires the use of state resources to boost internal security 
and to deter dissidents. Finally, the modernisation effect holds that growth of the economy based 
on oil and other minerals fails to boost social and cultural changes needed to produce democratic 
governance (Ross, 2001). 
10 The author acknowledges the difficulty of identifying and estimating instruments, especially in 
the matter of financial inclusion indicators. The aim is to show that political instability is 
consistently associated with lower degrees of financial inclusion outcomes. 
11 Gini coefficient is a measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals 
or households within a country from an equal distribution, where a value of zero represents 
absolute equality, and a value of a hundred as absolute inequality. 
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a percentage of GDP, replacing the geography proxy. The corruption variable 
measures the perception that public officials use public office for private gains. 
The gdppc and unemployment variables are interacted to serve as proxies for the 
Gini coefficient, which is dropped because of missing data. 
To effectively minimise and eliminate the endogeneity problem, the author 
includes lag variables to instruments that will account for the reverse causal 
correlation between independent causal parameters. In addition, by including all 
the three streams of the Global Findex data (2011, 2014 and 2017), the author is 
able, as proposed by Angrist and Krueger (2001), to control for the consistency 
and biasedness of the instrumental variables in the study. Furthermore, fixed 
effects are also used to capture time-invariant country characteristics that may be 
related to political instability and to capture additional variations. These measures 
have ultimately resolved the endogeneity problem in the study. 
The author set up the instruments with the following probit models, where (2.8) 
is a function of the instrumented instability measure in (2.7): 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑗 +




𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗   
+ 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗   +   𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 +   𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗 +
 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑠𝑗 +  µ𝑖                                                                                               (2.7)     
 
 
The 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 in a country j is determined by gdppcg, oil reliance, agriculture, 
GDP per capita growth interacted with unemployment, state religious tensions, 
corruption and lagged variables.  
The author uses both probit and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models to 
demonstrate that the instruments chosen are consistent and robust, and by using 
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lagged variables, the author mitigates the problem of simultaneity. The results of 
the IV (instrumented instability variables) in columns (1) to (5) from Table 2.8 
are significant. They explain the fact that economic variables can have an effect 
on the stability of a country.  
The coefficients of column (5) of Table 2.8 is used as the instrumented political 
instability to determine its association with the financial inclusion indicators in 
equation (2.8). From the results of the instrumented estimation in Table 2.9, the 
author finds that Pinstability* remains negatively associated with the indicators 
of financial inclusion. The results are robust. 
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Table 2.8 Estimation of IV political instability indicator as predicted by country level exogenous variables 
𝑃𝐼𝑗= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑗 +   𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗   +   𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 +




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Variables Pinstability Pinstability Pinstability Pinstability Pinstability 
Gdppg -0.026** -0.019**   -0.033** 
 (0.042) (0.050)   (0.021) 
GDP_unemployment   0.013*** 0.004*** -0.002*** 
   (0.210) (0.050) (0.010) 
Oil reliance 0.019*** 0.005***  0.014*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.001) 
corruption 0.088***   0.201*** 0.021*** 
 (0.065)   (0.005) (0.003) 
Unemployment  0.023*** 0.030**  0.019*** 
  (0.043) (0.050)  (0.022) 
Agriculture -0.240*** -0.180***  -0.210*** -0.320*** 
 (0.070) (0.030)  (0.040) (0.053) 
Religious tensions  0.305***  0.270*** 0.164** 
  (0.022)  (0.060) (0.092) 
Lagged variables 
gdppgt−1 -0.017*** -0.033***   -0.021*** 
 (0.025) (0.038)   (0.221) 
Gdp_unemployt−1   0.023** 0.041*** 0.056*** 
   (0.190) (0.045) (0.012) 












This table presents the linear probability model estimations of the instrumental variables, where Gdppcg, oil reliance or export, corruption, unemployment, agriculture, religious 
tensions, and the proxy for inequality (gdp_unemployment), determine political instability. The author presents linear probabilities in columns (1) to (4), and column (5) reports 
the 2SLS. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 (0.000) (0.025)  (0.032) (0.020) 
Corruptiont−1 0.182***   0.112*** 0.231*** 
 (0.009)   (0.052) (0.041) 
Unemploymentt−1  0.012*** 0.060**  0.011*** 
  (0.002) (0.040)  (0.031) 
Constant 0.245*** 0.194*** -0.091*** 0.201*** -0.150*** 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.054) 
R-squared 0.542 0.446 0.610 0.636 0.594 
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2.6.2 Test for an asymmetric relation using a variable interaction modelling 
approach 
According to Woodside (2013, p. 464) “Reality usually includes more than one 
combination of conditions that lead to high values in an outcome condition; thus, 
reality usually indicates that any insightful combination of conditions has an 
asymmetrical relationship with an outcome condition and not a symmetrical 
relationship”. In other words, symmetry refers to necessary and sufficient causes 
for which a variable causes an outcome, whereas asymmetry refers to causes that 
are either necessary or sufficient but not both (Clark et al., 2006). This means that 
political instability may have the necessary causal effects on low levels of financial 
inclusion but not a sufficient parameter to cause the low levels of financial inclusion. 
Accordingly, asymmetric claims are more difficult to falsify than those of 
symmetry (Lieberson, 1987). The author postulates that more variables could be 
attributed to the low levels of financial inclusion in the MENA region and, as such, 
their relationships could be asymmetric.  
Since social and economic processes of interest are not caused by single variables, 
testing for the presence of heteroscedasticity may not be appropriate to evaluate 
asymmetric relationships because of omitted variable bias. If the heteroscedasticity 
in this study’s data is caused systematically by additional variable(s) that may 
correlate with the independent (and dependent) variable of interest, then the 
generated coefficients by a purely stochastic process will lead to biased inferences 
about the relationship of interest. In these cases, a multi-causal approach is required.  
The MENA region, having enjoyed political stability for a long time before the 
2011 Arab Spring, has recorded low access to financial services (Creane, 2004). 
Causes of this low access has been attributed to the lack of enabling regulation, the 
51 
 
lack of efficient mechanisms to determine interest rates, informality, and high levels 
of unemployment (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2002; Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Huizinga, 2001; Creane, 2004). The effects of the Arab Spring however, 
deteriorated the already abysmal performance of financial access in the region. 
Realising that the relationship between political instability and low levels of 
financial inclusion could be asymmetric, the author follows Clark et al. (2006) in 
proposing the use of a multiplicative interaction test of asymmetry model to 
understand the causal effects of political instability on lower levels of financial 
inclusion. A multiplicative interaction test of asymmetry model is a conditional 
specification test where multivariate causal interaction is associated with outcome 
variables. The conditional application assumes that each individual explanatory 
variable is either necessary or sufficient to cause low levels of financial inclusion 
in the MENA region, but none can be necessary and sufficient at the same time.  
To estimate the asymmetric relationship between political instability and low levels 
of financial inclusion, the author introduces a variable that the literature considers 
to be one the many causes of low levels of financial inclusion in MENA before the 
2011 Arab Spring (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2002; Claessens et al., 2001; Creane, 
2004). The author uses the presence of a bond market as a dummy variable to 
capture the lack of effective interest rates regime before 2011. The author posits 
that it retards investment for economic growth at least in the financial sector. The 
dummy interest rate variable is then interacted with the political instability variable 
to see the effect on the outcome variable, i.e., low levels of financial inclusion. In 
this case, if the effect of the interaction between political instability and interest 
rates are “reinforcing”, then their coefficient should be positive.  Political instability 
and interest rates can be considered as individually sufficient, but complementary, 
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to cause the low levels of financial inclusion, given the standard assumption that 
the author has the correct and fully specified model.  
Consider the following probit linear multiplicative interaction model in (2.8), where 
𝑋1𝑗 (political instability) and 𝑋2𝑗 (interest rates) are thought to be alternative causes 
of   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1|𝑋|), the low levels of financial inclusion.   
   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1|𝑋|)  =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1𝑋1𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑋2𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑋1𝑗𝑋2𝑗 +    𝐶1𝑖𝑗   +  µ1𝑖𝑗  (2.8) 
 
where 𝐶1𝑖𝑗  is a number of control variables. To ascertain the consequence of 
changes in the explanatory variable of  𝑋1𝑗  on the outcome variable, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ =
1|𝑋|), it is necessary to take the first derivative of (2.8) with respect to this variable 





∗ = 1|𝑋|) = 𝛽3𝑋2𝑗                                                 (2.9) 
 
This demonstrates the effect of levels of  𝑋1𝑗   on the outcome variable, 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1|𝑋|) is intrinsically tied to specific levels of  𝑋2𝑗 : the marginal 
contribution of 𝑋1𝑗 is conditional on 𝑋2𝑗 and vice versa (Tsai & Gill, 2013). The 
overall marginal effect of 𝑋1𝑗 and 𝑋2𝑖𝑗 on  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1|𝑋|) is given as: 
 
𝜕(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1|𝑋|)|𝑋1𝑗𝑋2𝑗   =   𝛽3                                                  (2.10) 
 
The coefficient 𝛽3, if positive, explains that the low levels of financial inclusion in 
MENA can effectively be caused by both political instability and a lack of effective 
determination of interest rates. Table 2.9 reports the result of the asymmetric 
multiplicative model.  
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The following empirical model is used for the multiplicative interaction test of the 
asymmetric model: 
𝐹𝐼𝑗= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑗+𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗  + 𝑖 (2.11)                                                                                                                                                                       
Table 2.9 Financial inclusion indicators as predicted by instrumented 
political instability and interaction between political instability and interest 
rates 
𝐹𝐼𝑗= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐺𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑗+𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗  + 𝑖 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
 


















Pinstability* -0.078*** -0.052** -0.055*** 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.018) 
Interest -0.091*** -0.004*** -0.041** 
 (0.210) (0.002) (0.020) 
Pinstability*interest 0.056*** 0.004*** 0.040** 
 (0.014) (0.030) (0.011) 
Gdppcg 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.101*** 
 (0.044) (0.003) (0.063) 
corruption -0.022** -0.005** -0.032** 
 (0.140) (0.005) (0.025) 
Religious tensions -0.090*** -0.010*** -0.201*** 
 (0.230) (0.020) (0.101) 
Constant -0.151*** -0.203*** 0.202*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) 
R-squared 0.695 0.713 0.680 
This table presents the probit estimations of the indicators of financial inclusion, instrumented 
political instability, interest, gdppcg, corruption, religious tensions, and interaction of political 
instability and interest rates. Pinstability* is the IV of column (5) in Table 2.8. Formal account, 
formal savings and formal credit are the dependent variables.  Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
The interaction variable with coefficient 𝛽3 (0.056) is positive, indicating that the 
low levels of financial inclusion is caused by a lack of political stability post the 
Arab Spring and a lack of effective determination of interest rates before and after 
the 2011 Arab Spring. 
54 
 
2.6.3 Test for an asymmetric relation using the threshold model approach 
The proposition that political instability is prevalent in the MENA political culture 
is not tenable. This is because until the 2011 Arab Spring, the MENA region had 
enjoyed stability. This political stability, however, could not have happened without 
tight security measures by the non-democratic regimes (whereby the expected costs 
of challenging the regime outweigh the expected benefits of widening or replacing 
the narrow base of power). Unfortunately, although the region might experience 
stability, it did not translate into overall economic growth and financial inclusion. 
The author hypothesises that there is a political stability threshold that would trigger 
financial inclusion. The stability of the region prior to 2011 could be below this 
threshold12. In the political party system, a threshold of representation as opined by 
Szalai, Petrella, and Rokkan (2016) is the condition set by election managers and 
political parties in democratic regimes by which parties have to meet in order to 
obtain seats in the legislature or for a party to win an election (Szalai et al., 2016). 
In the financial sector, a similar concept exists: exchange rates have target zones. 
Exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate freely within a given zone, but, when they 
move outside the target zone, central banks intervene to stabilise the market (Balke 
& Fomby, 1997). An economic threshold for an oil price impact is the size of the 
price increase beyond which an economic impact on production and stock prices is 
noticeable (Huang, Hwang, & Peng, 2005). When an oil price change or its 
volatility exceeds the threshold level, its impact on the economy may well be 
negative.  
                                                          




Although economic threshold values may vary from country to country depending 
on the natural endowment of the economy, a political stability threshold could 
marginally be the same in MENA due to the political system that exists. Estimating 
this threshold value is essential to provide policymakers with an indicator to target 
and to promote financial inclusion. 
To estimate the threshold function, the author follows Balke and Fomby (1997) and 
Hansen and Seo (2002), and sets out a simultaneous quadratic equation that 
measures a threshold variable as an indicator for political stability in two regimes, 
i.e. before the 2011 Arab Spring and after the 2011 Arab Spring, where  
      𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦1𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1)  =  𝐹𝐼1𝑗 = 𝛽1 +  𝑃𝑆1𝑗
∗  + I (𝑆1𝑗 > 𝛾 ) + 𝜇1𝑖𝑗               (2.12)  
 
                                               
 
       𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦2𝑖𝑗
∗ = 1)  =  𝐹𝐼2𝑗 = 𝛽2 + 𝑃𝑆2𝑗
∗   + I (𝑆2𝑗 ≥ 𝛾 ) + 𝜇2𝑖𝑗              (2.13) 
   where,  
          𝑆𝑗 is defined as a political stability threshold variable whose critical value 
serves as a cut-off point below which political instability (stability) impacts on 
economic activities and financial inclusion is noticeable, 𝛾 denotes the threshold 
parameter, and I(.) is the indicator function. This means that the financial inclusion 
variable, 𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗
 increases (decreases) for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ individual and 𝑗𝑡ℎ country when 𝛾 is 
above or equal to 𝑆𝑗.  
Estimating the threshold parameter (i.e. 𝛾  in (2.12)) is one of the difficulties 
highlighted in operating the threshold models. The author follows Balke and Fomby 
(1997) in designing grid-search procedures to determine and estimate the threshold 
parameter13.  
                                                          
13 The author first arranges the 𝑃𝑆𝑗
∗  (political stability) in ascending order. After the threshold value 




The empirical model is as follows: 
 
 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑗  = α + β∗  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡−5 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑗 +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗     (2.14) 
 
 
 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑗  = α + β∗  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡+5 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑗 +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗    (2.15) 
 
where  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡−5  (Regime I) and  𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡+5  (Regime II) capture 
incidents of political stability five years before and after the 2011 Arab Spring. 
To find the minimum political stability threshold level that will trigger financial 
inclusion, the author asks the question: ‘what level of political stability will allow 
full private participation in the economic and financial sectors without any 
interference from the governing elites?’ This stability threshold level will allow for 
the market variables of demand and supply to determine where economic resources 
are needed and by who and to whom. It is the level at which individual liberties are 
sanctioned while rent seeking, corruption, and obstruction of justice is curtailed. 
Following Balke and Fomby (1997), the author determines the minimum political 
stability threshold level that will trigger financial inclusion to be equal to  -0.960 
for the region of MENA.  This means that countries that meet this political stability 
threshold level should have high levels of financial inclusion and vice versa14. 
                                                          
determine the real threshold value. (1) The series of arranged  𝑃𝑆𝑗
∗ , 𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗
 and I(.) variables in 
Equation (12) are established and 𝑃𝑆𝑗
∗, 𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗
 and I(.)  are ordered according to the value of 𝑆𝑗  . (2) By 
obtaining the average to serve as the initial value of γ, the series of arranged 𝑃𝑆𝑗
∗and  𝑦∗
𝑖𝑗
  are then 
split into two different regime periods: regime I (2011𝑡−5) against regime II (2011𝑡+5) to account 
for the 5 year period before the 2011 Arab Spring and the 5 year period after the Arab Spring.  (3) 
The regression of (12) is estimated for each regime and the residual sum of square (RSS) is 
calculated and saved. (4) The value of γ is increased using one grid with a very small value of 0.01, 
and the above step (3) is then repeated for the new values of γ. (5) Steps 3 and 4 are repeated and 
the RSS value is derived for each value of γ; γ with the minimum RSS then chosen. 
14 However, due to asymmetry, some within-country level coefficients do not follow this observation 
(see Table 2.11). This suggests that although political instability may be high, other economic 
fundamentals are equally high and therefore might be responsible for the high levels of financial 
inclusion in those countries.  
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From Table 2.10, in regime I, the author observes that the coefficient of political 
instability (-0.982) before the 2011 Arab Spring is below the stability threshold of 
(-0.960). However, the coefficient for regime II (-1.106) is also lower compared to 
that of regime I (-0982 > -1.106). The result is consistent with the stability of the 
region before and after the 2011 Arab Spring (where political stability was 
considered to be higher before the 2011 Arab Spring). The result indicates that an 
asymmetric relationship between political instability and low levels of financial 
inclusion is not widely seen in the region when using panel data (as all coefficients 
are below the minimum stability threshold level, supporting the proposition that 
political instability leads to low levels of financial inclusion). However, analysing 
the country-level data clearly shows that asymmetric relationships exist between 
political instability and financial inclusion within countries. Table 2.11 depicts the 
real issue, where some countries have higher levels of financial inclusion even 
though those countries also have high levels of political instability. Overall, the 
results indicate that a level of political stability threshold is important for financial 
inclusion. This is reflected by the results from Table 2.11, where countries with 
appreciable levels of political stability also have higher levels of financial inclusion. 
Table 2.10 Financial inclusion indicators as predicted by instrumented 
political instability and interaction between political instability and interest 
rates 
                  𝑭𝑰𝒊𝒋 = α + β∗  𝑷𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒋𝒕−𝟓 + 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒋 + 𝑰𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒎𝒋 +𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒋 + 𝒆𝒋 
Country fixed effects Yes  
Control for individual-level characteristics Yes  
Variables Coefficient  Standard error P-value 
Regime I (2011𝑡−5), political stability before 2011 Arab Spring, where 𝑆𝑗 ≥ -0.960 
𝑃𝑆𝑡−5
∗  -0.982 0.221 0.002*** 
interest -0.001 0.094 0.000*** 
Islam  1.044 0.060 0.026** 
Constant  0.037 0.025 0.000*** 
Regime II (2011𝑡+5), political stability after 2011 Arab Spring, where 𝑆𝑗 ≤ -0.960 
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This table presents the threshold model estimations of financial inclusion, political stability and 
interest rates. * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 5% level and ***Significance 
at the 1% level. 




Table 2.11 Financial inclusion as predicted by political stability with 
threshold political stability variable in MENA 
𝑺𝒋 ≥ -0.960: Regime I versus  𝑺𝒋 ≤ -0.960: Regime II 
𝑃𝑆𝑡+5
∗  -1.106 0.245 0.006*** 
Interest  -0.042 0.103 0.004*** 
Islam  0.082 0.422 0.034** 
Constant -0.006 0.041 0.000*** 
RSS (Residual sum of squares) 3.914 *105 
R-squared 0.686 0.686 0.686 
Regime  I 
 2011𝑡−5 




Threshold value = -1.106 
 
Country Coefficient Standard 
Error  
P-value  Coefficient Standard 
Error  
P-value 
Afghanistan  -1.908 0.143 0.000*** -2.050 0.210 0.000*** 
Algeria -1.020 0.023 0.004*** -0.983 0.054 0.010** 
Bahrain  0.042 0.003 0.000*** 0.157 0.034 0.000*** 
Chad  -0.170 0.086 0.004*** -1.030 0.105 0.032** 
Comoros    -0.993 0.104 0.250 
Djibouti    -0.100 0.087 0.103 
Egypt -0.981 0.102 0.051* -0.101 0.076 0.001*** 
Iran  0.970 0.003 0.012** 0.083 0.102 0.000*** 
Iraq  -1.102 0.104 0.000*** -1.074 0.210 0.004*** 
Jordan -0.969 0.043 0.036** -0.955 0.065 0.010** 
Kuwait 0.034 0.009 0.000*** 0.005 0.040 0.000*** 
Lebanon  -0.102 0.050 0.054* -0.985 0.067 0.011** 
Libya     -0.122 0.024 0.011** 
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This table presents the effects of political stability on financial inclusion in two regimes. Regime I 
represent political stability before the 2011 Arab Spring, while regime II represents political stability 
after the 2011 Arab Spring. Coefficients are compared with the threshold stability level of -0.960. 
Countries with coefficients higher than or equal to the stability threshold level should have higher 
levels of financial inclusion and vice versa. * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significance at the 
5% level and ***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
2.7 Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, the author examines the link between financial inclusion and political 
instability in the MENA region. In the wake of recent political instabilities around 
the world, financial development is perceived to be negatively affected by political 
instability more than most institutional features. Roe and Siegel (2011), Alesina et 
al. (1996), and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) demonstrate how political instability 
can impede financial development.  
The author subjected the data from MENA and variables of interest through a 
number of tests in the form of robustness checks in order to determine why the 
MENA region grapples with low levels of financial inclusion. For instance, a test 
Morocco  0.562 0.103 0.054* 0.102 0.004 0.013** 
Oman     0.066 0.021 0.000*** 
Pakistan  -0.201 0.104 0.000*** -0.223 0.301 0.003*** 
Qatar     0.032 0.002 0.000*** 
Saudi Arabia 0.085 0.004 0.002*** 0.005 0.021 0.000*** 
Somalia     -0.192 0.094 0.000*** 
Sudan  -0.134 0.241 0.001*** -0.201 0.044 0.000*** 
Syria     -0.224 0.046 0.000*** 
Tunisia  0.022 0.035 0.034* 0.053 0.007 0.010** 
Turkey  -0.962 0.047 0.044* -0.980 0.049 0.012** 
United Arab Emirates 0.006 0.000 0.000*** 0.005 0.001 0.000*** 
West Bank and Gaza -0.104 0.032 0.004*** -0.106 0.102 0.000*** 
Yemen  -0.120 0.130 0.943 -0.230 0.106 0.000*** 
RSS (Residual sum of squares) 3.911 *105 
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for an asymmetric relationship was completed, where a dummy interest rates 
variable was introduced to capture the presence of omitted variables in the model. 
Using this technique and IV with lagged variables, the endogeneity problem 
associated in the sample was eliminated. In this regard, the author reported that 
political instability correlates with lower levels of financial inclusion. 
 In addition, the author estimated a political stability threshold value as an essential 
component that can trigger and promote financial inclusion in the MENA region. 
In the wake of the political instability, governments and policymakers are in urgent 
need of guidelines to stabilise their countries through financial access and economic 
growth. Establishing a political stability threshold value is important to provide 
policymakers with an indicator to target and promote financial inclusion. Following 
Balke and Fomby (1997), the author determined the political stability threshold 
level that will trigger financial inclusion to be equal to  -0.960 for the MENA region 
(given the unstable political environment and country level score of the WGI index, 
this value is the most appropriate for stability). The author then argued that 
governments that seek to open up and diversify their economies, especially in the 
financial services sector and allow enabling regulation and ease other structural 
bottlenecks, effectively require political stability in that direction. Roe and Siegel 
(2011) indicate that political instability impacts developing nations, with the more 
stable ones developing better financial markets.  
The author also examined the basis behind the low levels of financial inclusion 
among individuals in the MENA region and in selected OIC countries by analysing 
the barriers to financial inclusion data from the Global Findex database from 2011 
to 2017. By examining the perceived barriers to financial inclusion in the MENA 
region, the author found that a lack of proper documentation is widely reported to 
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be a barrier to FI. The informal economy in the MENA region is estimated to be 
around 50% of the GDP and a significant amount of people have no payslips. 
Furthermore, another major barrier to obtaining loans in the region is the lack of 
proper documentation to present to banks. For example, despite the fact that the 
borrower might have enough land or real estate properties to cover the loan, the 
proof of ownership does not meet the formal institutions’ requirements (Kuran, 
2008; Ziadeh, 1993). The result of this study supports the CGAP (2017) finding 
that 92 million of borrowers in the region do so from the informal sector.  
In summary, the author’s results indicate that political instability has the tendency 
to lower financial inclusion in the region. The results also indicate that Islam is 
negatively associated with financial inclusion indicators. The lack of an efficient 
mechanism to determine real interest rates, which prevents the efficient allocation 
of financial resources, is also found to impede the development of financial 
inclusion. However, GDP per capita growth and agriculture are seen as essential 
components in promoting financial inclusion, whilst corruption, oil reliance, 
unemployment, and religious tensions negatively affect financial inclusion in the 
region. The lack of proper documents is also found to hinder progress in financial 
inclusion. Because of the high informal sector participation in the economy, there 
are difficulties associated with proper accounting of cash flows which are necessary 
for formal banks’ borrowing. The above summary confirms the author’s 
hypotheses, 𝐻1: Political instability negatively affects financial inclusion, and H2: 
There is a positive relationship between individual characteristics and financial 
inclusion.  
In conclusion, the author contributes to the extant literature by establishing that the 
unstable political environment within the MENA region does not support financial 
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sector development and economic growth. The author shows that policies which 
limit individual liberties and aspirations can trigger political instability and are also 
detrimental to financial inclusion. To foster financial inclusion, limitations on 
government control of financial institutions should be encouraged. In addition, 
policy makers should endeavour to achieve the political stability threshold value 
that will trigger and promote financial inclusion by allowing easy entry into, and 
exit from, the financial sector. A lack of documentation required by formal financial 
institutions is a major barrier to financial inclusion. Through identifying the main 
obstacles individuals face in their quest to becoming financially included, countries 
may effectively implement measures that reduce and eliminate those obstacles.  
This research has identified two key future research themes. First, a survey might 
be conducted to assess the level at which political instability disrupts financial 
inclusion and economic growth in the MENA region. Second, in order to promote 
and facilitate financial inclusion and economic growth, steps could be identified 
which serve to incorporate the over 50% proportion of the informal sector in the 






Informal financial intermediation and financial inclusion 
3.1 Introduction  
In most African countries, policymakers, despite being aware of the existence of a 
significantly large informal financial sector, have tended to direct economic policy 
without due consideration of how the policy will be affected by the informal sector 
activity (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991). The relative importance of financial inclusion 
(formal financial intermediation) in overall financial markets and the implication 
for financial market development, monetary policy, and efficiency in the financial 
system, are mostly prioritized over informal intermediaries. It has been argued that 
formal financial intermediation will increase the capacity of countries to leverage 
their domestic financial resources, strengthen their respective investment climates, 
and improve their asset management (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2008). To raise the levels of inclusion, policymakers and 
financial regulators give priority to entry thresholds, such as geographical barriers, 
affordability, accessibility and eligibility that have previously excluded socially 
vulnerable individuals (Armendariz & Morduch, 2007; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Martinez Peria, 2008; De Koker & Jentzsch, 2013; Otero & Rhyne, 2006). 
However, extant literature argues that financial intermediation in developing 
countries, especially Africa, are characterised by dualism (Bell, Srinivasan, & Udry, 
1997; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009; Jain & Mansuri, 2003). 
Observable evidence shows the existence of both formal and informal financial 
markets, and usage of either one is not mutually exclusive (Alvi & Dendir, 2009; 
Grimard, 1997). Because of weak institutional frameworks and market 
imperfections, formal financial intermediaries are disadvantaged when serving 
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people with low incomes (Aryeetey, 2008). As a result, the role of informal 
financial intermediaries in resource mobilization and allocation is quantitatively 
significant (Kedir & Ibrahim, 2011), as shown by the number of people who engage 
in the informal economy. The author argue that informal financial intermediation is 
a strong complement, rather than a substitute, for formal financial intermediation.  
The widely asserted hypothesis is that informal financial intermediation is 
exploitative and does not aid investment beyond consumption smoothing (Nissanke 
& Aryeetey, 2008). In this paper, the author questions this hypothesis in the context 
of Africa, arguing that informal financial intermediaries are relevant especially in 
resource mobilization through family and friends, and informal savings clubs.   
Again, because of the informal nature of the African economy, use of cash for 
economic activities cannot be downplayed. In addition, financially excluded people 
use informal intermediaries for their financial needs. Taking into consideration 
these factors, the author examines whether the use of formal financial 
intermediaries (i.e., account ownership) reduces the use of informal financial 
intermediaries and cash holding. Earlier studies (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991; 
Aryeetey & Udry, 1995; Besley & Levenson, 1996; Buckley, 1997; Christen, 
Lyman, & Rosenberg, 2003; Christensen, 1993; El Qorchi, Maimbo, & Wilson, 
2003) have given attention to informal intermediation in Africa. However, few 
studies have empirically examined how this can function as a trade-off or 
complementary action. Minimal attention has also been paid to the nature of the 
linkage between informal intermediaries and cash preference in the African 
economy, an oversight that needs to be addressed especially in this era of financial 
inclusion. The study fills this gap by considering whether people use formal 
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financial intermediaries, informal financial intermediaries and cash preference as 
either substitutes or complements. 
Financial services in the formal sector need to be more competitive and agile 
relative to informal alternatives, by providing easy access, low transaction costs, 
and adequate financial services that help address people’s needs. In the context of 
the developing world, and especially in Africa, as one of the most important 
emerging markets in the world, formal financial intermediation has not been 
entirely feasible. Lack of easy access because of geographical constraints, 
documentation problems because of money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, low-income clients, transaction costs, and information asymmetry have 
all become enormous challenges for formal financial intermediaries. The primary 
issue is that the transacted sums involved are often too small for a formal institution 
because the cost of advancing a loan or accepting a deposit is independent of the 
size of the transaction. Often, the cost to formal institutions of opening branches in 
villages and remote areas is not justified by the business that can be generated 
(Seibel & Parhusip, 1990).  
This study contributes to knowledge by providing empirical evidence on the impact 
of formal financial intermediation on the use of informal financial intermediation 
and cash preference in Africa.  The results of the study indicate that formal financial 
intermediation has a positive impact on the use of informal financial intermediaries 
and that informal employment increases the use of informal financial intermediaries 
(such as moneylenders and store credit). Moreover, the empirical results reveal that 
enhancing the formal financial infrastructure has the potential to reduce the use of 
cash for economic activities. This result is essential for the African continent, where 
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evidence of informal intermediation is widespread across villages and towns and its 
contribution to GDP and financial inclusion cannot be underestimated. 
This paper progresses as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature; Section 3 
explains the research methods and describes the use of variables, measurements, 
and the empirical model; Section 4 describes the data, reports the results, control 
for mobile money and discusses policy implications; and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
3.2 Literature review  
3.2.1 Theories 
Two schools of thought in the literature of informal financial intermediation exist 
regarding why the informal sector continues to endure despite the growth of the 
formal financial sector. The first school of thought is based on a financial repression 
model originating from the seminal works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
They contend that informal financial agents operate because of excessive regulation 
of the formal sector, where monetary policy intervention in the areas of directed 
credit, preferential credit allocation by governments, and interest rate ceilings 
overshadow the free market (McKinnon, 1973). This results in the distortion of the 
real economy and in government debt crowding out private sector investments, 
which leads to graft among government officials and the financial sector (Shaw, 
1973). As these issues persist, the cost of providing funds to the poor, rural dwellers, 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) becomes excessively high, which 
eventually accentuates the development of the informal financial intermediation 
sector. According to McKinnon (1973), liberalization of the financial sector will 
widen competition and lead to financial deepening, which in turn improves 
efficiency and wipes out the less efficient informal financial sector. However, 
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evidence within the informal financial market seems to counter these arguments, as 
according to (Aryeetey, 2008), there are signs of formal financial intermediaries 
borrowing ideas from the informal sector in order to better serve clients. 
The alternative school of thought attributes the existence of the informal financial 
sector to factors beyond economics (Hugon, 1990). It is contended that informal 
financial intermediation is subordinate to the formal system, where the market is 
segmented not because of regulation, but because it serves other social goals 
(Hugon, 1990). An example is the redistribution of income among community 
members and the provision of social security by meeting their fluctuating liquidity 
needs (Besley & Levenson, 1996). Furthermore, expressions of solidarity among 
members based on kinship, ethnicity, culture, and religion are equally important 
(Aryeetey & Udry, 1995). 
Extant studies have shown that informal financial intermediaries are popular among 
rural and urban dwellers (Aryeetey, 2008; Gugerty, 2007; Guirkinger, 2008). For 
instance, in Bolivia, it is reported that formal financial employees are members of 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) (Adams & Fitchett, 1992). 
Studies show that in Cameroon, Ghana, India, Sri Lanka, and most other developing 
countries, professionals and others with relatively high incomes often participate in 
most informal financial arrangements (Gugerty, 2007). The popularity of informal 
financial intermediaries among low and middle-income groups shows that people 
like to save and borrow, even under trying circumstances (Allen, Qian, & Xie, 
2018). The primary driver of people to ROSCAs is that they want to save more and 




It is imperative to note that informal financial intermediation is not an illegal 
business and does not operate exclusively in isolation. Lack of regulation does not 
mean illegality because most financial intermediaries are under the control of the 
“Cooperative Acts” of their home countries. Many financial transactions that occur 
within the informal sector end up in the hands of formal financial intermediaries, 
suggesting important linkages. The First National Bank in South Africa has been 
offering special stokvel bank accounts for group savings since 2002 (Mashigo & 
Schoeman, 2012). Seibel and Parhusip (1990) find links between informal deposit 
collectors and banks in West Africa and in other developing nations. In addition, 
commercial banks and other formal financial intermediaries in developing countries 
are exploring risk-return trade-offs (Giné, 2011) in the financial market for non-
traditional clients, where credit is extended to groups and associations against 
deposit balances kept in formal bank accounts (Aryeetey, 2008).  
3.2.2 Importance of informal financial intermediation  
 Aryeetey and Gockel (1991) describe the term "informal financial 
intermediation" as participation in all commercial saving and lending activity that 
takes place outside of formal or established financial institutions. In poor 
developing economies, where formal financial intermediaries are lacking or 
government social interventions are insufficient, households are particularly 
inclined to make use of informal relationships to cater for their extra income needs 
and to absorb risks. According to Alvi and Dendir (2009), households need to 
smooth consumption as a result of their precarious situations. They argue that in 
rural areas, for instance, informal capital accumulation is important due to weather 
calamities that negatively affect crop production, and which expose rural 
households to income shocks as prices are adversely affected. During periods of 
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illness, when the head or working members of a household are unable to work, 
financial uncertainty looms in the family too. In the case of urban areas, 
unemployment, medical expenses, and a decline in business income are likely to 
induce income swings (Alvi & Dendir, 2009).  
Informal finance, through the traditional knowledge systems, seems to be better 
equipped and structured to reduce high transaction costs and the need for collateral 
in the provision of credit to poor households (Lee & Persson, 2016). Its success lies 
in its structure (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 2008), which is embedded in the informal 
financial arrangements that the households make to provide for their financial needs. 
(Aryeetey, 2008) argues that inadequate infrastructure, information asymmetry, and 
market distortions create barriers for formal financial institutions to reach low-
income households and rural dwellers. Also, non-corporate borrowers rarely have 
collateral acceptable to banks. Their creditworthiness resides in their human capital, 
which is difficult for formal intermediaries to gauge (Buckley, 1997). To this end, 
informal intermediaries become the best options to provide the financial linkage for 
the bulk of the population. Kedir and Ibrahim (2011) suggest the positive impact of 
informal financial intermediaries, concluding that “as indigenous sources of 
working capital, saving mobilisation via ROSCAs should not be neglected in favour 
of the formal financial sector, which already failed to serve the majority of urban 
dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kedir & Ibrahim, 2011, p. p.1013)” Furthermore, 
informal intermediaries (such as moneylenders and those providing store credit) are 
primarily crucial for certain classes of entrepreneurs whose capital requirements 
exceed family resources but are not eligible to borrow from the formal sector 
(Grimard, 1997; Otero & Rhyne, 2006). 
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A counter-argument to the positive roles played by informal financial 
intermediaries also appears in the literature. Aryeetey and Udry (1995), for example, 
are of the view that informal financial intermediaries are not sufficiently 
sophisticated to scale up to appropriate volumes of businesses as needed. Another 
effect is the lack of institutional frameworks for regulation and, in particular, when 
debtors fail to honour their indebtedness, the disposal of collaterals can be 
unrestrained (Christensen, 1993). Informal financial intermediaries are often 
regarded as exploitative and serve only consumption, rather than investment, 
purposes (Nissanke & Aryeetey, 2008). However, Lee and Persson (2016) contend 
that the argument against informal intermediation is unfounded. They argue that the 
majority of informal finance comes from family and friends; these sources are not 
exploitative by nature and may even encourage entrepreneurial growth. 
As the relative importance of financial inclusion stems from the use of formal 
financial intermediaries, these counter arguments against informal financial 
intermediation strengthen the principles underlying strategies for formal inclusion. 
However, it is also argued that the informal financial sector is larger than the formal 
financial sector in terms of outreach as the former can be found in both rural and 
urban centres in all developing countries (Lee & Persson, 2016), making them 
accessible to most socioeconomic and solidarity groups (Aryeetey, 2008). The 
importance of the informal sector is seen in instances wherein the education and 
healthcare needs of individual family members are met, as are social solidarity 
requirements.  Financial inclusion efforts need not discourage the use of informal 
financial intermediaries, as the informal nature of the economies of developing 
countries acts as conduits for their use.  
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Evidence of inadequate access to formal finance, where demand ‘spill-over’ effects 
create incentives for the use of informal finance, is widely acknowledged in the 
literature (Bell et al., 1997; Hoff & Stiglitz, 1997). Jain and Mansuri (2003) find 
that both microfinance institutions and informal moneylenders exist in Bangladesh, 
with the latter thriving from the strict repayment instalments schedules imposed on 
loan seekers immediately after loans are granted by formal institutions. Similarly, 
Collins et al. (2009) show that because of their income swings, poor people 
typically use more than one type of financial intermediary to smooth their 
consumption patterns.  
3.2.3 Overview of informal financial intermediaries in Africa 
Cultural and traditional age-long arrangements that have sustained the integrity of the 
people and which bond them together are still relevant today. Arrangements in the form of 
self-help groups in which members contribute both in cash and in kind to help one another 
to overcome difficulties in areas such as farm labour, inputs, and enterprise start-ups have 
been efficient (Aryeetey, 2008; Buckley, 1997; Grimard, 1997). Through these 
arrangements, informal financial intermediation has developed among rural dwellers.  
  Informal finance, premised on traditional knowledge systems, seems to be better equipped 
and structured to reduce high transaction costs and the need for collateral in the provision 
of credit to poor households (Alvi & Dendir, 2009). Its success lies in its structure, which 
is embedded in the informal financial arrangements that the households make to provide 
for their financial needs (Kedir & Ibrahim, 2011). 
Informal financial intermediation, which encompasses a wide range of financial activities 
that go beyond formal financial systems, are usually based on personal relationships and 
socio-economic activities (Besley & Levenson, 1996). They are common mostly within the 
rural poor but have now become a common arrangement in urban areas because of rural- 
urban migration (Grimard, 1997). In addition to family and friends, who provide a large 
72 
 
percentage of the loans, informal financial intermediaries consist of professional 
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, tradespeople, and associations of acquaintances (Alvi & 
Dendir, 2009). They are available in different forms and provide one form of service or a 
combination in some instances. They are known as susu or esusu in West Africa, tontines 
in francophone countries, hawala in the Maghreb of Africa, and stokvels in South Africa. 
Professional moneylenders provide an average of 12% of the total informal intermediation 
services in Africa. 
In West Africa, susu or esusu or savings collectors provide savings services and possible 
access to credit (Buckley, 1997). In the susu arrangement, a saver agrees to deposit a 
specific amount determined in consultation with the collector for an agreed period of time 
(usually a month). At the end of the period, the susu collector renders the accumulated 
savings to the client, keeping one day's savings as commission. 
Tontines, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), accumulating savings and 
credit associations (ASCRAs), and savings clubs all serve the same purpose in different 
parts of Africa (Grimard, 1997).  Although they may vary in size and practices, the 
principles that define them are the same (Aryeetey & Udry, 1995). They are a prominent 
means to pool resources, in which members contribute fixed amounts into a pool, usually 
on a weekly or monthly basis. At the end of each collection period or at meetings, the pool 
of collected money is given to one member. This practice is then repeated until all members 
in the group have had their turns. At any time during a full cycle of dealings, members who 
are waiting their turn are creditors to the tontine or ROSCA (net savers) and those who 
have received a pool of money are debtors (net borrowers) (Besley & Levenson, 1996; 
Christensen, 1993; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 2008; Seibel & Parhusip, 1990). As the ROSCA 
moves through a cycle, these positions are rotated (Buckley, 1997). Members usually know 
each other and are bound by a common bond such as location, ethnic group, approximate 
income level, or type of enterprise activity (Buckley, 1997). All these attributes strengthen 
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social control and serve as risk management tools through their group solidarity, which 
ensure efficient management and continuity (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1997).  
Hawala is a traditional means of transferring funds across borders and within countries. It 
finds it roots in the Arabian Peninsula, as a means for financing long-distance trade around 
the emerging capital trade centres in the early medieval period (El Qorchi et al., 2003; 
Passas, 2003). It is popular in the Middle East and the Maghreb of Africa, especially in 
Somalia. The hawala system transfers funds by means of a network of hawala brokers 
called “hawaladars”, who charge a fee, or an exchange rate spread in exchange for their 
services (El Qorchi et al., 2003).  The strength of the hawala system is that it is fast, cheap, 
confidential and easily available (El Qorchi et al., 2003). 
Stokvels are savings, credit, capital generating clubs, and funeral associations found in 
South Africa (Mashigo & Schoeman, 2012), with similar principles to the Tontines and 
ROSCAs schemes. Stokvels find their origins from the term “stock fairs” which largely 
constituted rotating cattle auctions around the Eastern Cape in the 19th century (Pronyk et 
al., 2008).  Members meet weekly or monthly and deposit a certain amount of money into 
a common fund. The accumulated amount is then paid out to one of the members on a 
rotating basis. Stokvels have constitutions that guide their operations, making them highly 
efficient (Pronyk et al., 2008). It is estimated that one in every two indigenous people in 
South Africa are members of a stokvel (Mashigo & Schoeman, 2012). There are different 
types of stokvels, such as family stokvels, savings or contribution stokvels, purchasing 
stokvels, investment stokvels, and borrowing stokvels that operate and pool funds which 
are normally kept in the bank. As a result, in 2002, the First National Bank in South Africa 
began to offer special stokvel bank accounts for group savings (Mashigo & Schoeman, 
2012). 
Funeral insurance arrangements are a common stokvel product of community-based 
informal insurance associations within what is called a burial society (Mashigo & 
Schoeman, 2012), aimed at ensuring that enough funds are available to cover funeral 
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expenses. An estimated 28% of the population in South Africa and 21% in Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) are part of a burial society based on the contributions of 
its voluntary subscribers (Pronyk et al., 2008).  
In Figure 1, the author shows the use of formal and informal financial services, taken from 
the Global Findex database for African countries. Figure 1 indicates that the use of informal 
financial intermediaries is highly prevalent in Africa. Appendix 1 shows the full list of 
countries included in this figure. The percentages for the informal borrowing comprise 
borrowings from family and friends as well as borrowings from private moneylenders.  
3.3 Research questions, measurement of variables and methods  
3.3.1 Development of research questions 
Development finance literature has given significant attention to the issue of 
lending risks that arise because of opaque information, particularly in the context 
of formal financial intermediation. Due to information asymmetry, resulting from 
ex-ante and post ante moral hazard and adverse selection (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1997), 
formal financial intermediation is a practice that is unable to compete effectively in 
rural areas of developing countries. Informal financial customers, who are 
compounded with problems such as low incomes and a lack of collateral will be 
inclined to consider trade-offs or complementarity in the use of formal financial 
intermediaries.  
Individuals can decide whether to use formal or informal financial intermediation 
if they know all the costs and benefits involved (De Koker & Jentzsch, 2013). The 
decision-making processes of the poor can be more complicated than their 
counterparts above the poverty line: they are not financially illiterate, and they 
constantly weigh up choices based on the reality of their poverty (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2007). There are specific factors that influence the individual decision to 
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either use formal or informal intermediation. These factors include income, 
convenience, and ease of use, transactions costs, preference for cash usage because 
of the informal nature of the economy, and social solidarity (Karlan et al., 2014). 
However, given the lack of appropriate data to empirically test these variables, the 
author used the World Bank Global Findex data that captures information such as 
formal account ownership, informal financial intermediaries, and the use of cash 
for transactions and payments15. 
The individual factors (income, convenience, ease of use, transactions costs, and 
preference for cash usage) are validated by imposing certain conditions. These 
conditions are assumptions about the structure of preferences, such that if an 
individual who has an account in a formal financial intermediary realises that there 
are additional costs (such as inconvenience, lack of social solidarity and a 
preference to use cash), that individual may choose an alternative, resulting in a 
trade-off or complementary action. The continual process of trade-offs involves 
weighing choices based on the reality of one’s poverty and a continual battle to 
stabilize and raise income while reducing vulnerability (Henderson, 1996).  
Group members who may be constrained in accessing credit on individual bases for 
lack of collateral find it extremely important to be part of a ROSCA. According to 
Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993), savings clubs or ROSCAs provide a means of 
accumulating savings to purchase an indivisible good or starting a business more 
quickly than can be done in autarky. The social solidarity that drives individuals to 
                                                          
15 The data provides proxies on formal financial intermediation, income quintiles, types of informal 
financial intermediation, and preference for use of cash for domestic remittances and payments. See 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Klapper, L. F., Singer, D., & Van Oudheusden, P. (2015). The global findex 
database 2014: Measuring financial inclusion around the world.  
76 
 
save then becomes an important preference for a trade-off. The research addresses 
two main questions:  
(1) Does ownership of bank accounts reduce the use of informal financial 
intermediaries such as family and friends, ROSCAs and moneylenders? and  
(2) Does the informal nature of African economies serve as a conduit for cash 
preference in financial and business transactions? 
3.3.2 Measurement of financial inclusion variables 
3.3.2.1 The use of formal intermediaries   
The study uses the ownership of a bank account as a proxy for formal financial 
intermediation as a key independent variable. To be financially included, an 
individual needs an account (transaction account) from which other financial 
services can be offered. In the sample, the author tests a number of proxy variables 
for formal financial intermediation using a formal account (account ownership) in 
its generic form. These proxies include variables such as savings, borrowings, 
mobile money accounts, receipt of wages, receipt of government poverty relief 
transfers, and receipt of agricultural produce payments through the bank (see Table 
3.1 for details).  
The proxies allow us to determine whether informal financial intermediaries are 
substitutes or complements to formal financial intermediation by regressing the 
dependent informal proxies16 against the formal financial proxies. Using data from 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015), the author are able to determine the nature of the trend. 
                                                          
16 Informal financial intermediation denotes four separate variables describing how individuals 
engage in resource mobilization. These include informal savings clubs (ROSCAs), family and 
friends, moneylenders and store credit. These and the other variables used can be obtained from ibid. 
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To examine the trade-off or complementarity in savings among adults in the sample, 
the author posed the following question:  
In the PAST 12 MONTHS, have you, personally, saved or set 
aside any money by…? A. Using an account at a bank or another 
type of formal financial institution, B. Using an informal savings 
club (like ROSCA), or a person outside the family.   
 
Table 3.3 column 2, shows that on average, 15.8% of adults in the sample report 
saving with an informal intermediary, such as a savings club or ROSCA, while only 
21.3% saved in formal financial intermediaries. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) statistics 




Table 3.1 Variables description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Individual level characteristics 
Female Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and 0 otherwise Global findex 2014 
Age  Age in years  Global findex 2014 
Income: poorest 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the lowest income quintile and 0 
otherwise.  
Global findex 2014 
Income: second 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the second lowest income quintile and 
0 otherwise. 
Global findex 2014 
Income: Third 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the middle-income quintile and 0 
otherwise.  
Global findex 2014 
Income: fourth 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the second highest income quintile and 
0 otherwise. 
Global findex 2014 
Income – richest 20% Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in the highest income quintile and 0 
otherwise.  
Global findex 2014 
Primary education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has completed primary school or less, 0 otherwise Global findex 2014 
Secondary education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has completed secondary education, 0 otherwise Global findex 2014 
Tertiary education Dummy variable equal to1 if the individual has completed tertiary education or more, 0 
otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
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Urban  Dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent lives in an urban area and 0 otherwise Global findex 2014 
Formal financial outcomes 
Formal account Dummy that takes the value 1 if respondent reported to have an account at a bank, credit 
union, cooperative, or microfinance institution, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Saved money using account Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have saved or set aside money in the past 12 
months using an account at a bank, credit union, cooperative, or microfinance institution, 0 
otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Borrowed money from bank Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have borrowed money in the past 12 months 
from a bank, credit union, cooperative, or microfinance institution, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Received wages from account Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to received wage payment from employment 
through an account from a formal financial intermediary, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Received gov’t transfer into 
account 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have received government transfers through an 
account or a card from a formal financial intermediary, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Received agric pay into account Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have received payment for agricultural produce 
through an account from a formal financial intermediary, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Sent or received domestic 
remittance using account 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have sent or received domestic remittance using 
an account from a formal financial intermediary, 0 otherwise – identical variables with 
similar responds 
Global findex 2014 
Paid utility or school fees using 
account 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have paid utility bills or school fees using an 
account from a formal financial intermediary – identical variables with similar responds 
Global findex 2014 
Informal financial outcomes 
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Saved: informal savings club Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have saved or set aside money in the past 12 
months using an informal savings club (ROSCA), 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Borrowed: family and friends Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have borrowed money in the past 12 months 
from family members or friends, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Borrowed: moneylender Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have borrowed money in the past 12 months 
from a moneylender (private lender), 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Borrowed: store credit Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have had credit from a store in the past 12 
months, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Preference for cash 
Sent or received domestic 
remittance using cash 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have sent or received domestic remittance using 
cash only, 0 otherwise – identical variables with similar responds 
Global findex 2014 
Paid utility or school fees using 
cash 
Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have paid utility bills or school fees using cash 
only – identical variables with similar responds 
Global findex 2014 
Received wages in cash Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to received wage payment from employment in 
cash only, 0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Received gov’t transfer in cash Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have received government transfers in cash only, 
0 otherwise 
Global findex 2014 
Received agric pay in cash Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reported to have received payment for agricultural produce 
in cash only, 0 otherwise 





3.3.2.2 Informal financial intermediaries 
 
The information that corresponds to informal borrowing is derived from the 
following question: 
In the PAST 12 MONTHS have you, by yourself or together with 
someone else, borrowed any money from any of the following 
sources? A. Have you borrowed from a bank, or another type of 
formal financial institution? This does NOT include credit cards. 
B. Have you borrowed from a store by using instalment credit or 
buying on credit? C. Have you borrowed from family, relatives, 
or friends? D. Have you borrowed from another private lender 
(for example, a loan shark, payday lender, or pawnshop)?”  
 
From the sample, individuals within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) report that they 
borrow from mostly family and friends. This is common compared to other regions 
of Africa, as reported by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015). On average, about 11.5% of 
adults from the sample report borrowing from family and friends, compared with 
only 6.9% who borrow from banks (Table 3.3 column 2).  
The most common phenomenon within the sample was the use of a private lender, 
such as moneylenders, which constituted 34.6% of the borrowings. South Africa, 
as well as West African countries, report significant figures in the use of 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers with the sample. Another trend that emerged from 
the sample is that in North African countries, adults report borrowing from a store 
as oppose to borrowing from a financial institution. Overall, about 7.4% within the 
sample reported to have borrowed from a store, which involves the use of instalment 
credit or buying on credit.  




To test the use of cash in the domestic economy of Africa, the author measures the 
following variable proxies: sending and or receiving domestic remittance using 
cash only, payment for utility and or school fees using cash only, receipt of wages 
in cash only, receipt of government poverty relief transfers in cash only, and receipt 
of payment for agricultural produce in cash only. These variables are explained in 
Table 3.1. In terms of domestic remittances, the preference for cash and other 
methods in domestic money transfers is ascertained through the following question:  
In the PAST 12 MONTHS, have you, personally, GIVEN or 
SENT money to a relative or friend living in a different area in 
any of the following ways?  A. You handed cash to this person 
or sent cash through someone you know, B. You sent money 
through a bank or another type of formal financial institution 
(for example, at a branch, at an ATM, or through direct deposit 
into an account), C. You sent money through a mobile phone, D. 
You sent money through a money transfer service.  
 
On average, 30.1% of adults in the sample reported sending cash, while 37.4% 
received cash for domestic remittances. Comparatively, 19.1% reported using a 
formal financial intermediary to send money (Table 3.3 column 2). It is noted that 
those who reported using cash for the domestic remittances are adults with 
accounts in formal financial institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). Similarly, 
those who reported using cash to pay utility bills and school fees in the sample also 
reported having accounts in formal financial institutions. On average, 31% of 
adults reported using cash to pay utilities while 29.2% reported paying school fees 
with cash.  
In the sample, the number of reported cash receipts in wage payments for public 
employees and government transfers is relatively high. Because of the informal 
nature of the African economy, it is common practice for private employers to pay 
wages in cash.  However, those who reported receiving government transfers in 
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cash raised questions about the use of cash by government departments. On average, 
21.4% of adults in the sample reported receiving cash transfers from governments, 
compared to only 6.9% who did so from accounts in formal financial institutions 
(Table 3.3 column 2). This raised the question: what was the driving factor for a 
government decision to pay transfers in cash? 
The sample also reports the receipt of cash payments for the sale of agricultural 
produce. In SSA, where most adults work in the agriculture sector, payments in 
cash is 36.2% compared with the 28.9% of adults who get paid through the bank. 
In contrast, most adults in North Africa are not engaged in the agricultural sector as 
an economic activity  
3.2.4 Control variables 
A set of individual-level covariates are included in this study. The interest is to 
understand what drives people to make choices in the use of a financial intermediary 
-- formal or informal -- and the author hypothesized that individual characteristics 
might affect outcomes (Allen et al., 2016). The literature, for instance, contends that 
females make up the majority membership of most informal financial 
intermediaries (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991; Aryeetey & Udry, 1995; Kedir & 
Ibrahim, 2011). In the study, female respondents are expected to have a positive 
sign in the regression. Age is a linear variable and the author expected that age 
would complement the use of both formal and informal financial intermediation. 
Older adults are most likely to use formal financial intermediaries than young adults. 
Each country income quintile is expected to show a positive association with the 
use of financial intermediaries, where a higher income corresponds with formal 
financial intermediaries, and a lower income corresponds with informal financial 
intermediaries. For convenience, the income quintiles have five categories, which 
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are all dummy and which range from the poorest 20% to the richest 20%. The author 
proxies the income quintiles to denote convenience of use of financial 
intermediaries, where a trade-off is expected to occur. The author hypothesized that 
being rich or poor influences the choice of financial intermediaries, in that richer 
people are inclined to use formal financial intermediaries, whereas poor people are 
more comfortable using informal intermediaries.   
The author added the educational qualification of respondents as a further variable 
to determine if levels of education related to the use of financial intermediaries. The 
author divided this variable into three categories, primary, secondary, and tertiary 
levels of education and the author expect that primary levels would show a 
correspondence with informal and cash preferences, while secondary and tertiary 
education levels would show an association with formal financial intermediaries. 
All three categories are dummy variables that took the value of one if a respondent 
reported completing primary, secondary or tertiary education respectively, or zero 
otherwise. Table 3.1 summarizes the definitions of the variables used (all variables 
are taken from Global Findex 2014). 
3.3 Empirical model 
3.3.1 Test on informal financial intermediation 
Consider the following binary outcome model where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 
takes the value 1 if an individual, i uses an informal financial intermediary at time 
t in a country j or 0 otherwise: 
  
[𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 1) > 0] = { [𝛽1  +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝑖𝑡]  >  0}              (3.1)     
                                                            
where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 denotes the individual ownership of a bank account that may or may not 
correlate with [𝑃(𝑦 = 1) > 0]. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a set of varying individual covariates, and 
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includes proxies such as income quintiles, and age, while 𝐶𝑖𝑗  represents the 
preference for cash in an economy. 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 are parameters to be estimated, 
while 𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Model (1) represents the factors that may drive an 
individual to use informal financial intermediaries despite owning an account in a 
formal financial intermediary.  
3.3.2 Test on preference in the use of cash 
 
The author postulates a second model (3.2) to understand the use of cash in the 
African economy. The model is represented in the following equation:  
[𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) > 0] = { [𝛽1  +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡   +  𝑖𝑡]  >  0}                       (3.2)   
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗  represents the probability of the use of cash for economic purposes, 
denoted by a positive correlation between the dependent variable 𝐶𝑖𝑡  and the 
variable of interest, 𝑍𝑖𝑡. Because of informal employment, the individual covariates 
and cash preference are also perceived to produce positive outcomes.  The 
dependent variable 𝐶𝑖𝑗 represents a set of varying variables that the research set out 
to test. These include using cash for the following items: sending and receiving 
remittances, payments for utilities, payments of school fees, wage payments, 
payments for government livelihood reliefs, and payment for agriculture produce.  
3.4 Data and empirical results 
3.4.1 Data  
The data for the empirical analysis comes from the Global Findex database of the 
World Bank 2014 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015), which reports the levels of 
penetration of financial intermediaries among a number of individual covariates 
such as gender, income quintiles, educational qualification, and age. The data are 
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cross-sectional covering more than 150,000 individuals from over 140 countries, of 
which the 37 SSA and North African countries are used in the research. The data 
contains information on the number of people who use formal financial 
intermediaries, as well as the frequency of usage denoted by the number of deposits 
and withdrawals made per month. It also contains information on the use of 
informal financial intermediaries such as family and friends, savings clubs, private 
moneylenders, and store credit.  
Data on the preference of cash, however, is used cautiously as the survey questions 
did not directly ask the reasons why people prefer the use of cash over formal banks. 
The potential attributes for the use of cash may be the informal nature of the 
economies of developing countries, convenience of use as a result of the income 
levels of individuals, lack of financial education, or lack of formal financial 
infrastructure, which could have limited people’s choices and provided no 
alternatives. In any case, the data provides us with useful information in 
understanding why financial inclusion strategies need both financial infrastructure 
and commitment from various suppliers in developing countries. The data provides 
us with information on the number of people who prefer to use cash for payments 
rather than formal financial intermediaries.  
In Table 3.2, the author provides the use of formal and informal financial services, 
taken from the Global Findex database for African countries. Columns 1 to 4 
provide information on the active use of formal financial intermediation and those 
who are formally banked, thus providing the percentage of the population with 
accounts in a country and those excluded from the formal financial system (see 
column 4 in Table 3.2). Column 5 provides information on the portion of the total 
population that uses informal financial intermediaries. On average, the percentage 
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of individuals who are formally included in the financial system are 30.4%, while 
69.6% are without a bank account in any financial institution. Regarding informal 
financial services, 62.5% of individuals save or borrow informally; this includes 
individuals who save and borrow through savings clubs and credit associations such 
as ROSCAs, Tontines, and Stokvels. 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Algeria 13.1 2.2 50.5 49.5 3.4 14.7 
Angola 14.9 2.8 29.3 71.7 11.9 22 
Benin 7.1 7.6 16.6 83.4 36.8 26.9 
Botswana 26.6 13 52 48 35.4 70.3 
Burkina Faso 8.7 5 14.4 85.6 18 32.9 
Burundi 4 1.5 7.1 92.9 8.1 51.9 
Cameron 7.7 1.9 12.2 81.8 34.6 43.8 
Chad 4.6 2.4 12.4 81.6 20.1 27.6 
DRC-Congo 4.7 2.4 17.5 82.5 15.4 46.9 
Congo 9.8 4.4 17.1 82.9 24.1 30 
Cote d'voire 8.9 2.3 34.3 65.7 22.9 36.3 
Egypt 4.1 6.3 14.1 85.9 11.8 24 
Ethiopia 13.6 7.4 21.8 78.2 29.8 26.6 
Gabon 18 4.3 33 67 24.7 38 
Ghana 18.6 8.1 40.5 59.5 21.5 25.9 
Guinea 2.9 2 7 93 18.7 40.7 
Kenya 30.2 14.9 74.7 25.3 39.9 67.8 
Madagasca 3.3 2 8.6 91.4 1.4 54.3 
Malawi 7.1 6 18.1 81.9 28 58.3 
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Mali 2.9 2.7 20.1 79.9 23.5 35.4 
Mauritania 10.6 7.7 22.9 77.1 11.6 34.9 
Mauritius 35.5 17.1 82.2 17.8 5.9 3.7 
Namibia 26.7 6.9 58.8 41.2 9.5 32.4 
Niger 2 1.4 6.7 93.3 27.9 57.5 
Nigeria 27.1 5.3 44.4 55.6 23 39.2 
Rwanda 25.5 8.2 42.1 57.9 24.1 38.5 
Senegal 6.6 3.5 15.4 84.6 28.6 43.9 
Sierra Leone 10.9 4 15.6 84.4 39.3 49.3 
Somalia 2.8 2 38.7 61.3 15.1 50 
South Africa 32.7 12.1 70.3 29.7 30.6 87.8 
Sudan 7.5 4.2 15.3 84.7 21.9 39.6 
Tanzania 9 6.5 39.8 60.2 13.1 46.5 
Togo 6.7 3.7 18.3 81.7 18.7 19.3 
Tunisia 10.3 8 27.4 72.6 1.3 19.4 
Uganda 16.8 15.7 44.4 55.6 36.7 75.7 
Zambia 16.8 4.8 35.6 64.5 24.3 59.6 
Zimbabwe 5.2 4 32.4 67.6 17.8 60.2 
Average 12.5 5.8 30.4 69.6 21.1 41.4 
*SSA 
average 
15.9 6.3 34.2 65.8 23.9 46.6 




Table 3.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual level Characteristics 
    
Female 37,102 0.493 0.500 0 1 
Age 37,073 34.952 15.317 15 99 
Age Squared 37,073 1456.213 1324.506 225 9801 
Income: Poorest 20% 37,102 0.165 0.371 0 1 
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Income: Second 20% 37,102 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Income: Third 20% 37,102 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Income: fourth 20% 37,102 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Income: Richest 20% 37,102 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Primary education 37,100 0.535 0.499 0 1 
Secondary education 37,100 0.411 0.492 0 1 
Tertiary education 37,100 0.054 0.226 0 1 
Rural 37,102 0.476 0.408 
  
Formal financial Outcomes 
     
Formal account 37,102 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Savings with account 37,102 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Received wages: Account 37,102 0.134 0.475 0 1 
Gov't transfer: Account 33,588 0.069 0.495 0 1 
Agriculture pay: Account 37,102 0.289 0.297 0 1 
Borrowed from bank 37,102 0.069 0.253 0 1 
Sent rem.: Account 37,102 0.191 0.458 0 1 
Received rem.: Account 37,102 0.335 0.441 0 1 
Paid School fees: Account 37,102 0.261 0.369 0 1 
Paid utility: Account 37,102 0.232 0.382 0 1 
Informal financial Outcomes 
     
Saved: Informal 37,102 0.158 0.364 0 1 
Borrowed: family/friends 37,102 0.115 0.320 0 1 
Borrowed: Moneylender 37,102 0.346 0.476 0 1 
Borrowed: Store credit 36,102 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Preference for Cash 
     
Agriculture pay: Cash 37,102 0.362 0.480 0 1 
Received wages: Cash 37,102 0.072 0.480 0 1 
Gov't transfer: Cash 33,588 0.214 0.261 0 1 
Sent remittance: Cash 34,152 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Received remittance: Cash 34,234 0.374 0.484 0 1 
Paid School fees: Cash 34,118 0.292 0.454 0 1 
Paid utility: Cash 34,594 0.310 0.462 0 1 
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Overall Table 3.2 shows that the informal sector dominates the savings and 
borrowings activities and 69.6% of the population is formally excluded from using 
formal financial intermediaries. Further, the SSA averages reveal that formal 
intermediaries are used more for savings (15.9%) than for borrowings (6.3%), and 
the reverse applies to the use of informal intermediaries, which are used twice as 
much for borrowing (46.6%) when compared to saving (23.9%).  Additionally, the 
author note that the percentage of population formally excluded from use of formal 
financial intermediaries varies greatly. For example, Burundi appears to be 
financially under-developed or underused as 92.9% are financially excluded, 
whereas in Mauritius, only 17.8% do not have active formal savings or borrowing 
accounts. However, the range of activity also varies considerably across the 37 
countries (see Table 3.4 below). Based on this data, the author argue that informal 
financial intermediaries are prevalent in Africa. 
Table 3.4 Saving and borrowing activities using formal and informal 
intermediaries 
 Formal Informal 
Activity Low High Low High 
Savings 2.0% 35.5% 1.3% 39.9% 
Borrowings 1.4% 17.1% 3.7% 87.9% 
Source: Global Findex 2014. 
3.4.2 Financial inclusion and informal financial intermediation 
The model from Table 3.5 examines whether formal financial inclusion, in the form 
of savings and credit accounts ownership in banks, lowers the use of informal 
financial intermediaries in Africa, vis-à-vis trade-offs or complementarity. Table 
3.5 column 1 indicates ownership of formal bank accounts positively correlates 
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with the use of informal financial intermediaries such as savings clubs and ROSCAs 
in Africa. This increases the likelihood of the use of informal financial 
intermediaries by 22.8% for every 1% increase in account ownership and by 7.9% 
if individuals have active savings accounts in formal financial institutions. These 
results are significant at the 0.01 significance level. The results also indicate that 
women and young adults are more likely to use informal financial intermediaries 
than men or older adults. However, an increase in income and educational levels 
decreases the likelihood of individuals using informal financial intermediation. 
Wealthy individuals and people who attain higher education levels are less inclined 
to choose informal finance relative options over formal financial intermediaries.  
Table 3.5 Probit model on the impact of financial inclusion on informal 
savings and borrowing in 37 African countries 
[𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 1) > 0] = { [𝛽1  +  𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝑖𝑡]  >  0} 




















     
Formal Account 0.228*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Female 0.009*** 0.006** 0.004 -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age Squared -4.650*** -5.081*** -3.720*** -0.000*** 
 (6.240) (6.130) (4.710) (9.120) 
Income: Poorest 20% -0.047*** 0.027*** -0.007* 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
Income: Second 20% -0.055*** 0.034*** -0.003 -0.014* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Income: Third 20% -0.045*** 0.024*** -0.002 -0.016** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Income: Fourth 20% -0.028*** 0.019*** -0.006** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Primary Education -0.084*** -0.062*** -0.012** -0.084*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) 
Secondary Education -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.009** -0.070*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) 
Formal Savings 0.079***    
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 (0.003)    
Formal borrowing  0.091*** 0.166*** 0.048*** 





















Each column represents the estimation results of a regression of financial inclusion on informal 
financial intermediation, a set of individual characteristics and country fixed effects. Column (1) is 
informal savings club and Columns (2), (3) and (4) represent informal borrowings. Marginal effects 
are reported, whiles the omitted variables are the richest 20% and tertiary education. Standard errors 
are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * Significance at 10% level, ** significance 
at 5% level and ***significance at 1% level. 
 
In Table 3.5, columns 2, 3 and 4, the probability of individuals borrowing from 
family and friends, accessing credit from the store, and using moneylenders for their 
financial needs increase significantly when they have accounts in formal financial 
institutions, i.e., an increase by 5.2%, 6.8%, and 1.6% respectively. The results also 
indicate that women, as compared with men, are more likely to borrow from family 
and friends and less from moneylenders. Women may be deterred by the 
mechanisms used by moneylenders to influence repayments for their loans.  Having 
a formal loan gives a strong indication of the use of informal finance in Africa. 
Repayment arrangements wherein borrowers are forced to start repaying their loans 
immediately after receiving the loan encourages borrowers to use informal finance 
mechanisms in order to satisfy the repayment schedules and avoid being tagged as 
poor creditworthy persons. The author confirms the findings by Jain and Mansuri 
(2003) who examine why people make parallel use of microfinance institutions and 
moneylenders for their financial needs.  
Table 3.5 shows that an increase in income levels of individuals significantly 
increases the likelihood of borrowing from family and friends (column 2) but not 
from a store (column 3). Short-term revenue disparities where enterprise owners 
need money to pay for goods and services at short notice may be a reason why 
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borrowing from family and friends become efficient. The use of moneylenders also 
decreases with higher levels of income.  Use of informal finance negatively 
correlates with levels of educational attainment, where a 1% increase in education 
leads to a 6.2% reduction in the use of informal finance (borrowing from family 
and friends). Similarly, individuals with higher educational qualifications are less 
likely to borrow from moneylenders.  
3.4.3 Financial inclusion and cash preference 
The results of the preference of cash for transactions instead of bank-based 
mechanisms is shown in Table 3.6. Columns 2 to 4 reveal a strong negative 
correlation between account ownership in formal financial intermediaries and the 
resultant preference for cash transactions. The results indicate that individuals who 
have bank accounts are less likely to use cash for domestic remittances and to pay 
for utility and school fees (if these services provide account-based payments 
services). The author observes that individuals who have used banks for domestic 
remittance services may also have a strong desire to use cash for the same purpose. 
These results are consistent with the literature that attribute the use of cash for 
domestic remittances to the under-developed payment systems across Africa (Alvi 




Table 3.6 Probit model on the impact of financial inclusion on cash 
preference in domestic remittance, and payments for utility and school fees in 
37 African countries. 
[𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 1) > 0] = { [𝛽1  + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡]  >  0} 
























     
Formal Account -0.001 -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Female 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age Squared 1.050 8.070 4.870 -7.610 
 (7.190) (5.131) (4.560) (5.751) 
Income: Poorest 20% -0.012* -0.006 0.000 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Income: Second 20% -0.0102* -0.015*** -0.000 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Income: Third 20% -0.005 -0.008** 0.004 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Income: Fourth 20% -0.006 -0.005* 0.005* 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Primary Education 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.007* 0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Secondary Education 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.005 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
D.Remit: Account 0.025*** 0.026***   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
Utility Payment: A/c   -0.001  
   (0.003)  
Fees Payment: A/c    0.004 
    (0.003) 











Each column represents the estimation results of a regression of financial inclusion on cash 
preference, a set of individual characteristics and country fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) are 
domestic remittance (sending and receiving cash), and Columns (3) and (4) represent utility and 
school fees payments by cash. Marginal effects are reported, whiles the omitted variables are the 
richest 20% and tertiary education. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country 
level. * Significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level and ***significance at 1% level. 
 
The author surmise, however, that the trend is changing because of the introduction 
of mobile money in most parts of the region (Asongu, 2015). Increasing income 
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levels can reduce the inclination to use cash in domestic remittances and bills 
payments, but the same does not apply to education levels. About 45% of domestic 
remittances in Africa are from urban centres to the hinterlands. This is because 
educated family members who gain employment in urban centres often remit 
money for family upkeep in villages and towns; where there is no viable money 
transfer infrastructure, the use of cash is widespread (Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, 
& Tierney, 2016; Asongu, 2018). 
Table 3.7 reports the results of the estimation for individuals preferring cash for the 
following: receipts of wage payments by public employees, government transfers 
in the form of livelihood relief for families and individuals, and the receipts of 
payments for the sale of agricultural produce. In all columns, the probability for 
cash inclination relative to bank account ownership strongly reduces by a margin 
of 2.8%, 21.4% and 0.08% for public employees’ wage payments, government 
transfers, and agricultural payments respectively. A reduction is also recorded for 
income and education.  
Table 3.7 Probit model on the impact of financial inclusion on cash 
preference for receipt of wages, government transfers and agricultural 
payments in 37 African countries. 
[𝑃(𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 1) > 0] = { [𝛽1  + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡]  >  0} 





















    
Formal Account -0.028** -0.214*** -0.008*** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.002) 
Female 0.003 -0.025** -0.002** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.001) 
Age 0.008*** -0.000 -9.631 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
Age Squared -6.070** -4.320 1.030 
 (2.620) (1.941) (2.450) 
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Income: Poorest 20% -0.055*** -0.061*** 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.002) 
Income: Second 20% -0.057*** -0.074*** 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.002) 
Income: Third 20% -0.041*** -0.033* 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) 
Income: Fourth 20% -0.020 -0.025 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.002) 
Primary Education -0.200*** 0.041* 3.090 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.002) 
Secondary Education -0.064*** -0.015 -0.002 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.002) 
Wage Receipt: A/c -0.266***   
 (0.009)   
Gov. Transfer: A/c  -0.209***  
  (0.014)  
Agric. Payment: A/c   0.007*** 
   (0.001) 









Each column represents the estimation results of a regression of financial inclusion on cash 
preference, a set of individual characteristics and country fixed effects. Column (1) is receipt of 
employee cash wage payment, (2) is receipt of cash gov’t transfer, and (3) denote receipt of cash 
agricultural produce payment. Marginal effects are reported, whiles the omitted variables are the 
richest 20% and tertiary education. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country 
level. * Significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level and ***significance at 1% level. 
The above results are, however, more suggestive than conclusive, because the 
Global Findex survey does not specifically ask respondents about their preference 
for using cash instead of bank accounts in their day-to-day financial and business 
transactions. Consequently, the author is cautious about the use of proxies to effect 
causations.  
3.4.4 Control for mobile money 
The focus of this study is to understand how formal financial inclusion in the form 
of owning bank accounts in formal financial institutions affects the use of informal 
financial intermediaries in Africa. However, the 2014 Global Findex database that 
underpins this study defines ownership of a bank account to include mobile money 
accounts.  Technological advancements in financial services delivery, particularly 
the introduction of mobile money in Africa, means that the fundamentals of 
financial inclusion have expanded, and formal account ownerships are no longer 
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sourced from formal financial intermediaries exclusively. According to the Global 
Findex data 2014, “the definition of a mobile money account is limited to services 
that can be used without an account at a financial institution. Adults using a mobile 
money account linked to their financial institution are considered to have an account 
at a financial institution” (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015, p.4). In analyzing the data, 
the author found that a number of countries have more mobile money accounts than 
traditional formal bank accounts and some of these accounts are used for savings 
and borrowings. Again, because of the dichotomous nature of most of the variables, 
respondents who report having used mobile money sparingly (at least once in 12 
months) are likely to be excluded in the dataset. This means that some respondents 
could be inadvertently excluded from the sample when in fact Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the leader in mobile money technology (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2015).  
To ensure that the reported results on the impact of financial inclusion on informal 
savings, informal borrowings, and cash preference remained robust in the context 
of mobile money, the author removed the observations with mobile money accounts. 
This reduced the number of observations in the sample from 37,071 to 33,015. The 
results are shown in Table 3.8. After excluding the observations of mobile money, 
the impact of financial inclusion on informal savings and informal borrowings is 
still positive and significant (coeff. = 0.240 with p-value < 0.01 and 0.026 with p-
value < 0.01, respectively), which is consistent with Table 3.417. Moreover, the 
                                                          
17 In Table 3.4, the informal borrowing variable has three categories (family and friends, store credit 
and moneylenders) which are all forms of informal borrowings. In Table 3.7 however, the author 
put them together as one variable of informal borrowing. This is because the study is interested in 




impact of financial inclusion on cash preference is significantly negative (coeff. = 
-0.011 with p-value < 0.01), which is consistent with Table 3.5 and Table 3.618. 
Table 3.8 Probit regression results (censored data) on the relationship 
between financial inclusion and informal savings, informal borrowings, and 
cash preference. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡  +    𝛽1𝑍𝑖𝑡  +     𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡+     𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑡  +    𝑖𝑡                                                                      
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Informal savings 
clubs 
Informal borrowings Cash preference 
 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Formal Account 0.240*** 0.026*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) 
Female 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.001) 
Age 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.060*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age Squared -0.250*** -4.010*** 7.120*** 
 (3.020) (2.021) (5.210) 
Income: Poorest 20% 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.054) 
Income: Second 20% 0.002** 0.011*** -0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.024) (0.000) 
Primary Education 0.002*** 0.048*** 0.002* 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
Secondary Education 0.018** 0.027** 0.029* 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.023) 
Formal Savings 0.020***   
 (0.008)   
Formal borrowings  0.032***  
  (0.008)  
Wage Receipt: A/c   -0.013*** 
   (0.021) 
Gov. Transfer: A/c   -0.044*** 
   (2.013) 
Agric. Payment: A/c   0.028*** 
   (0.081) 
D.Remit: Account   0.001*** 
   (0.003) 
Utility Payment: A/c   -0.001** 
   (0.105) 
Fees Payment: A/c   0.022*** 
   (0.043) 
Observations 33,015 33,015 14,221 
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.338 0.367 
                                                          
18 Tables 5 and 6 have several variables of cash preference with their corresponding formal financial 
institutions accounts ownerships that help us to define which activity involves the use of cash or 
banks. However, in Table 3.7 column 3, the author chose a generic title to represent all the cash 
preference variables for simplicity, but regress each form of cash preference against their 
corresponding bank accounts ownership forms as reported in column 3 of Table 3.7. 
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The probit regression accounts for the censored data set of the number of respondents who report to 
have formal financial institutions bank accounts, excluding mobile money accounts at the country 
level. Each column represents the estimation results of a regression of informal savings, informal 
borrowing and cash preference, on financial inclusion (bank accounts), a set of individual 
characteristics and country fixed effects. The omitted variables are the richest 20% and tertiary 
education. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * Significance 
at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level and ***significance at 1% level. 
 
Having ensured that the sample without mobile money observations still holds with 
the null hypothesis that formal financial intermediation correlates positively with 
informal financial intermediation, the author then reran the regression with mobile 
money accounts as an additional control variable. This test was essential to 
understand whether accounting for mobile money accounts would alter the 
significant relationships between the variables of interest or not. The results are 
listed in Table 3.9. First, the coefficient on the variable of mobile money accounts 
is positive and significant, which indicates the importance of mobile money 
accounts, and supports the current finding in the literature (Kate & Mann, 2016). 
Importantly, the variable of formal account is positive and significant for the 
regression of informal savings and informal borrowings (coeff. = 0.261 with p-
value < 0.01 and 0.045 with p-value < 0.01, respectively), which is consistent with 
Table 3.4. Furthermore, consistent with Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, the coefficient on 
formal account is negative and significant for the regression of cash preference 
(coeff. = -0.015 with p-value < 0.01). In sum, the author finds that the impact of 
financial inclusion on informal savings, informal borrowings, and cash preference, 






Table 3.9 Probit regression results (uncensored full data) on the relationship 
between financial inclusion and informal savings, informal borrowings, and 
cash preference. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡  +    𝛽1𝑍𝑖𝑡  +     𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡+     𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑡  +    𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡  +    𝑖𝑡 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Informal savings 
clubs 
Informal borrowings Cash preference 
 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Formal Account 0.261*** 0.045*** -0.015*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Mobile money Account 0.221*** 0.009*** 0.029*** 
 (0.102) (0.022) (0.0211) 
Female 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.013*** 
 (0.008) (0.052) (0.005) 
Age 0.001*** 0.020*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age Squared -0.310*** -2.000*** 5.010*** 
 (5.011) (1.044) (2.002) 
Income: Poorest 20% 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) 
Income: Second 20% 0.024** 0.025*** -0.051** 
 (0.013) (0.095) (0.009) 
Primary Education 0.150*** 0.019*** 0.062* 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Secondary Education 0.015** 0.068** 0.014* 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) 
Formal Savings 0.021***   
 (0.011)   
Formal borrowings  1.083***  
  (0.006)  
Wage Receipt: A/c   -0.069*** 
   (0.248) 
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Gov. Transfer: A/c   -0.079*** 
   (2.064) 
Agric. Payment: A/c   0.032*** 
   (0.001) 
D.Remit: Account   0.049*** 
   (0.008) 
Utility Payment: A/c   -0.024** 
   (0.005) 
Fees Payment: A/c   0.021*** 
   (0.026) 
Observations 37,071 37,071 18,731 
Pseudo R2 0.485 0.342 0.323 
The probit regression accounts for the uncensored data to allow for unbiased coefficients of the 
independent variables. The mobile money account is a control variable that test the relative 
relationship of the dependent and independent variable of interest (informal financial intermediation 
and formal financial institutions bank accounts respectively). Each column represents the estimation 
results of informal savings, informal borrowings and cash preference, on financial inclusion (bank 
accounts and mobile money), a set of individual characteristics and country fixed effects respectively. 
Marginal effects are reported, whiles the omitted variables are the richest 20% and tertiary education. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. * Significance at 10% level, 
** significance at 5% level and ***significance at 1% level. 
 
3.4.5 Discussion and policy implication  
In order to design appropriate instruments that serve to strengthen financial 
inclusion and raise efficiency, it is essential to understand the various reasons why 
households use both formal and informal financial intermediaries. Understanding 
local contexts is an essential element for the effective design of an inclusive 
financial system that can stand the test of time.  
Incentives for the complementary use of formal and informal financial 
intermediation dwell in the features of the services offered. Affordability, social 
solidarity, eligibility, and accessibility frontiers are particularly important when 
choosing to use a financial service (Armendariz & Morduch, 2007; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2008). In the case of affordability, individuals 
consider factors such as the costs of maintaining savings accounts, interest charges 
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for credits, and fees paid in money transfers (such as mobile money). Social 
solidarity relates to the social capital and interactions that serve as norms for 
effective behaviours within savings and loans groups, such as the ROSCAs, 
Tontines, and savings clubs. Eligibility determines whether an individual can make 
use of particular services, while accessibility involves questions of ease or difficulty 
in reaching the location of a service point (Aryeetey & Gockel, 1991; Aryeetey & 
Udry, 1995; Otero & Rhyne, 2006).  A trade-off, therefore, occurs if marginal utility 
(preferences) in satisfying a need is found to be more in one intermediation or both 
when preferences are complementary.   
Informal financial intermediaries, especially ROSCA’s and moneylenders, need to 
be included in the regulation of financial services. The literature and available data 
indicate that informal financial intermediaries serve much of the population in 
Africa. Therefore, regulating the informal financial sector will have a more 
significant impact on the number of people who will be financially included. A 
number of countries, such as Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya, have initiated this 
process; however, more needs to be done in terms of coverage, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation to be consistent with current changes and trends. One 
of the major problems faced by regulators in Africa is the use of ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
regulation mechanisms that group different forms of financial intermediaries with 
minimal consideration of their differing roles and structures. Regulatory 
frameworks, however, need to be context and situation-based if they are to be 
effectively and efficiently implemented.  Policymakers need to prioritise this issue 
in order to harness the benefits that come with financial inclusion.  
Technological advancement in financial services delivery has changed the 
landscape of the financial system of Africa and other parts of the world. Mobile 
103 
 
money has been seen as a good alternative for financial inclusion, with its uptake 
defying the scale and depth of poverty in Africa. Statistics show that Sub-Saharan 
Africa has become the hub of mobile money accounts ownership (Demirguc-Kunt 
et al., 2018). Rural Africa, where more informal financial intermediation occurs, 
can take advantage of mobile money to gain financial inclusion. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The research set out to examine if ownership of bank accounts reduces the use of 
informal financial intermediaries and if a preference for using cash in financial and 
business transactions existed in Africa. Data was drawn from the World Bank 
Global Findex 2014 for 37 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and employed 
approximately 37,000 observations.   
The research supports the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015) which showed 
that the population of Africa widely accesses informal financial services. The 
theoretical literature explains why individuals use informal financial intermediaries 
when formal financial intermediaries are available. Credit rationing, high interest 
rates, and a reliance on collaterals to avert risks make formal credit more expensive. 
Insufficient collateral may force people out of formal credit markets. Comparatively, 
informal lenders, due to their information advantages and proximity, can substitute 
effective screening and monitoring for collateral (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1993). Kochar 
(1995) suggests that the informal sector may also be the sector of choice, arguing 
that informal loans, particularly those from family and friends, may be cheaper than 
formal loans and thus preferred by borrowers. 
The empirical results from the research indicate that using formal financial 
intermediaries positively correlates with the use of informal financial 
intermediation. These findings confirm the argument of De Koker and Jentzsch 
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(2013) that the use of formal banking does not translate into a reduction in the use 
of informal finance. Collins et al. (2009) conclude that individuals who own bank 
accounts in South Africa also use informal financial arrangements, especially if 
there is a mismatch between individual preference and the products and services 
provided by banks. Kate and Mann (2016) also find complementary evidence of the 
links between mobile money and informal financial intermediation in Africa. 
Regarding savings, the results show that individuals who own accounts in formal 
financial institutions are members of savings clubs and ROSCAs. A 1% increase in 
formal account ownership leads to a 22.8% increase in the use of savings clubs and 
ROSCAs. The argument that the informal sector is used as a last resort for loans 
cannot be sustained. 
The widespread use of cash in trade, attributed to the informal nature of the 
economies of Africa, is recorded in the literature. The Global Findex 2014 survey 
does not specifically ask respondents about their preference for using cash in their 
day-to-day financial transactions. The author use proxies to estimate this variable; 
consequently, the author are cautious in interpreting the results regarding the 
preference for cash. However, the estimations show that where formal financial 
intermediaries are available, preference for cash reduces. Growth in the formal 
financial infrastructure could trigger economic growth by mobilizing excess 
liquidity in the form of cash that is outside the banking sector. It is clear that 
financial inclusion has the potential to reduce the use of cash in the African 
economy. The author suggest that future research opportunities may lie in the 
following topics:  
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 why households use both formal and informal financial 
intermediaries, incorporating an examination of the local context of 
their decision; 
 what driving factors exist for a government decision to pay 
transfers in cash; 
 why households access one particular form of financial 
intermediary; and  
 why households prefer cash-based transactions over bank-
based transactions.  
The author recommends that efforts be made to ensure that a greater proportion of 
those who are currently in the financially excluded category are introduced to, and 
catered for by, the various financial intermediaries within the financial system with 
a particular reference to mobile money. Regulation mechanisms should reflect the 
different forms, roles, and structures of both formal and informal financial 
intermediaries. Regulatory frameworks need to be context and situation-based. 
Policies that affect how financial intermediation should be regulated need to be 
broadened to cover the informal sector.   
The author conclude that ownership of bank accounts is complemented by the use 
of informal financial intermediaries and a preference for using cash in financial and 
business transactions in Africa tends to exist when formal financial intermediaries 
are not available. At the same time, it appears that the individual country context is 
essential. More research is needed to ascertain the individual country characteristics 





Mobile money adoption and financial inclusion 
4.1 Introduction 
Mobile money is considered by many as the new service frontier for financial 
inclusion, especially in Africa. This innovation has created tremendous 
opportunities for both service providers and users. Prior research states that only 
23% of adults in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) living below 2 USD per day possess a 
formal bank account (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). The mobile phone is offering 
opportunities for financial access to previously unbanked segments of the 
population. The increased penetration of mobile phones for MM among the poor of 
Africa has concerned policymakers and development experts, especially in respect 
to the poverty level of the people and the drivers for mobile money penetration 
(Aker & Mbiti, 2010). 
The findings of prior researchers have provided some understanding of the key 
drivers of consumer adoption and acceptance of mobile money in Africa, with key 
reference to the M-PESA of Kenya. These observations, in particular, include 
factors such as networks of agents, poor financial infrastructure development, and 
vigorous marketing, leading to the explosive adoption of mobile money.  The high 
number of consumers adopting mobile money since the inception of the Kenyan M-
PESA in 2007 provides assurance that consumers are willing to engage. The issue 
that needs to be addressed is “whether post-adoption attitudes and intentions will 
allow users to continue to use this innovation in the future”, as in traditional 
financial inclusion models19. Given the significance of mobile money usage, it is 
                                                          
19 Empirical evidence of poor take up and inadequate continuous use of bank accounts in randomised 
control trials (RCTs) research provide evidence of the consequences of failing to address context 
based factors before interventions and innovations are rolled out. More details can be found in Dupas, 
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necessary to identify the factors that affect continuous usage of mobile money in 
Africa. This proposition is the motivation for conducting this research.  
This study contributes to literature by providing empirical evidence on critical 
context-based factors (modelled using TAM) that leads to long-term, adoption and 
continuous usage of mobile money, especially in rural Africa. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, this is the first piece of research that critically examines 
context-based factors in the African region. Given the high practical relevance of 
prior empirical work, this research develops and tests an integrative model of 
factors determining consumers’ adoption and use of mobile money services.  
Mobile money costs that comprise service pricing, supply of electricity for mobile 
phone functionality, mobile network infrastructure development, regulation, and 
income disparities are essential determinants of current and future adoption and 
usage patterns beyond the endogenous factors of agent networks and marketing. An 
in-depth study that includes these factors may lead to greater consumer acceptance 
when the cost implication of this innovation is relatively lower than traditional 
alternatives such as money transfer through banks and informal mechanisms 
through bus drivers in the long run (Schierz, Schilke, & Wirtz, 2010). The 
preliminary results show that electricity availability, which denotes ubiquity, is a 
significant factor for the adoption and continuous usage of mobile money in Africa, 
and that perceived cost of mobile money is still in the agreed threshold compared 
to traditional money transfer mechanisms, such as banks and informal systems. 
Moreover, perceived income disparity is not a significant factor that determines the 
                                                          
P., Green, S., Keats, A., & Robinson, J. (2012). Challenges in Banking The Rural Poor: Evidence 
From Kenya's Western Province. National Bureau of Economic Research, Karlan, D., Ratan, A. L., 
& Zinman, J. (2014). Savings By and For The Poor: A Research Review and Agenda. Review of 
Income and Wealth, 60(1), 36-78.  
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continuous adoption and usage of mobile money in Africa. The results suggest that 
enabling mobile money regulation is a significant factor for mobile money adoption 
in Africa. 
The rest of this paper is formulated as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and provides an account of the state of mobile money in Africa; Section 
3 provides the hypotheses development, research model and method for testing 
these hypotheses in this study; Section 4 describes the data, measurement, and the 
empirical results; Section 5 discusses the results and policy implications; and 
Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Review of related literature 
Dermish, Kneiding, Leishman, and Mas (2011) observed that financial inclusion is 
the main reason for the introduction of mobile money because financial transactions 
take place without the use of a bank account.  Ideally, mobile money enables easy 
transfer of e-money in a secure, convenient and economical way. This is likened to 
the creation of a “pseudo account” when a person purchases e-money from an agent 
(Aker & Mbiti, 2010). Donner and Tellez (2008) contend that mobile transactions 
in developing countries enable users to do three main things: store value in an 
account, convert cash into and out of the bank account, and transfer stored value 
between accounts. Donovan (2012) states that the use of technology to extend 
financial services to the poor has become an urgent challenge, owning to the fact 
that over 1.5 billion individuals and households are reported to be without bank 
accounts. The use of innovative technology, especially mobile money, is considered 
a “quick fix” because of the easy adoption of mobile phones by the poor. A lack of 
access to instruments and to a means through which the poor can improve their lives 
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has been identified as hampering their efforts to escape poverty. For instance, 
exclusion from the financial system is seen as an impediment for the poor to 
improve their lives (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). 
The adoption of mobile money has helped in the generation of employment 
opportunities; created platforms for other businesses to grow; improved production; 
and efficiency gains have lowered the costs of transactions and operations. It also 
serves as a platform for bill payment. Innovation in bill payments can become a 
huge relief for utility providers in Africa, where bill payments are characterised by 
inefficiency and long queues that completely lower productivity. In addition, rural 
areas that lack the traditional financial infrastructures can benefit from the 
transformational innovative ability of mobile money to extend financial services to 
them (Aker et al., 2016; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Evans & Pirchio, 2014; Gencer, 2011; 
Jack & Suri, 2014). The public-private partnerships (PPPs) policy of African 
governments can help further development in extending the telecommunication 
infrastructure to rural areas.  
Mobile money as a new innovation can empower poor people to improve their lives 
and to escape poverty. Studies have demonstrated how mobile money innovation 
has helped to stabilise and secure the domestic money transfers for improved 
standards of living. Jack and Suri (2014) find that households that adopt M-PESA 
are better able to absorb shocks and experience improved consumption than their 
peers who do not use it. This is because they receive more remittances and lose less 
in terms of transaction costs, compare to those who receive money transfers in the 
traditional and informal forms. Aker et al. (2016) compare the use of mobile money 
and physical cash remittances in a drought crisis in Niger. In randomly selected 
households, they find that those who use mobile money to send and receive money 
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enjoy lower variable costs, better diets, and depletion of fewer assets compared to 
those households that send physical cash. Asongu (2015) empirically verified the 
impact of mobile phone penetration on African income re-distribution at the 
macroeconomic level and found that mobile penetration is pro-poor, as it correlates 
positively with income equality effects. 
Empirical studies on the adoption of mobile money have recently grown in the 
literature. For instance, Murendo, Wollni, De Brauw, and Mugabi (2018), in their 
study of social network effects on mobile money adoption in Uganda, find that 
mobile money adoption is positively influenced by the size of the social network 
with which information is exchanged, controlling for correlated effects and other 
information sources. In addition, they find that the effect of the social network is 
particularly pronounced for non-poor households. Gosavi (2018), who looks at 
mobile money and firms’ access to finance in Eastern Sub-Saharan-Africa (SSA), 
indicates that firms that adopt and use mobile money are more likely to obtain loans 
or lines of credit after controlling for a large number of firm-level characteristics 
and using a newly introduced measure to identify the access-to-finance status of 
firms. (Gosavi, 2018) also shows that the firms that use mobile money are more 
productive than other firms in the region.  
Hanafizadeh, Behboudi, Koshksaray, and Tabar (2014) look at mobile-banking 
adoption by Iranian bank clients and find that adaptation with lifestyle and trust are 
the most significant antecedents in explaining the adoption of mobile banking. A 
study that looks at alternative banking services provision for the poor by Hinson 
(2011) argues that the poor can be offered banking services through the use of 
mobile technologies if the traditional financial setting does not allow the poor 
access to financial services.  By proposing a mobile banking model, Hinson (2011) 
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conceptualised the key ways by which mobile phone technology can be used to 
increase pathways to banking access for poor people.  Alalwan, Dwivedi, and Rana 
(2017) study the factors influencing adoption of mobile banking by Jordanian bank 
customers using an extended UTAUT2 with trust. The results show that behavioural 
intention is significantly and positively influenced by performance expectancy, 
effort expectancy, hedonic motivation, price value and trust. They maintain that a 
successful implementation of mobile banking largely depends on the extent to 
which customers are fully motivated to adopt mobile banking. Chaouali, Souiden, 
and Ladhari (2017) find in their study that intentions to adopt mobile banking is 
determined by attitudes toward mobile banking, which in turn is determined by 
attitudes toward success, attitudes toward failure, and attitudes toward learning to 
use mobile banking, in which the last three attitudes are significantly influenced by 
general self-confidence and cynicism.  
Evidence of high costs leading to slow uptake of mobile money has been 
documented (Evans & Pirchio, 2014; Gencer, 2011). For instance, in Botswana, the 
cost per transaction is $1.07 while in Ghana it is $0.25. When the costs of 
transactions become lower, it translates directly into significant savings for the poor. 
This, coupled with its safety and fast delivery, becomes for the poor a better 
alternative to traditional forms. In addition to extending financial  services  to  the 
poor, mobile  money  is  expected  to  improve  productivity  by increasing  
efficiency,  lowering  the  cost  of transactions,  improving  security,  generating  
new  employment opportunities, and creating a platform on which other businesses 
can grow. 
 Another factor that influences the adoption and growth of mobile money in Africa 
is the flow of rural-urban migration. The informal structure of the economy of 
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Africa always sees a drift of rural dwellers seeking employment and other 
opportunities in cities. This creates a latent demand for money transfers because it 
is often the male household heads who move and who have the obligation to remit 
the members of their households for their sustenance. Mas and Morawczynski 
(2009) contend that poor alternatives to domestic remittances (where the majority 
of low-income Kenyans use informal methods to send money home) and the lack 
of technology-driven alternatives create a gap in the Kenyan domestic remittance 
market. The introduction of M-PESA fills this gap, owning to its growth. Mobile 
money also enables privacy and autonomy, where women are able to have personal 
savings without seeking permission from their husbands (Mas & Morawczynski, 
2009). Because mobile money or e-money is less visible than cash, it also gives 
women a means to own property. 
The mobile money system as an electronic device can only function if there is 
electricity. Therefore, national grid coverage becomes an important component to 
the continuous use of mobile phones for financial services.  As mobile phone 
hardware costs continue to drop, the share of spending on energy for its 
functionality increases. High energy costs become a barrier to low-cost financial 
access. According to Rubin (2017), the expansion of digital technologies is 
fundamentally changing when and where energy is needed. Most of these devices 
need constant, reliable electricity, and increasing demand for mobile network 
coverage is particularly pronounced in rural and remote areas, which require 
electricity services to reach beyond the traditional grid. The findings of the Internet 
Inclusion Summit panel, which the World Bank joined recently, nicely put it: 
“without electricity, the internet is just a black hole”.  
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Regulatory frameworks of mobile money ensure effective competition and 
availability of recourse for customers and players. Although first adopters of mobile 
money such as M-PESA in Kenya did not think of regulatory frameworks in the 
beginning, subsequent adopters have begun to see the need for regulation as it 
encourages competition. Competition in the section has brought efficiency, 
effectiveness of service provision, and associated costs for recourse (Aker & Mbiti, 
2010; Jack & Suri, 2011, 2014). Blind (2012) shows that regulation can either 
influence or obstruct innovation activities. Regulation has a tendency to restrict 
technological innovation because it reduces market competition by increasing 
market entry requirements, thus leading to price increases.  
Although a number of studies have empirically looked at mobile money adoption 
using different variables and constructs, none have attempted to consider how the 
energy needs of mobile phones can directly influence the adoption of mobile money, 
especially in SSA. This study uses this variable and others to critically understand 
how context-based factors influence the adoption and intention to use mobile 
money in Africa. 
4.2.2 Mobile Money in Africa 
Mobile money (or digital money) is a mobile payments system based on the use of 
a mobile phone. It consists of accounts held by a mobile network operator (MNO) 
and is accessible from subscribers’ mobile phones. A network of agents helps to 
convert cash into electronic value (and vice versa). All transactions are authorised 
and recorded in real-time using short messaging services (SMS). The generic idea 
behind mobile money is to facilitate the transfer of cash from P2P and or in 
merchant payments in a cheap, fast, easy, secure and safe manner. However, mobile 
money has evolved into other uses such as bill payments, savings and credit services, 
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insurance and bulk disbursements, while other new services are still being 
developed. Aker and Mbiti (2010, p. 208) quoted Paul Kagame, the president of 
Rwanda at the 2007 “Connect Africa” summit, that “in ten short years, what was 
once an object of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has become a basic 
necessity in Africa”.  Demombynes and Thegeya (2012) observed that Kenya has 
revolutionised the use of mobile phones for financial payments and savings services. 
According to them, in the 1990s, less than 3% of Kenyan households owned a 
telephone and less than one in 1,000 Kenyan adults had a mobile phone service. 
Towards the end of 2011, about 93% of Kenyan households owned a mobile phone, 
and 73% are M-PESA customers, with 23% of them using it at least once a day. 
These trends cut across Africa, with mobile phone SIM subscriptions reaching more 
than 734 million people, according to data from GSMA (2016).   
The growth of mobile money in Africa has been phenomenal, where more than 48% 
of the adult population in Africa are actively using mobile money as at the end of 
2017. According to the African Development Bank, the growth of mobile money 
accounts has surpassed traditional bank accounts within 10 years of deployment. 
For instance, between 2006 and 2016, mobile money accounts have reached 277 
million compared to the all-time peak of 178 million bank accounts in 2016. In Sub 
Saharan Africa (SSA), bank accounts per 1000 adults is 334.5, indicating 
improvement in financial inclusion after 40 countries in Africa have deployed 
mobile money. For instance, in 2006, there were only 2 instances of mobile money 
deployed in SSA but by the end of 2017, there were as many as 144 instances of 
mobile money deployment. Globally, only 7 instances of mobile money were 
deployed in 2006 and by the close of 2017, the number has increased to 277. 
Furthermore, the percentage of mobile money adoption by gender is also important 
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for financial inclusion. According to statistics from GSMA, adoption of mobile 
money by women in SSA has seen a significant increase compared to the other 
regions of the world. In SSA, the percentage gap in mobile money adoption for 
women has reduced to 19.5%, whereas the Middle East has the highest at 81%. 
South Asia has 66.6% and Latin America and the Caribbean have 41%. East Asia 
and the Pacific also have a 29% female gap. The challenge currently facing the SSA 
is how to mobilise and encourage the 225 million female non-users to adopt mobile 
money to improve their standards through financial inclusion.  
The desire to extend the delivery of financial services to the unbanked through the 
medium of mobile money has seen more countries launching different financial 
services using the mobile phone. For example, as at the end of 2017, 17 countries 
in SSA have deployed mobile money for insurance, while 10 more countries started 
savings schemes using mobile money. For example, in Ghana, MTN, a MNO, offers 
a life-insurance product called Mi-Life which is linked to its mobile money 
accounts. For about $0.23 a month, users get cover of around $100. Safaricom, 
which started M-PESA in 2007 in Kenya, have also launched a savings account 
facility called M-Shwari that pays interest on mobile money accounts that are in 
credit. Weather insurance products provided by Econet (in Zimbabwe) and Acre 
Africa (in East Africa), offer farmers “index insurance” for their crops. Farmers will 
be paid out automatically to a mobile money account, without the need to put in a 
claim, if, say, a rainfall index drops below a certain level. The mobile money 
accounts can also be used to harvest data to widen access to financial services for 
people with little or no history in the formal financial sector. Mobile money-based 
loans schemes such as M-Shwari in Kenya and the Tanzanian counterpart, M-Pawa, 
are reported to be doing well in terms of loan payments and recovery. M-Shwari, 
116 
 
for instance, has lower non-performing loans (NPL) of 1.92% with a total loan 
amount of USD 1.3billion, compared to the traditional bank NPL of 5.3% as at the 
end of 2016. 
As of 2017, more than 30 countries in SSA have either enacted regulations 
pertaining to mobile money or have draft versions. The need for interconnection 
and interoperability is important for mobile money to become universal. 
Interoperability will enable traditional banks and MNOs to facilitate transfers of 
funds between individuals and merchants and vice versa, without the need for third 
parties. This will also enable effective competition and allow for operators to share 
information such as the creditworthiness of mobile money users for onward credit 
disbursements. As regulation is key for effective implementation and monitoring of 
all the activities of operators, it is ideal that enabling regulation is put in place to 
ensure that the system has rules and regulations that govern their operations.  
Usage of mobile money in SSA has also generated positive externalities according 
to data gathered from GSMA (2016). For example, payments for school fees using 
mobile money has improved in Cote D’voire. Bill payments for water and sanitation 
in Tanzania have increased by 38%, while solar energy customers in Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania can pay for services through M-KOPA. Vodafone has 
promoted farmer alliances in Tanzania and Kenya, in helping farmers to network 
for extension services and marketing.  
To effectively deal with financial exclusion and build people’s capacity for 
economic empowerment, mobile money must be universally available across a 
greater range of digital transactions. Issues such as lower levels of adoption by 
women and rural coverage (as adoption of mobile money is concentrated in urban 
117 
 
areas) are still important problems to tackle in order to expand financial inclusion, 
economic development, and inclusive growth. Rural coverage can only be achieved 
if infrastructure such as national grids, effective regulation, good pricing, and 
mobile networks are available. 
4.3 Methods and hypotheses development  
4.3.1 Theoretical perspectives 
Davis (1985) argues that technological system user motivation can be used to 
predict the use of the system, which in turn is directly influenced by an external 
stimulus consisting of the actual system’s features and capabilities. He proposed 
the technology acceptance model (TAM) which can be considered the most 
influential extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) posit that behavioural 
intention is often predicted using models that have multiple attributes, such as those 
based on users’ beliefs about technology. In this case, the TAM can also be 
predicted in the same way using multi-attributes such as user-friendliness and 
usefulness to predict users’ intentions in the use of technology.  Accordingly, TAM 
has five attributes or concepts that help to predict the acceptance of a system by an 
individual. These include perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, attitudes 
toward use, intention to use, and actual use. Davis (1989) defined perceived 
usefulness as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system 
would enhance his or her job performance” (p. 320), whereas perceived ease of use 
(user-friendliness) is “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular 
system would be free of efforts” (p. 323). Other concepts of TAM were derived 
from the works of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), in which attitudes toward use is 
defined as “an individual’s positive or negative feelings about performing the target 
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behaviour” (p.216). Intention to use is based on the definition of behavioural 
intention: “the strength of one’s intention to perform a specified behaviour” 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p.288). TAM replaces variables related to attitude and 
behavioural control in TRA and TPB with technology acceptance measures 
(Bagozzi, 2007).  
According to Bagozzi (2007), the TAM model is too parsimonious and should be 
expanded by factors particularly relevant to the specific technology under 
investigation. Also, integrating variables from related theoretical perspectives can 
provide a better understanding of consumer acceptance (Nysveen, Pedersen, & 
Thorbjørnsen, 2005). Thus, consistent with other studies, the author regards the 
TAM as a starting point of the research and extends it with additional constructs 
important to mobile money acceptance (Schierz et al., 2010). In this way, the author 
broadens the research agenda by the addition of context-based variables and allows 
for further research using similar variables in order to explain user acceptance of 
mobile money in Africa and in other developing economies.  
The author believes that costs of mobile money is an important component in the 
adoption and continuous usage of mobile money in Africa. These costs can be 
substantial in developing countries where financial systems and infrastructure are 
underdeveloped, and energy development for charging mobile phones is inadequate. 
With mobile money systems, costs associated with phone functionality (electricity 
for charging the phones), and transaction costs for money transfers can be 
substantial over time and rational consumers who see these costs rise will have 




The fundamental idea of value is tied to willingness to pay, which is also affected 
by income. Thus, wealthier individuals have the ability to pay for mobile money, 
but for poor people, it is a sacrifice and so the return value or benefits should be 
more than the costs.  
4.3.2 Research model and hypothesis development 
Davis (1989) refined the TAM by suggesting that the user’s motivation can be 
explained by three factors: perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, and attitude 
towards using the system. He hypothesised that the attitude of a user towards a 
system was a major determinant of whether the user will actually adopt or reject the 
system, defined as the degree to which using a technology is positively or negatively 
valued by an individual. Behavioural intention to adopt the system is modelled as a 
function of attitude. Attitude in turn positively affects consumers’ adoption and 
usage intentions (Davis, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). In the model, 
the author uses the percentage of subscribers per 100 inhabitants as the proxy for 
attitude towards the use of mobile money. This proxy is important in the sense that 
the percentage of people who actually subscribe to any mobile company will 
determine their attitudes to adopt and use the system. In this case, higher 
subscription percentages are considered as stronger attitudes towards adoption and 
lower subscription percentages demonstrate weaker attitudes. Given the positive 
relation between attitudes towards use and intention to adopt (Luarn & Lin, 2005), 
the author proposes the first hypothesis: 
𝑯𝟏 : There is a positive relationship between individual attitude towards 
continuous adoption and the intention to use mobile money.  
The attitude of the user in turn was considered to be influenced by two major beliefs: 
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, with perceived ease of use having 
a direct influence on perceived usefulness. Kleinrock (1996) argues that most 
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people are “nomads” when it comes to technology and this can be identified with 
mobile phones and Africans who are always on the “go” for economic activities. A 
person who leads a busy life such that he/she is always on the move will be more 
likely to adopt a mobile money technology compared to one who leads a sedentary 
lifestyle. Mobile money effectiveness therefore relies on it ubiquity (Kleinrock, 
1996), and this can only happen if the functionality of the mobile phone, such as 
having electricity to charge it, is available. As electricity generation is well below 
full capacity in most parts of Africa, it is important to consider how this factor can 
affect the functionality of mobile phone usage. Rural dwellers who have no 
electricity will find it difficult to adopt and use mobile money, compared to those 
in urban areas. Therefore, the mobility-related needs that serve as the driver for 
adopting mobile money (Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002) may affect its usage if the 
national grid is unavailable. Mobile money signifies the value arising from the 
mobility of the new medium and therefore requires power to charge the instruments 
(mobile phones) that help in providing the mobile money services. According to 
Rubin (2017), the expansion of digital technologies is fundamentally changing 
when and where energy is needed. This thinking can be likened to the perceived 
usefulness of mobile money, defined as how well consumers believe mobile money 
can be integrated into their daily mobile activities. Perceived usefulness, which is 
believed to be directly influenced by perceived ease of use, means that mobile 
money services are available for everyday activities anytime, anywhere. In 
accordance with this line of reasoning, the author argues that mobile money can 
obtain a dominant position in product/service categories for financial inclusion, 
where the use of mobile applications offers customers indisputable mobile value by 
grasping the very essence of the combination of mobility, technology and lifestyle 
121 
 
(Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002), but only if electricity is available to charge the 
technology (Rubin, 2017). The author therefore uses the percentage of people with 
access to electricity as proxy for perceived usefulness (ability to use mobile phone 
and mobile money at anytime and anywhere). The ubiquity of the mobile money 
system can only be possible if electricity availability matches the use of mobile 
devices for financial services. Based on this, the author proposes the second 
hypothesis: 
𝑯𝟐𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between perceived usefulness 
(ubiquity/grid) and attitudes towards continuous adoption and usage of mobile 
money. 
𝑯𝟐𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between perceived usefulness (ubiquity/grid) 
and intention to adopt and use mobile money. 
To model for perceived ease of use, the author takes inspiration from the work of 
Swanson (1982), who provided evidence that perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness of technology were both important behavioural determinants. Swanson 
hypothesised that potential users will select and use information reports based on a 
trade-off between perceived information quality and associated cost of access. 
Information quality relating to perceived usefulness construct, and cost of access 
similar to perceived ease of use construct. Comparatively, Mathieson, Peacock, and 
Chin (2001) and Luarn and Lin (2005) find that perceived financial resources (costs) 
are important behavioural intentions to use an information service (IS) and mobile 
banking respectively. Venkatesh, Thong, and Xu (2012) argue that the cost and 
pricing structure may have a significant impact on consumers' technology use. They 
define price value as the consumer's cognitive trade-off between the perceived 
benefits of the technologies and the monetary cost of using them. The perceived 
benefits of using a technology are greater when the price value is more, and the 
perceived monetary cost is less, or vice versa. In the model used in this study, the 
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author considers the price value to be the prices of prepaid mobile voice as the cost 
of mobile money in Africa.20 This is used as the proxy for perceived ease of use 
(perceived costs), defined as the extent to which a person believes that using mobile 
money will cost money (Luarn & Lin, 2005). The author proposes that financial 
costs can influence the behaviour and intention to adopt and use mobile money in 
Africa, especially if costs continue to rise. Based on the above, the author proposes 
the next hypotheses: 
𝑯𝟑𝒂 : There is a negative relationship between perceived costs and attitudes towards 
continuous adoption and usage of mobile money. 
𝑯𝟑𝒃 : There is a negative relationship between perceived costs and intention to 
adopt and use mobile money. 
According to Field and Field (1997), several pricing studies have found that 
customer characteristics may influence willingness to pay (WTP), which in turn can 
influence attitudes and intentions towards adoption of mobile money. These 
differences in WTP may depend on demographic or behavioural characteristics. 
The demographic variables include age, gender, income, marital status, education, 
and geographical location as well as psychographic variables such as activities, 
interests, opinions and lifestyle. In addition, Venkatesh et al. (2012) contend that 
facilitating conditions influences technology use directly based on the idea that 
consumers can vary significantly across application vendors, technology 
generations, mobile devices, and so on. In this context, facilitating conditions will 
act more like perceived behavioural control in the theory of planned behaviour 
(TPB) and influence both intention and behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Specifically, a consumer who has access to a favourable set of facilitating 
                                                          
20 The author is sure that using the voice prices will be closer to the MM transfer costs and is a 
necessary proxy due to the unavailability of consolidated mobile money transfer prices,. 
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conditions is more likely to have a higher intention to use a specific technology. All 
things being equal, a consumer with a lower level of facilitating conditions will 
have lower intentions to use mobile money. Venkatesh et al. (2012) emphasise that 
the effect of facilitating conditions on behavioural intentions can be moderated by 
age, gender, and experience. As such, this study proposes that facilitating conditions 
and WTP for adopting and using mobile money can be affected by gender, age, 
income disparity, experience (education) and rural dwelling as argued by Field and 
Field (1997). Older consumers tend to face difficulties in processing information or 
in using technology and thus may require more support compared to young 
consumers. In the same way, females are likely to require more support than men 
to adapt to technology, in light of the emphasis on societal gender roles which 
incline men to be task-oriented (Venkatesh et al., 2012). In terms of income 
disparities, richer consumers will be more likely than poor consumers to adopt 
mobile money due to their greater purchasing power and WTP. With experience 
(education), this can also moderate the relationship between facilitating conditions 
such as regulation and attitudes toward adoption. Greater experience can lead to 
greater familiarity with the technology and better knowledge structures to facilitate 
user learning, thus reducing user dependence on external support. Finally, the lack 
of mobile network infrastructure and electricity in rural areas can moderate attitudes 
to adopt mobile money.  As such, the author hypothesises the following: 
𝑯𝟒 : There is a negative relationship between perceived female and attitudes 
towards adoption of mobile money. 
𝑯𝟓 : There is a negative relationship between perceived old age and attitudes 
towards adoption of mobile money. 
𝑯𝟔𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between perceived income disparity (rich) 
and attitudes towards adoption of mobile money. 
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𝑯𝟔𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between perceived income disparity (rich) 
and the perceived usefulness (ubiquity) of mobile money. 
𝑯𝟔𝒄 : There is a negative relationship between perceived income disparity (poor) 
and attitudes to adopt and use mobile money. 
𝑯𝟕𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between perceived education levels and 
attitudes to adopt and use mobile money. 
𝑯𝟕𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between perceived education levels and 
enabling regulation to use mobile money. 
𝑯𝟕𝒄 : There is a positive relationship between perceived education levels and 
perceived income disparity (rich) to use mobile money. 
𝑯𝟖 : There is a negative relationship between perceived rural dwelling and 
attitudes to adopt and use mobile money. 
Liu, Kauffman, and Ma (2015) argue that market competition, cooperation, and 
regulation act as key accelerators or decelerators of industry changes, while 
innovations in new mobile payments have the potential to transform it. As 
accelerators, certain businesses (new technology services innovations, and the 
emergence of new strategic thinking from high-tech firms that become financial 
institutions themselves) gain advantage by using a judicious mixture of cooperation 
with suppliers, customers and firms producing complementary or related products. 
On the other hand, the decelerators arise from the defensive behaviour of existing 
firms in the market, and from the increased complexity and uncertainty when 
multiple firms offer different technology solutions in the absence of regulatory 
guidance and technology standards (Liu et al., 2015). These are likely to lead to 
market entry deterrence to prevent innovators from participating, as well as to 
damage due to fierce competition that can impair the health of the payments sector 
in the financial services industry. Regulation regarding competition policy, pricing, 
market entry, natural monopoly and public utilities plays an important role in 
shaping technology and innovation evolution (Blind, 2012). Stricter regulations 
seem to have had a negative influence on services innovation in certain industries 
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(Prieger, 2002). In the financial services sector, financial institutions are closely 
connected to consumer welfare, so regulators are extremely cautious about how 
disruptive technological innovations may change the market (Dewatripont & Tirole, 
1994). Silber (1983) analysed financial innovations and showed that about 30% 
were induced by regulation. On the other hand, when regulation offers support for 
a technology standard in some way, or provides a roadmap for a specific technology 
innovation, market uncertainty will be diminished, and its development will be 
accelerated. From this, the author states the final hypotheses: 
𝑯𝟗𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between perceived enabling regulation and 
attitudes towards adoption and usage of mobile money. 
𝑯𝟗𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between perceived enabling regulation and 

















Figure 4.1 Research model: The hypothesised research model indicating the 
direction of mediation 
 
4.3.3 Research method 
Two of the most widely used statistical methods to test mediated effects in 
secondary data are multiple regression analysis and structural equation modelling 
(SEM) analysis. Multiple regression analysis uses methods such as stepwise 
regression and progressive adjustment to detect mediation effects. Baron and Kenny 
(1986) argue that the tendency to include variables in multiple regression analysis 
rests on assumptions that variables should be normally distributed, and that 




















variables are dealt with. Furthermore, all variables included in a multiple regression 
analysis must be observed measures. These assumptions cannot be supported with 
the type of data the author is using for his studies. Because not all of the data are 
directly observed in a survey, the author cannot guarantee that the data is free from 
measurement errors or that there is no multicollinearity present in the explanatory 
indicators. 
 For these reasons, the author proposes to use SEM for the empirical estimation. 
SEM analysis is arguably the most effective way to test mediated effects when data 
requirements are met. As multiple indicators are used, SEM constructs 
measurement models for the theoretical concepts hypothesised (Li, 2011) and 
allows for multiple indicators of latent variables which are a more realistic 
representation of the variables under study (Schierz et al., 2010). When 
measurement error is a concern as in the data, SEM uses multiple indicators to 
overcome it. Equally, discrete measures in SEM using secondary data has been 
observed to be problematic where observed and latent variables are not continuous 
(Li, 2011). One way of overcoming this issue is to estimate the data using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) method with polyserial correlations as proposed by 
Jöreskog, Sörbom, and Du Toit (2001). For this study, all the constructs were 
estimated using SEM with maximum likelihood. The rationale for this is that each 
explanatory and dependent variable may be associated with measurement errors in 
contrast to OLS regression, which is based on the assumption that variables are 
measured perfectly (Bollen, 1987).  
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4.4 Data, measurement and empirical results 
4.4.1 Data  
Data on the percentage of the total population with electricity consists of the 
percentage of the country’s population that are connected to the national grid, taken 
from ITU and the World Bank. Energy development has not kept pace with rising 
demand in Africa, placing a large strain on the continent's existing resources. 
Although some African countries export energy to their neighbouring countries, 
most lack the basic infrastructure and systems to generate and consume electricity. 
In light of this, mobile money, which is dependent on mobile phone technology, 
may fail to induce economies of scale if the current supply of electricity remains as 
it is. The electricity variable is important for understanding how adoptions are 
scaling up in the midst of an inadequate supply of energy needed for mobile phones, 
especially in the rural areas of Africa. 
The data for the study is taken from the Research ICT Africa (RIA) Network, a non-
profit organisation based in South Africa. RIA conducts research on ICT policy and 
regulation and facilitates evidence-based and informed policy making for improved 
access, use, and application of ICT for social development and economic growth. 
The data on prices is gathered from mobile network operators across Africa on a 
quarterly basis and standardised using the OECD mobile pricing measurement 
(cheapest prepaid mobile voice product by country (in USD)). The prices are based 
on 50 minutes of 30 calls based on users split between networks and peak / off-peak 
/ off-off peak times; and 100 Short Messaging Services (SMS). For a typical mobile 
money transaction, it involves the transfer of cash into e-money via a text message 
or SMS. This e-money value is stored and can be retrieved (transferred back to cash) 
via a mobile phone and designated network agent, bank or ATM. Customers pay 
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(by buying airtime) for the use of the voice and SMS services through their mobile 
phones but also pay additional commissions for any amount sent or received 
through mobile money.  
Data relating to the percentage of mobile cellular subscribers for every 100 
inhabitants and the percentage of population covered by a mobile cellular network 
were taken from the International Telecommunications Unit (ITU). These data were 
cross checked with data from the World Bank and the differences are only in 
decimals, which are negligible.  The author also used data on regulation of mobile 
money in Africa but proxied this variable with data from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI). Although about 40 countries in Africa have an enabling 
regulation for mobile money, the author used the regulatory quality indicator from 
WGI. The WGI regulatory quality indicator reflects public perceptions of the 
government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. Data on the individual 
characteristics of mobile money customers (proxy for facilitating conditions) were 
taken from the Global Findex database. These comprise age, gender (female), 
income, and education. Finally, the author obtained data for the rural variable from 
the World Bank’s development indicators (WDIs).  
4.4.2 Measurement of variables  
The measurement items were formulated based on theory and reviewed literature 
and were modified to reflect the assumptions, propositions, and hypotheses of 
context-based themes. The items to measure attitudes towards continuous adoption 
and intentions to adopt and use mobile money were drawn from work by (Davis, 
1989; Davis et al., 1989; Luarn & Lin, 2005) and used as a proxy in order to 
understand mobile money in the African context. Items for perceived ease of use 
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(costs) and perceived usefulness (ubiquity) were taken from earlier validated 
studies (Luarn & Lin, 2005; Rubin, 2017; Swanson, 1982; Venkatesh et al., 2012) 
and were modified to fit the specific technology under study. With items based on 
facilitating conditions, the author follows the studies of Field and Field (1997) and 
Venkatesh et al. (2012) on behavioural intentions to adopt mobile services. These 
facilitating conditions include individual covariates such as age, gender (female), 
income disparities, and experience (education). Lastly, the proposed regulation item 
is taken from (Liu et al., 2015), in line with the modification strategy. The full list 
of items used in this study and their corresponding modifications are listed in Table 
4.1.  






Intention to use 
mobile money 
Given the opportunity the respondent will use 
mobile payment services, measured (proxy) as 
percentage of population with a mobile network in 
a country 
(Davis, 1989), (ITU, 





Degree to which using a technology is positively or 
negatively valued by an individual, measured 
(proxy) as the percentage of mobile subscribers per 
100 inhabitants 
(Davis, 1989), (ITU, 





How well consumers believe mobile money can be 
integrated into their daily mobile activities (ability 
to use mobile phone and mobile money at anytime 
and anywhere), measured (proxy) as percentage of 
population with electrification (national grid) 
(ITU, RIA, World Bank, 
2017), (Kakihara & 
Sorensen, 2002), (Rubin 
(2017) 
Perceived cost Extent to which a person believes that using mobile 
money will cost money, measured (proxy) as price 
of prepaid mobile voice and SMS 
(Luarn & Lin, 2005), 
(RIA, 2017) 
Perceived female Likelihood that females may require more support 
to adapt to technology use than men, measured 
(proxy) as percentage of women with mobile 
money accounts 
(Venkatesh et al., 2012), 
(Field and Field (1997), 
(WDI, 2017) 
 
Perceived old age 
Likelihood that older consumers may face difficulty 
in processing information or using technology, 
measured (proxy) as percentage of population aged 
65 and above out of the total population 
(Field and Field (1997), 




Willingness to pay (WTP) for mobile money due to 
price value, measured (proxy) as percentage of 
mobile account ownership by the richest 60%  






Willingness to pay (WTP) for mobile money due to 
price value, measured (proxy) as percentage of 
mobile account ownership by the poorest 40% 




Better knowledge structures to facilitate user 
learning of mobile money, measured (proxy) as 
primary school completion rate as percentage of 
total population 
(Field and Field (1997), 




Lack of mobile network infrastructure and 
electricity measured (proxy) rural population as 
percentage of total population 




Enabling regulation offering support for mobile 
money standards, competition and innovation, 
measured (proxy) as ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
(Liu et al. (2015), (WDI, 
2017) 
Note: ITU = International Telecommunication Union, RIA = Research ICT Africa, and WDI = World 
Development Indicators.  
4.4.3 Empirical results 
To begin with, the author conducted analysis of a hybrid model of the structural 
model, incorporating the measurement models and all of the paths specified in 
Figure 1. A set of goodness-of-fit indices (GFIs) was generated, indicating that the 
theoretical model accurately predicted the observed and latent input matrix (Li, 
2011). The goodness-of-fit measures for the structural model show satisfactory 
values as follows: Goodness of fit index (GFI) = 0.98, Root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) = 0.061, the Bentler-Bonett normed fit index (NFI) = 0.95, 
the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = 0.96, the comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.92, the 
incremental fit index (IFI) = 0.92, and the coefficient of determination (CD) = 0.93, 
which are within accepted values (Bollen, 1987).  
Having satisfied questions about of the appropriateness of the model, the author 
shows preliminary results on the context-based factors that determine the 
continuous use of mobile money in Africa. Following Bollen (1987) approach on 
direct, indirect and total models in SEM, the author shows the direct paths among 
the key theoretical constructs in which items or factors in the hypothetical model in 
Figure 4.1 are either confirmed or rejected. In Figure 4.2, only the significant key 
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theoretical constructs are included in the model. The indirect effects can be 
computed by multiplying all of the direct links from one variable to another. The 
total effect is then the sum of the direct and indirect effects. The study shows the 
standardised coefficients in Figure 4.2 and in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for easy 
comparison of magnitudes as the measurement of the variables were done on 
different scales. The standardised coefficients for each path closely approximate the 
effective magnitude usually shown by beta weights in regression. Thus, low 
coefficients have limited substantive effect (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
1995). 
In support of 𝐻1, the author finds a significant and positive relationship between 
individual attitude towards continuous adoption of mobile money and intention to 
use mobile money in Africa (β = .41; p ≤ .01). Hypotheses 𝐻2𝑎 and 𝐻2𝑏 investigate 
the role of the availability of power (electricity or grid) with the construct name 
ubiquity, themed as an item for the perceived usefulness of mobile money on 
individuals’ attitudes and intentions for the adoption and usage of mobile money in 
Africa. The estimation results show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between ubiquity and individuals’ attitudes towards the continuous 
adoption of mobile money and intention to use mobile money, thus confirming 
hypotheses 𝐻2𝑎 and 𝐻2𝑏 respectively (β = .42; p ≤ .01, β = .60; p ≤ .01). Similarly, 
hypotheses 𝐻3𝑎 and 𝐻3𝑏  specifically tested the role of perceived costs of mobile 
money, (construct for perceived ease of use) as a predictor of individuals’ attitudes 
and intentions towards the continuous adoption and usage of mobile money in 
Africa (β = .01; p ≤ .05, β = .03; p ≤ .05). The result predicted positive significant 
coefficients of weaker magnitudes contrary to the hypothesised constructs in the 
model. By this, the estimation confirmed that perceived costs of mobile money in 
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Africa are still in the lower thresholds compared to traditional costs for money 
transfers via banks and informal intermediaries. Using the number of females with 
mobile money accounts as a construct for females’ attitudes towards continuous 
adoption of mobile money, the author finds an insignificant relationship between 
being female and attitudes towards adopting mobile money, thus rejecting 
hypothesis 𝐻4 (β = .00; p > .05).  
The structural link from perceived age to the attitude towards continuous adoption 
of mobile money is negative and significant (β = -.04; p ≤ .01), supporting 𝐻5. 
Hypotheses 𝐻6𝑎 to 𝐻6𝑐 related to the effect of income on two theoretical constructs, 
serving as a mediator for perceived attitude towards adopting mobile money, and 
perceived usefulness (ubiquity). However, their coefficients were not significant 
enough to support the relationships (β = - .04; p > .05, β = .02; p > .05, β = -.01; p 
≤ .05) respectively. The author therefore rejects hypotheses 𝐻6𝑎 to 𝐻6𝑐. Hypotheses 
𝐻7𝑎 to 𝐻7𝑐 tested whether perceived education (experience) is positively related to 
other constructs in the model, including perceived attitude towards continuous 
adoption of mobile money, perceived enabling regulation for mobile money, and 
the perceived income disparity (rich 60%). The results supported two constructs 
with statistical significance (attitude and enabling regulation) and rejected the third 
mediating construct between education and income disparity (rich 60%) (β = .40; p 
≤ .01, β = .02; p ≤ .01, β = .01; p > .05) respectively. The author therefore confirmed 
𝐻7𝑎  and 𝐻7𝑏 . The relationship between perceived rural dwelling and attitude 
towards adopting and using mobile money was supported with a statistically 
significant negative coefficient of -.36, confirming that adoption of mobile money 
in Africa is significantly concentrated in urban centres (β = -.36; p ≤ .01). 𝐻8 is thus 
confirmed. Finally, the theoretical construct of perceived enabling regulation 
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assessing the relationship between perceived attitude towards adoption of mobile 
money and intention to adopt and use mobile money are both positive and 
significantly supported (β = .05; p ≤ .01, β = .35; p ≤ .01) respectively.  
To provide for the stability of the results, the author tested the correlation of the 
exogenous variables (see Table 4.4) to deduce the presence of multicollinearity. 
Berry, Berry, Feldman, and Stanley Feldman (1985) argue that for any specific 
empirical analysis, multicollinearity, which is correlation among explanatory 
variables, can affect the stability of the empirical results. They suggest that, to avoid 
this, as a rule of thumb, correlation among the explanatory variables should be 
below 0.8. The correlation table (see Table 4.4) shows that the items are within the 
cut-off value of 0.8, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in the sample.  
Given that the sample is small, it is possible that the measurement scale could affect 
the results of the estimation if items are found to be highly correlated with each 
other. In order to address this effect, the author tested the scale of reliability for the 
consistency of the data and items in the sample by looking at the detailed 
information of the Cronbach’s alpha of the 11 items used. From Table 4.5, the 
author sees that the item-test correlation and the item-rest correlation all produce 
figures that are within limits of 0.8 for all the items. The overall α of 0.8 is an 
indication that items in the model are reliable and consistent to provide stable results.   
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Table 4.2  Mediation effects on individual attitudes towards adoption of 
Mobile Money in Africa. 
Note: SEM coeff = Structural equation model coefficient, t-values for standardised path coefficients 
are described in parentheses. The degree of freedom of 1 indicate that all constructs are 
unidimensional. SEM coeff = Structural equation coefficient 
 
Table 4.3 Mediation effects on the individual intentions to use Mobile Money 
in Africa. 
 
Variable SEM coeff Chi-statistics 
Attitude towards adopting mobile money 0.48*** χ2= .72 
 
(7.73) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived usefulness (ubiquity/grid) 0.60*** χ2= .87 
 
(7.01) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived cost 0.03** χ2= .41 
 
(-1.14) df = 1, p =  
Perceived age -0.04*** χ2= .59 
 
(5.46) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived regulation 0.35*** χ2= .72 
 
(3.56) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived education 0.40*** χ2= .61 
Variable SEM coeff Chi-statistics 
Intention to use mobile money 0.48*** χ2= .72 
 
(7.73) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived usefulness (ubiquity/grid) 0.42*** χ2= .79 
 
(7.01) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived cost 0.01** χ2= .49 
 
(-1.14) df = 1, p =  
Perceived age -0.04*** χ2= .59 
 
(5.46) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived regulation 0.05*** χ2= .68 
 
(3.56) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived education 0.40*** χ2= .61 
 
(4.35) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived income 60% -0.04 χ2= .37 
 
(-0.42) df = 1, p = .641 
Perceived income 40% -0.01 χ2= 33 
 
(-0.2) df = 1, p = .871 
Perceived female 0.00 χ2= .21 
 
(0.07) df = 1, p = .948 
Perceived rural dwelling -0.36*** χ2= .69 
 
(-6.77) df = 1, p = .000 
Observations 







(4.35) df = 1, p = .000 
Perceived income 60% -0.04 χ2= .37 
 
(-0.42) df = 1, p = .641 
Perceived income 40% -0.01 χ2= 33 
 
(-0.2) df = 1, p = .871 
Perceived female 0.00 χ2= .21 
 
(0.07) df = 1, p = .948 
Perceived rural dwelling -0.36*** χ2= .69 
 
(-6.77) df = 1, p = .000 
Observations 




Note: SEM coeff = Structural equation model coefficient, t-values for standardised path coefficients 






















                                                          Note:  *** = p ≤ .01, ** = p≤ .05 
Figure 4.2 Results of the relationships in the research model 













Table 4.4 Correlations among the exogenous variables 
 































         
Perceived 
ubiquity 
.73 .74 1.00 
        
Perceived 
cost 
-.20 -.09 -.18 1.00 
       
Perceived 
regulation 
.64 .62 .43 -.29 1.00 
      
Perceived 
rural 
-.60 -.71 -.63 -.14 -.15 1.00 
     
Perceived 
age 
.57 0.59 .75 -.20 .42 -.42 1.00 
    
Perceived 
female 
-.02 -.02 -.03 -.06 .30 .21 .13 1.00 
   
Perceived 
rich 








.54 052 .61 -.40 .45 -.24 .52 .16 .06 .08 1.00 
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This table measure the internal consistency of the 11 items, showing how closely related the items are as a group. Item-test and 
Item-rest correlations show values below .8 are reliable and consistent. The alpha of .8 suggest that the items have high internal consistency. 
               
   







Perceived intention 40 + .79 .72 .23 .75 
Perceived attitude 40 + .72 .76 .23 .75 
Perceived usefulness (ubiquity) 40 + .71 .75 .23 .75 
Perceived cost 40 + .52 .56 .28 .74 
Perceived regulation 40 + .64 .54 .25 .77 
Perceived rural 40 - .58 .46 .26 .78 
Perceived age 40 + .78 .73 .23 .75 
Perceived female 40 + .24 .08 .31 .82 
Perceived rich 40 - .30 .14 .30 .81 
Perceived poor 40 - .32 .17 .30 .81 
Perceived education 40 + .68 .58 .25 .77 
Test scale 




4.5 Discussion and policy implications 
4.5.1 Discussion of results 
The author follows Bollen (1987) in examining the total effect of, and establishing 
a ranking among, the factors that determine the people’s continuous adoption and 
intention to use mobile money in Africa. This is done by multiplying the 
coefficients along the paths (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6). As an example, the total 
effect for the intention to adopt and use mobile money when a person is educated, 
is calculated through the indirect effects (paths) of perceived regulation and 
perceived attitude towards adoption (.02*.05*.48 + .4*.48 = .19). 
The highest ranked determinant of mobile money in Africa is perceived usefulness, 
which relates to its mobile and ubiquitous nature. In the model, the proxy for the 
perceived usefulness is the percentage of the total population connected to the 
national grid. In other words, the author looks at the percentage of the population 
who have electricity to ascertain the functionality of the mobile phone device. This 
is particularly important for the fact that mobile money cannot function well if 
people do not have electricity to charge their phones. African people are known to 
be mobile (Kakihara & Sorensen, 2002; Kleinrock, 1996), in search for economic 
opportunities. The adoption and use of mobile money may allow them to facilitate 
financial transactions without needing to physically visit bank branches. However, 
if access to electricity is limited (Rubin, 2017), it can affect the number of people 
who may adopt and use mobile money. The costs involved in securing access to 
electricity may be high especially for the inhabitants of towns and villages that are 
not connected to the national grid. This happens when mobile phone users who are 
keen on making their mobile devices functional have to travel long distances in 
order to access electricity to charge their phone devices. 
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The author finds that a person’s attitudes towards mobile money is an important 
factor for the continuous adoption of, and intention to use, mobile money in Africa. 
This factor is ranked second and confirms that the proxy for perceived attitude 
(percentage of mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants) is a good measure. The data 
also provides evidence to this effect. For instance, the data for perceived attitude 
towards mobile money for South Africa, Mauritius, and Ghana are 147.13%, 143.73% 
and 135.8% respectively. The attitudes people hold towards mobile money may 
reflect the success of the marketing strategies employed by the MNOs in 
emphasising the easy, secure, and fast nature of mobile money transactions. To 
some extent, this also reflects the inadequate and underdeveloped nature of current 
payment systems in Africa. 
Perceived age is the third ranked factor in the model. The result is consistent with 
the hypothesis for perceived age which postulates that adults aged 65 years and over 
are less likely to adopt mobile money because of the technical knowledge 
associated with it. Also, age restrictions for SIM card purchases in most of African 
countries may also hinder intentions to adopt and use mobile money (Zimmerman 
& Arnold, 2013). It effectively excludes people younger than 18years from the 
mobile money system, even if they may have access to mobile phones.  
Perceived enabling regulation (Liu et al., 2015) is another factor that is significant 
to the intention to adopt and continuously use mobile money. When mobile money 
was first introduced in Africa (M-PESA), regulation was not considered to be of 
importance (Jack & Suri, 2011). However, because of reported consumer concerns 
about abuse by agents and operators, regulation has become paramount for parties 
to be able to have recourse and protection in times of abuse. The evident 
significance of enabling regulation in influencing public intentions to use mobile 
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money also relates to the fact that mobile money is a provision of financial services 
and, as such, cannot happen without proper regulations in place as in other 
traditional financial systems (GSMA, 2016). Regulation ensures that governments 
generate revenue, that taxes are properly secured, and that there is effective market 
competition in order to keep the prices of mobile money services low for everybody. 
The experience of people with the intention to adopt and use mobile money is as 
significant as the other factors. Education, which is the proxy for individual 
perceived experience, is modelled to reflect the hands-on experience of the 
individual’s mobile phone use and their subsequent intention to adopt and use 
mobile money. User experience relates to the individual facilitating conditions and 
shifts the emphasis away from user dependence on external support to adopt and 
use mobile money (Venkatesh et al., 2012). This factor is pertinent when a 
comparison is undertaken for mobile money usage between educated people and 
their non-educated counterparts in Africa. 
The sixth ranked factor for the determinants of mobile money is perceived rural 
dwelling. The result supports the hypothesis and the literature that mobile money 
adoption and usage is concentrated in cities and urban centres (Aker et al., 2016; 
Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Asongu, 2015; Donovan, 2012). Although rural adoption of 
mobile money is showing encouraging signs of uptake, a comparison with urban 
centre adoption yields significant percentage differences. One could interpret this 
result as a reflection of the underdeveloped and limited mobile network 




Finally, perceived costs rank seventh in terms of determinants associated with the 
intention to adopt and use mobile money in Africa. A comparison of the transaction 
costs associated with mobile money services with that of traditional money transfer 
systems in Africa indicates that mobile money has advantages (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Jack & Suri, 2014). The fast and secure nature of mobile money services can also 
be attributed to reduction in cost, where the benefits far outweigh the costs of 
transactions and use of informal systems (Aker et al., 2016; GSMA, 2016; Jack & 
Suri, 2011; Mas & Kumar, 2008).  
The other constructs in the model that did not produce significant coefficients to 
warrant inclusion in the final model include perceived income disparity (60% rich), 
perceived income disparity (40% poor), and perceived female. These items were 
measured by the percentage of rich people (60% rich) who have mobile money 
accounts, percentage of poor people (40% poor) who also have mobile money 
accounts, and the percentage of females with mobile money accounts respectively. 
However, according to the model estimation, their coefficients have larger p values 
that defy the empirical assumptions to justify their inclusion in the final research 
model. Of course, a possible reason for these results may be measurement errors 
















This table calculates the total effect among the constructs. This is done by adding the direct and 
indirect paths. The construct with the highest value is ranked first in that order. 
 
 
4.5.2 Policy implications 
While the empirical results are preliminary, they have policy implications that are 
important for mobile money services in Africa. Firstly, the findings indicate that 
perceived usefulness (ubiquity) that serves as a proxy for the availability of 
electricity to enable the functionality of mobile phones is an important factor as far 
as mobile money is concerned. The ability of people to charge their mobile phones 
to enable them to use it anytime and anywhere is an important first step towards 
public intentions to adopt and use mobile money. This means that energy 
infrastructure is a necessary component for the expansion of mobile money services 
to areas that are yet to connect to such services. When power or energy is available, 
it may cut the cost of travel and the risk involved by rural dwellers who use mobile 
money but who lack the electricity to charge their mobile phone devices. Rubin 
(2017) emphasises that policy frameworks are gathering momentum in the 
international scene around the build-once approach to infrastructure development. 
Examples of the build-once approach for Africa through the PPPs are electric 
Factor  Total effect on intention 
 to adopt and use mobile 
money 
Perceived usefulness (ubiquity) .80 
Perceived attitude .48 
Perceived age .44 
Perceived regulation .37 
Perceived education .19 
Perceived rural .12 
Perceived cost .03 
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companies and MNOs sharing towers for their wires and coordinating with each 
other to lay wires under new roads. This policy framework will direct future ICT 
and energy transformation projects that have the capacity to further lower the costs 
of energy and subsequently support the functionality of technology and mobile 
money services.  
Enabling regulation is important for mobile money services. Since the introduction 
of M-PESA in 2007, mobile money services in Africa have gone through 
tremendous transformations in terms of services provision and competition, 
consumer protection protocols, government and central banks’ monetary policy 
frameworks, and government revenue mobilisation efforts through tax payments. 
As all these variables have implications for mobile money operations, it is only 
necessary that there is enabling regulation to facilitate smooth mobile money 
operations. Enabling regulation also implies that MNOs act in accordance with 
rules and regulations that govern their operations and seek to give the consumer the 
needed protection in terms of redress of grievances. Central banks have the 
obligation to ensure that there are enough enabling regulations for the ever-evolving 
and expanding field of mobile money, given that technology continues to transform 
across time. Mobile money interoperability is still in its infant stages for several 
African countries that have rolled out mobile money technology. The challenge of 
interoperability relates to the failure of enabling regulations being sufficiently 
complex and robust to match the evolving technology. For policy makers and 
regulators, broader consultation that involves all stakeholders in the system is 




4.6 Conclusion and future research 
 
This research sought to understand the context-based factors that are necessary for 
the adoption and continuous use of mobile money in Africa. With data from 
different sources, including the RIA, ITU, and the World Bank, the author presented 
the preliminary results for individual intentions and attitudes towards adopting and 
using mobile money.  
The research model adopted the TAM with modification of local context factors to 
determine how these factors affect the adoption and continuous use of mobile 
money. Using the SEM, the results show that perceived usefulness 
(ubiquity/electricity) is an important factor to adopt and use mobile money. 
However, the ability of mobile money to be available anytime, and anywhere 
depends on the availability of electricity to charge the mobile phone used for mobile 
money. As such, people who do not have electricity may be denied the opportunity 
to adopt mobile money. While this consumer characteristic cannot be influenced 
entirely by the consumer at all times, partnerships between MNOs and the 
government can help to improve the electricity infrastructure, especially for rural 
inhabitants.  
The attitudes of consumers can be influenced by MNOs through their marketing 
and agent networks. The preliminary empirical results for the attitude construct 
(proxy: percentage of subscribers per 100 inhabitants) indicate that peoples’ 
attitudes toward their intention to adopt and use mobile money are effective 
determinants of mobile money in Africa. MNOs can identify reference groups who 
can play an important role in the diffusion of mobile money. Thus, MNOs need to 
identify early adopters and to stimulate their usage of mobile money services, so 
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that these adopters can help with the diffusion of mobile money networks in the 
future.  
Age was also identified as a factor that influences intentions to adopt and use mobile 
money. As technology evolves, older people may struggle to embrace the technical 
capabilities of the mobile phone and so will be directly affected in adopting and 
using mobile money. With younger generations, government restrictions on access 
to SIM cards for people under 18 years may affect their ability to adopt and use 
mobile money. MNOs can lobby to influence policy recommendations to effect 
changes for those belonging in this age group. This is critical given that early 
adoption and use of mobile money can have long-term impacts on the business 
models of MNOs.  
The establishment of enabling regulation is another important factor in influencing 
intentions and attitudes towards the adoption and use of mobile money. Once people 
are aware that there are enough regulations that guide MNOs in their mobile money 
operations, people may be more inclined to trust the system and to use mobile 
money. On the other hand, a lack of proper regulation will hinder the progress made 
in the diffusion of mobile money in Africa.  
Finally, the lack of infrastructure (mobile network and electricity) presents an 
obstacle to the diffusion of mobile money in rural areas. Since the majority of 
Africans continue to live in rural areas, it is only prudent that MNOs collaborate 
with governments to improve these infrastructures for shared prosperity.  
There are several directions for future research that this study offers. First, the data 
used in this study is secondary, with its attended measurement errors. Future 
research projects could use primary data to test the model further and confirm the 
147 
 
preliminary empirical results gathered in this research.  Second, there may exist 
other context-based factors that could further explain public attitudes and intentions 
towards the adoption and use of mobile money. A fruitful direction for additional 
research would be to examine the earlier stages of the adoption process and to 
incorporate additional data to capture the responses of those individuals who may 
discontinue the use of mobile money after initially trying it. Finally, the results of 
this study pertain only to the African society, which is characterised by a very high 
penetration rate of mobile phones that defies the local lack of infrastructure and 
poverty levels.  With availability of data, further empirical studies that include 
cross-cultural settings (with similar characteristics such as poverty, low electricity 
coverage, and lack of regulation) could widen the knowledge of the near future 




















Conclusion and recommendation 
5.1 Summary of main findings and policy prescriptions 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018) contend that about 1.7 billion adults remain unbanked 
globally, where they have no accounts at a financial institution or through a mobile 
money provider. Of this total, 95% are from developing economies. This constitutes 
an overwhelming number of people who are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty 
from which they struggle to escape. The promise of financial inclusion is that when 
people avail themselves of it, they liberate themselves from poverty by equipping 
themselves with the necessary tools that aid them to overcome poor income levels 
and other seasonal shocks (Demirgüç-Kunt & Singer, 2017). For instance, the 
availability of financial services enables people to accumulate savings and to 
increase their spending on necessities such as food and shelter. It also facilitates 
investments in health, education, and businesses (Armendariz & Morduch, 2007; 
Collins et al., 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018; Jack & Suri, 2011). Given these 
obvious advantages, a question arises: why will people do not avail themselves of 
these benefits? 
This study has identified a range of plausible reasons. Access to finance is usually 
hampered by the consumer’s lack of money, distance to service frontiers, and costs 
of delivery. Other factors include the consumer’s lack of required documentation 
(which includes rigid Know-Your-Customer rules), religion, and cultural 
complexities about the roles of gender in society. Low educational qualifications 
and unemployment are other key reasons. In terms of digital financial services 
provision, the lack of technological infrastructure, dwelling in rural areas, and 
illiteracy are factors that reduce the intentions of people to adopt and use digital 
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financial services such as mobile money (Allen et al., 2016; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Honohan, 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2008; Demirguc-Kunt 
et al., 2018; Donovan, 2012). 
The three essays set out to determine the reasons why people are still out of the 
formal financial system when available evidence shows that they are better off with 
financial inclusion. Each essay focused on the following topics respectively in 
relation to financial inclusion:  political instability, informal financial 
intermediation, and mobile money adoption. The main empirical findings of the 
thesis are: 
5.1.1 The relationship between political instability and financial inclusion 
Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa indicates that political instability 
positively correlates with lower degrees of financial inclusion with higher levels of 
persistence. A lack of documentation required by formal financial institutions is a 
major barrier to financial inclusion. Inefficient mechanisms to determine real 
interest rates, corruption, oil reliance, unemployment and religious tensions also 
negatively affect financial inclusion. Finally, the proposed political stability 
threshold level that will trigger financial inclusion in the MENA region is -0.960 
5.1.2 The impact of formal financial inclusion on informal financial 
intermediation and cash preference.  
 
Evidence from Africa suggests that financial inclusion, based on the use of formal 
financial intermediaries, strongly correlates with the use of informal financial 
intermediaries. This association is complementary rather than one being a substitute 
for the other; that is, the use of formal financial inclusion does not reduce the use 
of informal financial intermediaries such ROSCAs and family and friends. 
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However, the use of formal financial intermediaries significantly reduces the 
preference for holding cash in financial and business activities. A further empirical 
investigation finds that governments of Africa (especially those within the SSA) 
pay cash to poverty relief support beneficiaries instead of using bank accounts or 
mobile money. 
5.1.3 Does electricity supply and regulation affect people’s attitudes and 
intentions to use mobile money in Africa?  
 
The thesis finds that the availability of electricity is an important factor for the functionality 
of mobile phones and affects people’s attitudes and intentions to adopt and use mobile 
money.  Enabling regulation also has a significant correlation with individuals’ attitudes 
and intentions to adopt and use mobile money. The thesis also finds that inexpensive 
service costs positively correlates with peoples’ attitudes and intentions to use mobile 
money. However, rural dwelling is found to be negatively correlated with individuals’ 
attitudes and intentions to adopt and use mobile money because of limited infrastructure in 
rural areas. 
The empirical findings of this thesis suggest the following prescriptions for policy: 
1. The evidence from the aforementioned discussion on the possible causes of 
political instability in the MENA region indicates that there are numerous variables 
with which to contend. The limited variables used in this thesis include economic 
issues such as unemployment, especially among the youth, over-dependence on oil 
and other petrochemical exports to the neglect of other economic activities, social 
change in terms of globalisation and religious extremism, governance issues, and 
corruption. If left unaddressed, all these variables can lead to popular disaffection 
and protests with extreme consequences (Hibbs, 1973; Ross, 2001). Although these 
variables cannot be resolved in the short term, a long-term strategic direction and 
plan is needed, where each issue is prioritised according to the degree of danger it 
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poses to the wellbeing of society and the plans drawn to tackle them at the 
grassroots level. An example is the long-term conscious effort to tackle the 
development of young minds through the curriculum by instilling positive mindsets 
about the need to be economically self-independent. This, together with a range of 
medium term endeavours tackle unemployment and open up the economy, free 
people’s interactions and associations, and allow market forces to determine the 
prices of goods and services are through which “economic development for all” can 
be achieved. When these objectives are achieved, there is a greater likelihood of 
political stability, which will foster financial inclusion and ultimately lead to 
economic development.  
2. Informal financial intermediation is a cultural phenomenon that has a long history 
of resilience and success. Informal financial intermediation has become part of the 
cultural fabric of people in Africa, especially those living in rural areas (Aryeetey 
& Udry, 1995). People form cooperatives based on their social and religious needs, 
and modernisation and technology (such as banks and mobile money respectively) 
should enhance these cooperatives rather than eliminate them. Evidence shows that 
cooperatives such as family and friends, ROSCAs and savings clubs, Tontines, 
various stokvels, and moneylenders have contributed to the economic wellbeing of 
rural Africa through education, health and shelter. The common problem of 
cooperatives is that they are not standardised and harmonised. This thesis therefore 
recommends that policy makers should place greater efforts toward understanding 
how these cooperatives work and to take steps toward standardising and 
harmonising their operations in the interests of extending financial inclusion.  
3. Digital payments offer a feasible solution to problems of corruption when African 
governments make cash payments. Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar (2016) 
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find that in in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, the leakage of funds for pension 
payments dropped by 47% when the payments were made through biometric smart 
cards rather than in cash. Currently, governments of Africa are still handing cash 
out to poverty relief beneficiaries despite the availability of mobile money 
technologies throughout the African region. The pervasiveness of cash payments 
allows corruption to thrive and to enrich the elites to the detriment of the 
beneficiaries. Corruption costs African governments billions of dollars each year 
while hampering economic growth and development, and, in turn, the living 
standards of citizens. The improved accountability of digital payments may offer 
governments of Africa an answer to combat corruption while still providing 
financial relief to the poor and the vulnerable.  
4. The issue of energy supply must be resolved to facilitate the diffusion of mobile 
money, especially in rural areas of Africa. Overhead costs in rural Africa, where 
the national grid system is unavailable, are higher than in regions that have access 
the national grid and energy. Evidence of the distances people travel to charge their 
mobile devices for mobile money indicates that travel expenses increase their 
overhead costs per use. Coupled with the lack of mobile network infrastructure, this 
can become a disincentive for adopting and using mobile money. The thesis 
recommends that policy makers and private providers of mobile money can come 
together to adopt the “build-once approach”, where they lay wires under new roads 
and share poles and pylons for their wires that carry electricity and mobile networks.  
5. Regulation is also paramount for financial inclusion. Effective regulation of 
financial institutions and mobile money providers provide people with the trust and 
stability they require to subscribe to these institutions. As enabling regulation 
provide avenues for clients-providers redress, it is imperative for policy makers to 
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“watch the watcher” in a positive and independent environment without 
unnecessary interference so that the stability of the financial system will be 
enhanced. Third world countries such as African nations constantly and 
unnecessarily interfere in the conduct of monetary policy regulations that has led to 
undesired consequences of bank runs, lack of trust in and the instability of the 
financial system, which leads to the financial exclusion of previously included 
people. This thesis contends that African politicians should not interfere 
unnecessarily in the monitoring and supervision functions of central banks in order 
to allow those mandated to ensure the stability of the financial system to do so in a 
free and independent environment.   
6. Financial inclusion also entails financial education and better protection of 
consumers. Financial institutions need to understand that financial education of 
clients is part of their investment, not an expense. The major part of financial 
inclusion is for people to understand how banks and all providers work and how 
products and services work. This will lead to better clients who will pay their loans 
and offer to be part of other financial services. Financial inclusion is “not just about 
opening a savings or deposit account”; many accounts of poor and low-income 
people opened in response to new initiatives across most developing countries have 
since remained inactive. Hence, such one-off actions do not contribute to effective 
financial inclusion. Central to this is a better understanding of what clients need and 
how financial services can be made available to them in ways that align with how 
they live their lives. This calls for paradigm shift and approaches that put clients at 
the centre of financial inclusion. Clients will not only access services but also use 
them continuously and effectively to improve their lives. 
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5.2 Summary of hypotheses  
The thesis tested a number of hypothesis especially in chapters two and four, which 
were either confirmed or rejected depending on the estimation analysis conducted. 
In this section, the hypotheses are summarised in Table 5.1 and indicated whether 
a particular hypothesis is either confirmed or rejected. If an estimation result and 
analysis signify that the coefficients of some hypotheses are not significant, these 
hypotheses are rejected as well. In chapter two, there were two hypotheses that were 
tested and confirmed without any rejection. For chapter four, there were a total of 
sixteen hypotheses for which ten were confirmed, three outright rejections and three 
others whose coefficients were not significant and therefore rejected. Table 5.1 
contains all the summary of the hypotheses and the final confirmation or rejection.  
Table 5. 1 Summary of hypotheses 
Chapter  hypothesis Accepted  Rejected  
 
Two  





𝑯𝟐 : Individual levels barriers can lead to lower 









Four   
𝑯𝟏 : There is a positive relationship between 
individual attitude towards adoption and the 




𝑯𝟐𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived usefulness (ubiquity/grid) and 





𝑯𝟐𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived usefulness (ubiquity/grid) and 




𝑯𝟑𝒂 : There is a negative relationship between 
perceived costs and attitudes towards 




𝑯𝟑𝒃 : There is a negative relationship between 





𝑯𝟒 : There is a negative relationship between 
perceived female and attitudes towards 





𝑯𝟓 : There is a negative relationship between 
perceived old age and attitudes towards 
adoption of mobile money. 
 
  
𝑯𝟔𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived income disparity (rich) and attitudes 
towards adoption of mobile money. 
 
NS -  
 
𝑯𝟔𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived income disparity (rich) and the 
perceived usefulness (ubiquity) of mobile 
money. 
 
NS -  
 
𝑯𝟔𝒄 : There is a negative relationship between 
perceived income disparity (poor) and attitudes 
to adopt and use mobile money. 
 
NS -  
 
𝑯𝟕𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived education levels and attitudes to 




𝑯𝟕𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived education levels and enabling 




𝑯𝟕𝒄 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived education levels and perceived 




𝑯𝟖 : There is a negative relationship between 
perceived rural dwelling and attitudes to adopt 




𝑯𝟗𝒂 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived enabling regulation and attitudes 




𝑯𝟗𝒃 : There is a positive relationship between 
perceived enabling regulation and the intention 




Note: NS = not significant 
 
5.3 Thesis contributions  
This thesis explores three empirically related topics, seeking to unravel the 
determinants of financial inclusion in Africa and the Middle East. It adds to the 
body of research on financial inclusion by reiterating the important factors that 
determine financial inclusion and which increase inclusive economic growth. The 
following are the main contributions made to the extant literature on the 
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determinants of financial inclusion in Africa, which are applicable to other 
developing regions of the world.  
1. Using a unique global dataset developed by the World Bank for financial 
inclusion, political instability, and other variables respectively, Chapter Two of the 
thesis sought to understand the impact of political instability on financial inclusion 
in the MENA region. The findings from the chapter reveal that political instability 
does lower the levels of financial inclusion in the region after being able to resolve 
the issue of endogeneity of the variables of interest. This is a unique finding as it is 
the first paper to directly study how the political instability in the region affects 
economic variables, including financial inclusion. The chapter calculated the 
political stability threshold value that will trigger financial inclusion and economic 
development in the region to be -0.960. The chapter concludes that unemployment, 
religious tensions, corruption, and the regime’s grip of political and economic 
powers are the possible causes of political instability in the MENA region. 
2. The third chapter of the thesis reveals how the use of formal financial inclusion 
affects the use of informal financial intermediation and cash preference in Sub 
Saharan Africa. The paper attempts to understand why people use informal 
financial intermediation and questioned the asserted hypothesis (Nissanke & 
Aryeetey, 2008) that informal financial intermediation is exploitive and does not go 
beyond consumption. After careful consideration of the data and variables of 
interest, the findings reveal that the asserted hypotheses were not supported, and 
that formal financial intermediation complements the use of informal financial 
intermediation. The chapter further reveals that governments of Africa use cash to 
pay poverty relief beneficiaries instead of bank accounts or mobile money, which 
invariably defeats efforts for financial inclusion.  
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3. The fourth chapter provides evidence of why attitudes and intentions to adopt 
and use mobile money may not grow if electricity supply does not correspondingly 
improve. This is another unique contribution to the adoption literature that is silent 
about the functionality of phone devices used for mobile money vis-à-vis the supply 
of electricity. The findings reveal that in the end, the costs per unit use of mobile 
money may escalate, especially for rural dwellers who lack an adequate supply of 
electricity and need to travel long distances to charge their mobile phones. The 
chapter also finds that regulation is an important factor to consider when adopting 
mobile money for financial inclusion. The combination of innovation and sound 
regulation in financial services enables the private sector to improve economic 
opportunity and well-being for poor people in many countries. This is evidenced by 
the impact of mobile money on the poor of Africa. Effective regulation builds the 
trust of providers and users of the financial system and has the potential to enhance 
financial inclusion in Africa.  
4. Finally, the author looks at how enabling regulation and strategy can effectively 
lead to wider financial inclusion in Africa. The submission of the thesis is that local 
contexts and constant and efficient engagement with all stakeholders of the 
financial system are important factors to consider if effective financial inclusion in 
Africa, the Middle East and other developing regions of the world is to be achieved.  
5.4 Limitations of the thesis and directions for future studies 
 
Every research project comes with certain challenges that in one way or the other 
limited the full implementation of the initial design of the studies. These come in 
the form of methodological challenges, data limitations and prior studies that could 
have helped the researcher in his/her review of literature in order to lay the 
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foundations for the problems under investigation. The acknowledgment of these 
limitations is an overall appraisal of the research project and their impact on the 
initial design. This does not in any way negate the results of the project but allow 
future projects with similar designs to improve on the quality of their investigations.  
The following are some of the limitations encountered from the initiation to the 
final report of findings of the research project and future research directions are 
addressed after appraising these limitations. 
The issue of endogeneity and instrumental variables selection. The estimation of 
the first essay (chapter two) was not without the issue of endogeneity. Endogeneity 
refers to the condition in which an explanatory (endogenous, e.g. political 
instability) variable correlates with the error term, or at least one of the regressors 
is correlated with the residual and therefore cause inconsistent estimates 
(Wooldridge, 1995). This problem becomes apparent especially when researchers 
use coetaneous dependent and independent variables. Importantly, endogeneity 
issues can have different origins, and different methods exist to address them to 
ensure that results from the analysis are robust and statistically tenable. To resolve 
the endogeneity problem in the essay two of this thesis, the author resort to the use 
of instrumental variables (IVs) selection. However, working with secondary data 
poses the difficulty in the selection of instruments for some variables. For instance, 
there was the issue of selecting instruments for the political instability variable and 
the author has to spend a lot of time trying to get the appropriate instruments that 
would satisfy all the assumptions in instrumental variable selection.  The 
recommendation states that (1) an IV must be correlated with the endogenous 
variable and at the same time uncorrelated with unobserved factors that affect the 
residual or dependent variable.  (2) that when the IV changes, the endogenous 
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variable changes accordingly while the error term remains zero in average, so that 
the change in the residual would be useful information for inferring the coefficients 
of the endogenous variable. Though the IVs selected met these criteria and results 
are robust, there is a need for further analysis in the selection of IVs.  
Lack of direct prior research on the relation between mobile money and electricity 
was another limitation of the thesis. Prior research allows a review of what has been 
done in a particular study. This makes it easier to lay a foundation for understanding 
the research problem you are investigating. This applies to the fourth essay that 
investigated the attitudes and intentions of adopting mobile money and how 
electricity and regulation are important in this regard. Lack of prior research on the 
relation between electricity and mobile money adoption posed a challenge as to how 
to formulate hypotheses and constructs to reflect this current study. Nevertheless, 
the preliminary results provide the basis for future researches that wants to 
understand the drivers of mobile money in Africa and other developing countries 
vis-à-vis electricity and network infrastructure.       
The use of secondary data limited the investigation of some particular variables that 
provides important information about the issues under investigation. Data inhibited 
the author’s ability to conduct a thorough analysis of the results in some of the 
studies. For instance, one of the problems the second study looked at was the 
preference of cash use for economic transactions. The study needed an 
understanding of respondents’ experiences about why they may prefer to use cash 
for economic transactions instead of using accounts in formal financial institutions. 
However, the use of secondary data can only proxy for this experience and as such 
limit the author’s interpretation of the results. In essay four, similar data limitation 
was encountered. The construction of the instruments for analysis in the 
160 
 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was constraint by a lack of appropriate data 
for several variables. For instance, the study would have wished to use a survey 
data that reflect actual responses about the cost of mobile money, the availability of 
electricity and how it impacts on mobile money adoption, the perceived east of use 
of mobile money platform with respect to education and the overall perceived 
usefulness of mobile money to promote financial inclusion. However, for lack of 
data, proxies were used with the limited data gathered through secondary sources. 
This in a way limited the author’s ability to thoroughly conduct analysis and report 
causal relations among the key variables of interest.  
Future research directions coming from the appraisal of the limitations of the thesis 
are listed below; 
Because of the use of secondary data in essay two, certain experiences of 
respondents could only be studied using proxies. There is the need to use survey to 
assess the level at which political instability disrupts financial inclusion and 
economic growth in the MENA region in a longitudinal study. This will allow for 
a deeper understanding of the relations between political instability and financial 
inclusion, which for a very long time has been an issue for researchers.  
There is also the need to investigate why over 50% of MENA women do not have 
required documents needed by banks for account ownership and therefore rely on 
informal finance for their financial needs.  
In the second essay, the author investigated the use of informal and formal financial 
intermediaries in SSA, using proxies for a number of key variables of interests. 
There should be a survey to understand why households in SSA use both formal 
161 
 
and informal financial intermediaries, incorporating an examination of the local 
context of their decision into the investigation.  
A key result in the study found that governments in SSA use cash instead of banks 
to distribute relief funds in their welfare programmes. This defeats the clarion call 
for inclusive financial systems and the benefits that come with it. There is the need 
therefore, to further investigate what driving factors exist for a government decision 
to pay welfare relief transfers in cash instead of using accounts in formal financial 
institutions and mobile money.     
Furthermore, an investigation using survey data can be carried out to ascertain the 
reasons why households in SSA may prefer cash-based transactions to bank-based 
transactions.  
Finally, the third essay investigated the relations between individual attitudes and 
intentions, and the availability of electricity and enabling regulation in the adoption 
of mobile money in Africa. Though the study laid out a good foundation and 
provides preliminary results using secondary data and small sample, future research 
projects could use primary data to test the model further and confirm the 
preliminary empirical results gathered in this research.  
Lastly, what other context-based factors can further explain public attitudes and 
intentions towards the adoption and use of mobile money in SSA and other parts of 
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The enabling regulation for financial inclusion in Africa – issues 
and practices  
Extending access to financial inclusion for the poor and financially excluded is a 
top priority by the governments of Africa. This agenda will contribute to the 
sustainable long-term development of the economies of the African countries and 
lift the standards of living of low-income households. However, this agenda cannot 
be achieved without adequate regulation in the system.  According to Bester, de 
Koker, and Hawthorne (2003) regulation covers the market space, shapes its 
development, and seeks to control the behaviour of market players. Financial 
regulators are charged primarily with maintaining system stability. They determine 
who can enter and operate in the market and determine the cost implications, 
through compliance requirements, for providers. In addition, regulation determines 
the types of products or services as per the framework of the financial services 
industry. It sets out registration requirements for clients/consumers who are seeking 
direct access to the products and services (Falkena, Bamber, Llewellyn, & Store, 
2001). 
Regulatory arrangements have a powerful impact on competitive conditions overall 
and between subsectors of the system. Some regulatory structures are more likely 
to contribute to the ultimate objectives than others. Accordingly, regulation has the 
capacity to do great harm, including being inefficient by imposing unwarranted 
costs on regulated institutions (Falkena et al., 2001). Similarly, the absence of 
regulation can create market uncertainty, and thus drive the evolution of the market 
in a particular direction, where the outcome can lead to financial exclusion 
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(Porteous, 2006). Falkena et al. (2001) noted that effective regulation could be 
formulated when six “ideal conditions” are satisfied: 
 the financial system is based on subsets of specialist financial 
institutions, each conducting a narrow range of business, so that 
there is a reasonably precise parallel between function and institution; 
 the structure of the financial system and the business operations of 
financial institutions are reasonably stable; 
 the moral suasion of the regulatory agencies is universally accepted; 
 the business of financial firms is predominantly domestic in nature; 
 competitive pressures in the financial system are weak; and 
 simple and limited objectives of regulation are set.  
The more actual conditions move away from these “ideal conditions”, the more 
complex and challenging the regulatory process becomes. For regulation to be 
effective (in that it contributes to its objectives) as well as cost efficient, it has to 
adapt and respond to changes in institutional and market circumstances (Falkena et 
al., 2001). The financial system of many countries is undergoing periods of 
structural changes. The system is subjected to the combined impact of internal 
competition, global competitive pressures, changes in regulation, new technology, 
and the fast-evolving strategic objectives of financial institutions.  
The financial sector adjustment programme (FINSAP), as part of the 1980s and 
1990s structural adjustment programme (SAP) of the World Bank and IMF, saw 
many changes to the African financial landscape. Apparently, these changes in 
regulation opened up the banking sector by reforming distressed banks, abandoning 
the interest rates caps, deregulating the credit control policies by allowing market-
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oriented lending, and promulgating new legislation that would allow for effective 
prudential supervision (Easterly, 2005; Falkena et al., 2001; Heidhues & Obare, 
2011; Hugon, 1990; Riddell, 1992). The purpose of FINSAP was to make the 
African financial sector competitive with their counterparts in developed economies, 
but this has not been achieved over the years.  
Effective regulation cannot secure its objectives in the absence of efficient 
supervision and enforcement. This in effect is where African financial regulators 
are missing. The process of regulation consists of two basic activities: the provision 
of guidance and the imposition of constraints. The guidance mechanism consists of 
timely information, the sharing of rules and regulations regarding the banking 
sector, and effective monitoring and supervision of the constant evolution of 
activities in the market. The constraints process, on the other hand, has to do with 
enforcement of the law in matters that border on consumer protection and with the 
activities of the market players that seem to be reckless and unwarranted.  
Challenges of regulators  
Financial services are undoubtedly the most regulated sector in the economies of 
Africa. However, the sector also faces more challenges as it constantly evolves due 
to innovation and changes in societal responsibilities. According to Porteous (2006), 
innovation in financial services is a double-edged sword for regulators, where 
regulators have to keep a balance between ensuring the stability of the system and 
promoting new ways of doing things. Although innovation represents the possibility 
for greater efficiency, it has a tendency of disrupting older processes too. 
As a result of the 2007 global financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis in 1998, 
as well as the aftermath of the 2011 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Centre in 
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the US, the global banking industry and governments have instituted international 
codes and standards as a way of stabilising and standardising the banking system. 
The challenge for local regulators is how to apply these international standards 
without dislocating the priorities set for the local system. The costs of compliance 
could be high, which can have adverse consequences for local access.  Regulatory 
costs exhibit economies of scale and thus smaller banks face higher average costs 
than larger banks in complying with regulations (Christen et al., 2003; Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2003; Elliehausen & Kurtz, 1988; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 
2007). This is the case for Africa, where most financial institutions, such as non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and MFIs, are smaller. The costs associated with 
compliance such as start-up costs and the expertise for conducting prudential 
returns can disrupt their operations (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003). Additionally, 
formal financial services providers are required to increase eligibility requirements 
such as customer due diligence (CDD) and know-your-customer (KYC), the anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT). These 
requirements subsequently leave more individuals unbanked especially in the 
developing world (Porteous, 2006).  
A typical issue in regulation concerns with the accommodation of new institutional 
types. This comes as a result of the broadening of access to finance characterised 
by the introduction of microcredit, which results in the formation of MFIs across 
the developing world including Africa. The challenge faced by regulators has been 
how to regulate these new institutions (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2011; 
Porteous, 2006). Many countries in Africa, especially in SSA, have developed 
regulatory frameworks for MFIs by creating the tier system (charter). For example, 
Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and a host of others have initiated the tier 
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system, where mainstream banks are in the tier 1 category. Other financial 
institutions such as savings and loans services, NBFIs and MFIs are placed in tiers 
2, 3 or 4 respectively or in whatever category a particular institution is classified. 
The major challenge has been the prudential reporting standards for the tiers. There 
seems to be a one-size-fits-all system of reporting that has created a number of 
issues, especially for MFIs whose forms of operations inherently involve making 
small loans to large numbers of borrowers, and other social capital costs (Cull et al., 
2011). 
Another example of challenges faced by financial sector regulation is the 
introduction of mobile based financial services innovation that has come to play a 
strong force in the access frontier (Dolan, 2009). The pioneering introduction of M-
PESA by the Kenyan telecommunication giant, Safaricon in the past decade has 
marked a milestone in using technology to broaden access to financial services to 
low income individuals. Although it is a great initiative, it has forced the regulators 
of the financial industry to consider how to balance the regulatory challenge (Mas 
& Morawczynski, 2009) posed by mobile money vendors. The risks associated with 
the new system (Dolan, 2009), where most countries have yet to consider tailored 
regulations for the innovation, is a concern for the stability of the financial sector. 
Reports of fraudsters (Mas & Morawczynski, 2009; Maurer, 2012) capitalising on 
the lack of proper regulations to guide the activities of both providers and users 
have seen more unsuspecting individuals, especially those with minimal levels of 
education, become victims and losing large sums of money in the process.  
The protection of customers’ vis-à-vis broadening access has also become a 
challenge to regulators. As the number of consumers increases, so too does the 
potential number of victims of unscrupulous dealings rise as a result of companies 
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or individuals seeking the largest share of profits. The promise of MFIs to broaden 
access for inclusive and shared growth have resulted in a change of priority to 
protecting the very individuals these MFIs promised to help. Porteous (2006) argues 
that the minimalist prescription of product information alone is not enough if clients 
lack the ability to process such information, especially first-time borrowers and 
those with little financial literacy. Regulators, in an effort to protect borrowers from 
high costs of credits, may introduce interest rates caps. Available evidence shows 
that this form of protection does have negative outcomes, where credit rationing 
results in limited access, which also defeats the purpose of protection, and 
broadening access (Cull et al., 2011). Defining, prohibiting, and monitoring 
excessive and reckless lending and borrowing is again an issue that constantly 
confronts regulators and policy makers in most African countries. 
To effectively regulate and affect broader financial inclusion, the issues raised in 
this piece are important for policy discourse. Efforts should be made to understand 
how to deal with these issues through policy and regulatory changes for the 









Financial inclusion in Africa and the world: The numbers 
Table 0-1 Appendix XA: Levels of financial inclusion through account 
ownership (bank account and mobile money) at the country level 
Country Adults with 
an account 
Country  Adults with 
an account 
Afghanistan 15% Ethiopia 35% 
Albania 40% Finland 100% 
Algeria 43% France 94% 
Argentina 49% Gabon 59% 
Armenia 48% Georgia 61% 
Australia 100% Germany 99% 
Austria 98% Ghana 58% 
Azerbaijan 29% Greece 85% 
Bahrain 83% Guatemala 44% 
Bangladesh 50% Guinea 23% 
Belarus 81% Haiti 33% 
Belgium 99% Honduras 45% 
Benin 38% Hong Kong SAR, China 95% 
Bolivia 54% Hungary 75% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 59% India 80% 
Botswana 51% Indonesia 49% 
Brazil 70% Iran, Islamic Rep. 94% 
Bulgaria 72% Iraq 23% 
Burkina Faso 43% Ireland 95% 
Cambodia 22% Israel 93% 
Cameroon 35% Italy 94% 
Canada 100% Japan 98% 
Central African Republic 14% Jordan 42% 
Chad 22% Kazakhstan 59% 
Chile 74% Kenya 82% 
China 80% Korea, Rep. 95% 
Colombia 46% Kosovo 52% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 26% Kuwait 80% 
Congo, Rep. 26% Kyrgyz Republic 40% 
Costa Rica 68% Lao PDR 29% 
Côte d'Ivoire 41% Latvia 93% 
Croatia 86% Lebanon 45% 
Cyprus 89% Lesotho 46% 
Czech Republic 81% Liberia 36% 
Denmark 100% Libya 66% 
Dominican Republic 56% Lithuania 83% 
Ecuador 51% Luxembourg 99% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33% Macedonia, FYR 77% 
El Salvador 30% Madagascar 18% 
Estonia 98% Malawi 34% 
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Malaysia 85% Tajikistan 47% 
Mali 35% Tanzania 47% 
Malta 97% Thailand 82% 
Mauritania 21% Togo 45% 
Mauritius 90% Trinidad and Tobago 81% 
Mexico 37% Tunisia 37% 
Moldova 44% Turkey 69% 
Mongolia 93% Turkmenistan 41% 
Montenegro 68% Uganda 59% 
Morocco 29% Ukraine 63% 
Mozambique 42% United Arab Emirates 88% 
Myanmar 26% United Kingdom 96% 
Namibia 81% United States 93% 
Nepal 45% Uruguay 64% 
Netherlands 100% Uzbekistan 37% 
New Zealand 99% Venezuela, RB 73% 
Nicaragua 31% Vietnam 31% 
Niger 16% West Bank and Gaza 25% 
Nigeria 40% Zambia 46% 
Norway 100% Zimbabwe 55% 
Pakistan 21%   
Panama 46%   
Paraguay 49%   
Peru 43%   
Philippines 34%   
Poland 87%   
Portugal 92%   
Romania 58%   
Russian Federation 76%   
Rwanda 50%   
Saudi Arabia 72%   
Senegal 42%   
Serbia 71%   
Sierra Leone 20%   
Singapore 98%   
Slovak Republic 84%   
Slovenia 98%   
South Africa 69%   
South Sudan 9%   
Spain 94%   
Sri Lanka 74%   
Sweden 100%   
Switzerland 98%   
Taiwan, China 94%   
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Table 0-2 Appendix XB: Three-year interval accounts growth (banks and mobile money) among individual characteristics in the regions 

































2011 Arab world 22% 30% 14% 15% 26% 14% 31% 16% 26% 11% 
2014 Arab world 30% 38% 22% 21% 34% 21% 39% 23% 35% 19% 
2017 Arab world 37% 48% 26% 21% 43% 26% 49% 28% 43% 28% 
2011 East Asia & Pacific 60% 62% 58% 54% 61% 51% 73% 46% 69% 53% 
2014 East Asia & Pacific 72% 74% 70% 63% 74% 64% 81% 65% 76% 69% 
2017 East Asia & Pacific 74% 76% 71% 69% 75% 64% 85% 63% 81% 71% 
2011 Europe & Central Asia 69% 73% 66% 51% 73% 49% 75% 68% 70% 60% 
2014 Europe & Central Asia 78% 79% 76% 60% 81% 57% 82% 74% 80% 76% 
2017 Europe & Central Asia 81% 84% 79% 64% 85% 68% 85% 76% 85% 79% 
2011 Latin America & Caribbean 39% 44% 35% 27% 44% 30% 46% 24% 50% 34% 
2014 Latin America & Caribbean 52% 55% 49% 38% 57% 43% 58% 41% 59% 49% 
2017 Latin America & Caribbean 55% 59% 52% 40% 60% 44% 61% 43% 63% 53% 
2011 Low income 13% 16% 11% 9% 16% 8% 23% 7% 17% 12% 
2014 Low income 23% 26% 20% 17% 26% 18% 35% 14% 29% 20% 
2017 Low income 35% 40% 30% 31% 37% 29% 50% 26% 41% 32% 
2011 Lower middle income 29% 34% 23% 22% 32% 23% 40% 20% 35% 26% 
2014 Lower middle income 42% 48% 36% 34% 45% 31% 53% 32% 48% 41% 
2017 Lower middle income 58% 63% 53% 49% 61% 50% 66% 51% 63% 58% 
2011 Developing 42% 47% 37% 31% 45% 35% 53% 30% 50% 38% 
2014 Developing 55% 60% 51% 42% 59% 47% 65% 47% 61% 53% 
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2017 Developing 63% 67% 59% 53% 66% 54% 72% 54% 69% 62% 
2011 Middle East & North Africa 38% 47% 28% 28% 42% 26% 47% 31% 42% 28% 
2017 Middle East & North Africa 48% 57% 38% 34% 52% 31% 61% 40% 53% 39% 
2011 Middle income 43% 48% 39% 33% 46% 37% 54% 31% 52% 40% 
2014 Middle income 58% 62% 53% 45% 61% 50% 66% 49% 63% 56% 
2017 Middle income 65% 70% 61% 56% 68% 57% 73% 56% 71% 65% 
2011 North America 89% 92% 85% 78% 91% 63% 91% 80% 95% 88% 
2014 North America 94% 93% 95% 88% 95% 72% 95% 89% 98% 94% 
2017 North America 94% 94% 93% 88% 95% 67% 95% 87% 99% 93% 
2011 High income: OECD 90% 92% 88% 78% 93% 74% 93% 87% 93% 88% 
2014 High income: OECD 94% 94% 94% 84% 96% 80% 96% 91% 96% 94% 
2017 High income: OECD 95% 95% 94% 84% 96% 85% 96% 91% 97% 94% 
2011 South Asia 32% 40% 24% 24% 35% 27% 51% 24% 38% 31% 
2014 South Asia 47% 55% 38% 37% 50% 36% 60% 38% 52% 46% 
2017 South Asia 70% 75% 64% 60% 73% 63% 78% 66% 72% 69% 
2011 Sub-Saharan Africa 23% 26% 21% 17% 27% 12% 38% 13% 29% 19% 
2014 Sub-Saharan Africa 34% 39% 30% 26% 38% 23% 51% 24% 42% 30% 
2017 Sub-Saharan Africa 43% 48% 37% 37% 46% 31% 60% 32% 50% 39% 
2011 Upper middle income 57% 62% 52% 49% 59% 51% 65% 42% 67% 54% 
2014 Upper middle income 72% 74% 69% 60% 74% 67% 77% 64% 76% 71% 
2017 Upper middle income 73% 77% 69% 66% 75% 66% 80% 62% 80% 73% 
2011 World 51% 55% 47% 37% 54% 37% 66% 41% 57% 44% 
2014 World 62% 66% 58% 47% 66% 48% 73% 55% 67% 58% 
2017 World 69% 72% 65% 56% 72% 56% 79% 61% 74% 66% 


























































2011 Arab world 22% 30% 14% 15% 26% 14% 31% 16% 26% 11% 
2014 Arab world 29% 36% 21% 20% 33% 20% 38% 22% 34% 17% 
2017 Arab world 37% 48% 25% 20% 42% 26% 48% 27% 43% 28% 
2011 East Asia & Pacific 60% 62% 58% 54% 61% 51% 73% 46% 69% 53% 
2014 East Asia & Pacific 72% 74% 70% 63% 74% 64% 81% 65% 76% 69% 
2017 East Asia & Pacific 73% 76% 71% 68% 74% 64% 84% 63% 80% 70% 
2011 Europe & Central Asia 69% 73% 66% 51% 73% 49% 75% 68% 70% 60% 
2014 Europe & Central Asia 78% 79% 76% 60% 81% 56% 82% 74% 80% 76% 
2017 Europe & Central Asia 81% 84% 79% 63% 85% 68% 85% 76% 85% 79% 
2011 Latin America & Caribbean 39% 44% 35% 27% 44% 30% 46% 24% 50% 34% 
2014 Latin America & Caribbean 52% 55% 49% 38% 56% 43% 57% 41% 59% 48% 
2017 Latin America & Caribbean 54% 57% 51% 38% 60% 44% 60% 42% 62% 52% 
2011 Low income 13% 16% 11% 9% 16% 8% 23% 7% 17% 12% 
2014 Low income 17% 19% 15% 11% 20% 13% 27% 10% 22% 15% 
2017 Low income 24% 29% 21% 20% 27% 20% 35% 16% 30% 22% 
2011 Lower middle income 29% 34% 23% 22% 32% 23% 40% 20% 35% 26% 
2014 Lower middle income 41% 47% 34% 32% 44% 29% 52% 31% 47% 40% 
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2017 Lower middle income 56% 61% 52% 47% 60% 48% 65% 49% 61% 56% 
2011 Developing 42% 47% 37% 31% 45% 35% 53% 30% 50% 38% 
2014 Developing 54% 58% 50% 41% 58% 46% 64% 46% 60% 52% 
2017 Developing 61% 65% 57% 50% 65% 53% 70% 53% 67% 60% 
2011 Middle East & North Africa 38% 47% 28% 28% 42% 26% 47% 31% 42% 28% 
2017 Middle East & North Africa 47% 56% 38% 33% 52% 31% 61% 39% 52% 39% 
2011 Middle income 43% 48% 39% 33% 46% 37% 54% 31% 52% 40% 
2014 Middle income 57% 61% 53% 44% 61% 49% 65% 48% 62% 55% 
2017 Middle income 64% 68% 60% 54% 67% 56% 72% 56% 70% 64% 
2011 North America 89% 92% 85% 78% 91% 63% 91% 80% 95% 88% 
2014 North America 94% 93% 95% 88% 95% 72% 95% 89% 98% 94% 
2017 North America 94% 94% 93% 88% 95% 67% 95% 87% 99% 93% 
2011 High income: OECD 90% 92% 88% 78% 93% 74% 93% 87% 93% 88% 
2014 High income: OECD 94% 94% 94% 84% 96% 80% 96% 91% 96% 94% 
2017 High income: OECD 95% 95% 94% 83% 96% 85% 96% 91% 97% 94% 
2011 South Asia 32% 40% 24% 24% 35% 27% 51% 24% 38% 31% 
2014 South Asia 46% 54% 37% 36% 50% 35% 59% 37% 51% 46% 
2017 South Asia 68% 73% 64% 59% 72% 62% 76% 65% 71% 68% 
2011 Sub-Saharan Africa 23% 26% 21% 17% 27% 12% 38% 13% 29% 19% 
2014 Sub-Saharan Africa 29% 33% 25% 20% 33% 17% 46% 19% 36% 25% 
2017 Sub-Saharan Africa 33% 38% 27% 26% 36% 21% 50% 23% 39% 30% 
2011 Upper middle income 57% 62% 52% 49% 59% 51% 65% 42% 67% 54% 
2014 Upper middle income 72% 74% 69% 60% 74% 67% 77% 64% 76% 71% 
2017 Upper middle income 73% 77% 69% 65% 74% 65% 80% 62% 80% 73% 
2011 World 51% 55% 47% 37% 54% 37% 66% 41% 57% 44% 
2014 World 61% 65% 58% 46% 66% 47% 73% 54% 66% 57% 
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2017 World 67% 71% 64% 54% 71% 54% 77% 59% 72% 64% 





































































Afghanistan 1% 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Albania 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 6% 1% 1% 4% 0% 4% 2% 
Argentina 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 3% 2% 1% 3% 1% 3% 1% 
Armenia 10% 14% 6% 15% 4% 18% 8% 21% 8% 8% 11% 11% 
Burundi 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 4% 0% 1% 1% 
Benin 18% 25% 12% 21% 9% 19% 18% 11% 34% 14% 21% 16% 
Burkina Faso 33% 42% 24% 38% 23% 33% 34% 28% 52% 21% 41% 31% 
Bangladesh 21% 32% 10% 31% 13% 27% 19% 14% 26% 15% 26% 22% 
Bolivia 7% 9% 5% 7% 8% 11% 6% 2% 10% 7% 7% 7% 
Brazil 5% 5% 4% 7% 0% 5% 5% 1% 7% 2% 7% 4% 
Botswana 24% 29% 21% 34% 13% 28% 23% 9% 36% 12% 32% 22% 
Chad 15% 20% 11% 16% 14% 15% 15% 14% 28% 10% 19% 15% 
Cambodia 6% 6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 10% 5% 6% 5% 
Chile 19% 21% 16% 25% 8% 23% 18% 4% 24% 11% 24% 16% 
Cote d'Ivoire 34% 38% 30% 40% 23% 31% 36% 28% 53% 27% 39% 31% 
Cameroon 15% 17% 13% 18% 9% 16% 14% 9% 25% 7% 20% 11% 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
16% 19% 14% 19% 10% 15% 17% 8% 20% 12% 19% 14% 
Congo, Rep. 6% 9% 3% 9% 3% 7% 6% 6% 7% 6% 6% 8% 
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Colombia 5% 6% 4% 6% 2% 3% 5% 2% 6% 4% 5% 4% 
Developing 5% 7% 4% 7% 3% 7% 5% 3% 8% 3% 7% 5% 
Dominican 
Republic 
4% 6% 2% 5% 1% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 5% 
Ecuador 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 1% 4% 0% 5% 2% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2% 3% 1% 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 0% 3% 1% 
El Salvador 4% 5% 2% 4% 2% 5% 3% 2% 5% 2% 4% 4% 
Ethiopia 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 
Gabon 44% 46% 41% 49% 32% 49% 42% 31% 56% 37% 48% 36% 
Georgia 2% 4% 1% 4% 1% 3% 2% 0% 2% 1% 3% 2% 
Ghana 39% 44% 34% 42% 33% 37% 40% 33% 46% 32% 44% 35% 
Guinea 14% 18% 10% 16% 8% 17% 12% 10% 29% 12% 15% 10% 
Guatemala 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 1% 3% 1% 3% 2% 
Honduras 6% 10% 3% 9% 1% 6% 7% 5% 7% 6% 7% 6% 
Haiti 14% 16% 11% 20% 6% 12% 14% 6% 18% 7% 18% 11% 
Indonesia 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5% 3% 0% 6% 2% 4% 3% 
India 2% 3% 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 4% 1% 3% 1% 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
26% 31% 22% 33% 20% 34% 24% 8% 31% 20% 30% 23% 
Iraq 4% 7% 1% 6% 1% 4% 5% 4% 4% 3% 5% 3% 
Jamaica 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Jordan 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 1% 
Kenya 73% 77% 69% 78% 52% 70% 74% 57% 84% 59% 82% 73% 
Kyrgyz Republic 3% 4% 3% 4% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 0% 5% 3% 
Lebanon 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Liberia 21% 23% 18% 21% 19% 23% 19% 15% 33% 17% 24% 20% 





5% 7% 4% 7% 3% 6% 5% 3% 8% 3% 7% 5% 
Lesotho 28% 24% 31% 41% 20% 25% 29% 18% 47% 16% 36% 27% 
Madagascar 12% 12% 12% 13% 7% 13% 12% 9% 28% 9% 14% 10% 
Mali 24% 29% 20% 28% 16% 25% 24% 19% 42% 21% 27% 21% 
Malaysia 11% 13% 9% 13% 4% 16% 9% 8% 11% 10% 12% 8% 
Malawi 20% 23% 18% 23% 10% 21% 20% 14% 38% 10% 27% 19% 
Mauritania 4% 4% 4% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 5% 2% 
Mauritius 6% 7% 5% 8% 2% 8% 5% 3% 8% 4% 7% 6% 
Mexico 6% 7% 4% 8% 1% 12% 3% 1% 8% 2% 8% 4% 
Middle income 4% 5% 3% 5% 3% 6% 4% 2% 7% 3% 5% 4% 
Morocco 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 
Mongolia 22% 23% 21% 28% 12% 13% 25% 7% 27% 13% 28% 22% 
Mozambique 22% 27% 17% 26% 14% 26% 19% 16% 48% 12% 29% 18% 
Myanmar 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 2% 1% 1% 0% 
Namibia 43% 45% 42% 47% 35% 46% 42% 33% 49% 29% 53% 39% 
Niger 9% 12% 5% 13% 2% 7% 10% 8% 18% 7% 10% 7% 
Nigeria 6% 7% 4% 6% 4% 5% 6% 1% 9% 3% 7% 3% 
Nicaragua 4% 5% 3% 4% 3% 6% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Nepal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Pakistan 7% 13% 1% 12% 3% 7% 7% 4% 13% 3% 9% 6% 
Panama 4% 5% 2% 5% 1% 3% 4% 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% 
Paraguay 29% 31% 27% 33% 18% 23% 31% 21% 33% 22% 33% 27% 
Peru 3% 3% 2% 3% 1% 4% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Philippines 5% 5% 4% 5% 3% 4% 5% 2% 6% 1% 7% 2% 
Romania 3% 2% 4% 4% 2% 3% 3% 0% 4% 2% 4% 2% 
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Rwanda 31% 37% 26% 32% 26% 32% 31% 27% 58% 15% 42% 30% 
South Asia 4% 7% 2% 5% 3% 4% 4% 2% 7% 2% 6% 4% 
Senegal 32% 35% 29% 39% 22% 27% 35% 27% 43% 27% 35% 28% 
Singapore 10% 11% 8% 13% 2% 4% 11% 1% 12% 4% 13% 0% 
Sierra Leone 11% 14% 9% 10% 13% 11% 11% 7% 25% 7% 14% 8% 
Somalia 37% 42% 32% 46% 26% 41% 36% 32% 65% 27% 44% 30% 
Sri Lanka 2% 4% 1% 4% 1% 8% 1% 1% 4% 2% 3% 2% 
Tanzania 39% 44% 33% 45% 23% 37% 39% 33% 57% 30% 44% 38% 
Thailand 8% 11% 6% 9% 5% 16% 7% 1% 16% 3% 12% 5% 
Togo 21% 27% 16% 24% 16% 25% 20% 17% 30% 16% 25% 23% 
Tunisia 2% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
Turkey 16% 19% 14% 26% 5% 20% 15% 8% 21% 12% 19% 13% 
Uganda 51% 59% 43% 55% 35% 51% 50% 39% 66% 40% 58% 50% 
United Arab 
Emirates 
21% 23% 18% 23% 9% 10% 22% 9% 22% 16% 25% 14% 
Uruguay 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Venezuela, RB 11% 14% 8% 14% 1% 7% 12% 6% 12% 6% 14% 9% 
Vietnam 3% 3% 4% 4% 2% 8% 2% 1% 5% 1% 5% 2% 
World 4% 6% 3% 5% 3% 6% 4% 3% 6% 3% 5% 4% 
South Africa 19% 19% 19% 25% 9% 17% 20% 12% 22% 12% 24% 19% 
Zambia 28% 30% 26% 32% 19% 29% 27% 15% 41% 19% 34% 26% 
Zimbabwe 49% 51% 46% 52% 40% 43% 51% 32% 58% 40% 54% 43% 




Table 0-5 Appendix XE: Account ownership among countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
Country 












or less   
Account 
secondary  








60%   
Account 
rural   
Afghanistan 15% 23% 7% 10% 18% 9% 31% 14% 16% 15% 
Algeria 43% 56% 29% 29% 49% 39% 49% 35% 48% 44% 
Bahrain 83% 86% 75% 67% 85% 71% 84% 76% 87% 85% 
Chad 22% 29% 15% 18% 24% 18% 46% 14% 27% 21% 
Comoros 22% 26% 18% 7% 29% 13% 32% 11% 28% 20% 
Djibouti 12% 17% 9% 4% 16% 6% 22% 
  
8% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33% 39% 27% 14% 40% 32% 33% 20% 41% 29% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 94% 96% 92% 92% 95% 90% 95% 93% 94% 95% 
Iraq 23% 26% 20% 15% 26% 19% 28% 19% 25% 20% 
Jordan 42% 56% 27% 25% 51% 37% 45% 33% 49% 46% 
Kuwait 80% 83% 73% 70% 81% 28% 82% 71% 86% 61% 
Libya 66% 71% 60% 53% 70% 41% 69% 58% 71% 72% 
Lebanon 45% 57% 33% 25% 50% 31% 51% 30% 55% 44% 
Morocco 29% 41% 17% 16% 33% 23% 44% 19% 35% 20% 
Oman 74% 84% 64% 68% 77% 37% 76% 66% 79% 74% 
Pakistan 21% 35% 7% 15% 25% 16% 34% 14% 26% 19% 
Qatar 66% 69% 62% 64% 66% 32% 70% 54% 75% 53% 
Saudi Arabia 72% 81% 58% 54% 76% 65% 73% 65% 76% 79% 
Sudan 15% 20% 10% 10% 17% 7% 28% 8% 20% 13% 
Somalia 39% 44% 34% 43% 37% 33% 69% 27% 46% 32% 
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Syrian Arab Republic 23% 27% 20% 22% 24% 23% 24% 24% 23% 22% 
Tunisia 37% 46% 28% 23% 40% 24% 48% 21% 47% 28% 
Turkey 69% 83% 54% 56% 72% 57% 74% 56% 77% 65% 
United Arab Emirates 88% 93% 76% 60% 91% 71% 89% 83% 92% 80% 
West Bank and Gaza 25% 34% 16% 12% 33% 18% 28% 12% 34% 31% 
Yemen, Rep. 6% 11% 2% 2% 9% 4% 13% 4% 8% 6% 
Middle East & North Africa 48% 57% 38% 34% 52% 31% 61% 40% 53% 39% 
Arab world 37% 48% 26% 21% 43% 26% 49% 28% 43% 28% 
Source: @ Global Findex database 
